



# Baseline Report of a National Public Perception Survey on Reconciliation in Sri Lanka

2020 - 2021



**SRI LANKA  
BAROMETER**

OUR VOICES . OUR CHOICES

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எங்கள் குரல்கள் . எங்கள் தேர்வுகள்

**Baseline Report of a National Public Perception Survey  
on Reconciliation in Sri Lanka 2020 - 2021**

First Published in January 2022

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# Acronyms

CAPI	Computer Aided Personal Interviewing
CEPA	Centre for Poverty Analysis
CTF	Consultation Task Force
DS	District Secretariat
GiZ	German Technical Cooperation
GN	Grama Niladhari Division
HH	Household
HRC	Human Rights Commission
ICPPED	International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance
IJR	Institute for Justice and Reconciliation
LLRC	Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MoE	Margin of Error
OMP	Office on Missing Persons
ONUR	Office of National Unity and Reconciliation
OUSL	Open University of Sri Lanka
PPS	Proportionate to Population Size
PSU	Primary Sample Units
SRP	Strengthening Reconciliation Processes
SARB	South Africa Reconciliation Barometer
UNHCR	United Nations Human Rights Council
LPI	Lived Poverty Index

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# Executive Summary

This Baseline Report presents the findings from a nationally representative public opinion survey which is a part of the Sri Lanka Barometer, first conducted in 2020.

## The rationale for the Sri Lanka Barometer: Our Voices, Our Choices

Despite the many challenges, the end of the war in 2009 brought with it hope for reconciliation, the opportunity to rebuild war-affected communities and relationships, and to move forward. Both the State and civil society organisations initiated policy and programmatic efforts towards achieving reconciliation and social cohesion.

The Human Rights Council Resolution 30/1 of October 1, 2015 to promote reconciliation, accountability, and human rights in Sri Lanka was a significant step in this direction. However, a comprehensive approach to dealing with the past, incorporating the full range of judicial and non-judicial measures, did not happen as envisaged in the Resolution.

Since 2009, various key state-led reconciliation efforts include citizen consultations and recognition of their inputs to these processes. These include the 2010 Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) and several commissions of inquiry as well as the Consultation Task Force (CTF), which was another significant effort to

hear testimonials from across the country. The CTF and the approval of a National Policy for Reconciliation and Coexistence in 2018 led to the establishment by the Government of an Office on Missing Persons.

These processes included citizen consultation while the Diyawanna Declaration, launched in 2019 by the Select Committee of Parliament on Communal and Religious Harmony, was another state-led initiative recognised the importance of consulting citizens and called for a regular survey of opinions. While this was not undertaken, the Declaration recommended that these views be used to shape the direction of state initiatives on reconciliation.

Yet, many of the conditions that gave rise to the war remain, as do many of the obstructions faced by people directly affected by the war. The initial momentum towards reconciliation has also been hindered over time. Hence, there is a continuous need to feel the pulse of citizens and gain an understanding of how they view issues and experiences of reconciliation and social cohesion since the end of the war in 2009.

**“The Diyawanna Declaration of 2019 recognises the importance of consulting citizens and calls for a regular survey of opinions.”**



## Key Features of the Sri Lanka Barometer

The Sri Lanka Barometer aims to deepen the understanding of reconciliation and social cohesion in Sri Lanka in order to inform the public discourse and help decisionmakers to work towards its realisation over time.

It has been designed to represent diverse views on reconciliation and social cohesion, which are likely to change over time. It recognises that, reconciliation is multi-faceted, it is context specific, and encompasses a wider range of experiences, efforts, and opportunities.


The Sri Lanka Barometer comprises four key components:

1. An annual, island-wide public opinion survey using a quantitative methodology to measuring public perception.
2. A series of thematic studies using largely qualitative methodologies to explore related issues on reconciliation and social cohesion in more depth.
3. A set of discussion papers and concept notes on reconciliation and related issues.
4. An evidence-based outreach component to inform public discourse.

The Sri Lanka Barometer was initiated through “Strengthening Reconciliation Processes” (SRP), a four-year programme supporting government, non-government, and grassroots-level initiatives in their efforts to work towards reconciliation. Under the guidance of the Ministry of Justice, SRP is jointly funded by the European Union and the German Federal Foreign Office and implemented by German Technical Cooperation (GIZ) in Sri Lanka and the British Council.

Drawing from the valuable experience of the Institute of Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) in conducting the South Africa Reconciliation Barometer (SARB) over two decades has helped provide a foundation for the formulation of the Sri Lanka Barometer.

The Barometer is supported by a Consortium that include like-minded organisations working on reconciliation. In this phase of the Barometer, the Consortium include IJR, and the Centre for Poverty Analysis (CEPA). SRP is in discussion with the Open University of Sri Lanka to be part of the Consortium, with a more active engagement during the next phase of the project.



## Design of the Sri Lanka Barometer

The Sri Lanka Barometer conceptualises reconciliation through eight domains which, considered together, help explore reconciliation in Sri Lanka. The domains are:

- **Dealing with the past**
- **Justice for all**
- **Identity and belonging**
- **Interpersonal, social, and political trust**
- **Equal opportunity**
- **Active citizenship**
- **Accountable governance**
- **Security and wellbeing**

The Barometer Survey used a quantitative methodology, which enables the measurement of perceptions through the gathering and analysis of numerical data. Data was collected using a structured questionnaire as the research tool. It used a multi-stage random sampling technique and the systematic random sampling method. A representative sample of 3819 was completed between October and November 2020, allowing for a 95% confidence level and a Margin of Error of less than 2% nationally.

Psychometric testing and validation of the proposed indicators and their composite scales were done during the pilot and main study phases. The psychometric validation ensured that the measurement used in the Barometer is robust so that the substantive analysis employing these indicators is credible, valid, and reliable. The cleaned data set was weighted to population representation of districts, gender, and age characteristics using published population data of the 2012 Census conducted by the Department of Census and Statistics of Sri Lanka.



Figure i: Eight reconciliation domains in the Barometer

## Findings of the Sri Lanka Barometer Baseline Survey

Findings are presented in two ways, either as mean scores (a score from 1 to 10) for the composite indices or as frequencies for the single questions.




# RECONCILIATION IN SRI LANKA

The majority of Sri Lankans associate reconciliation with meanings that relate to unity and achieving a united Sri Lanka (37.6%). People feel that reconciliation is positive in general and good for Sri Lanka (23.3%). Overall, 11.3% feel that there is a lack of reconciliation. Some Sri Lankans also feel that the term does not give rise to any particular thought or that it has no meaning (9%). Sri Lankans have a neutral view (6.4) that progress has been made towards reconciliation. All the main ethnic and religious groups are neutral as are the scores by gender. At the same time there is a strong demand for reconciliation (8.1) among Sri Lankans, regardless of their location, gender, religion, or ethnicity.

Sri Lankans consider institutions to be important (7.4) in helping Sri Lankans deal with the impact of the armed conflict.

They do recognise that there are barriers to reconciliation, identifying the lack of political will and commitment (25.8%), nationalism (20.2%), divisive politics (17.8%) and religious and ethnic discrimination (9.3%) as critical barriers. Some people feel there are no barriers (4.2%) to reconciliation.



**Figure ii:** Demand for and views on progress towards reconciliation by ethnic group (mean)



## DOMAIN: DEALING WITH THE PAST

- Sri Lankans at national level (7.5), and similarly by gender - males (7.4) and females (7.5) - consider dealing with the past in the context of the war as important. People in the Northern (8.4) and Eastern (8) provinces have the strongest views on its importance.
- People of all the main ethnic groups recognise the importance of dealing with the past, with Tamils (8.1) reporting the highest levels of importance, followed by Sinhalese (7.4) and Muslims (7.3).
- Sri Lankans (7.4) agree that it is important to recognise past injustices related to the armed conflict. People in the Northern (8.6), the Eastern (7.9) and Uva (7.7) provinces reported higher levels of recognition of past injustices.
- People are neutral (6.8) towards memorialisation at the national level. Provincially, there is a higher level of agreement about memorialisation from people in the Northern (8.3) and Eastern (7.5) provinces.
- The key justifications for reparations by Sri Lankans include the loss of income (25.3%), forced evictions (22.7%), and loss of communal land and property (21%). Some feel that compensation should be provided for victims and families of those who had disappeared, gone missing, held in detention without trial, and been tortured (12.3%).
- Nationally, political influence and interference (31.8%) is considered the most significant barrier to dealing with the past. Some also identify the lack of political will to deal with the past (7.9%) as another barrier in addition to other issues such as not addressing issues in a post-war context (12.5%), lack of management and help from government (8.7%), and racisms (6.7%).





Figure iii: Barriers to dealing with the past – At national level, first mention (%)



## DOMAIN: JUSTICE FOR ALL

- The biggest barriers to justice for victims of the armed conflict and are perceived as the lack of political will (29%), corruption/unstable economy (13%), political influence/political interference (11%), unnecessary delays/stalling of legal processes (6%); and perpetrators getting away without consequences (5%).
- Sri Lankans are not in agreement with the use of violence against civilians (2.8). People in all the provinces, but more strongly in the Northern Province (1.8), disagreed or strongly disagreed about using violence against civilians. Both females (2.8) and males (2.7) oppose the use of violence against civilians.





Figure iv: Biggest barriers to justice – At national level, first mention (%)




## DOMAIN: **IDENTITY AND BELONGING**

- Sri Lankans are in agreement (7.9) of the importance of a Sri Lankan identity and the possibility of constructing one. These views are held equally by males (7.9) and females (7.9) and are the strongest from the minorities and from those in the Northern (8.3) and Eastern (8.2) provinces.
- People identify most strongly with others who are of their ethnic group (24.7%) than other social groups. While 7.4% identified with people of their own language group, 14.2% identified as

Sri Lankans. One in ten people said that they did not identify with any group, while others said they identified with people based on religion (8%) and with those who are poor (8%). Only 1.3% identified with people of the same caste as themselves.

- People feel that the main basis on which people discriminate against other people include economic status (28.1%), ethnicity (26.9%), religion (10.4%), and language (8.4%).



**Figure v:** Perception on the importance of creating a Sri Lankan Identity – national and provincial levels (mean)



DOMAIN:  
**INTERPERSONAL, SOCIAL,  
 AND POLITICAL TRUST**

- Most Sri Lankans (64.3%) trust the people who live in the same neighbourhood/vicinity to some extent; 13.3% do not trust their neighbours very much; and 6.3% do not have any trust in their neighbours. Meanwhile 13.5% and 2.5% of people say that they have quite a lot of trust and a great deal of trust respectively in their neighbours.
- When considering social trust, people in Sri Lanka are distrusting of people who belong to different social groups from themselves (4.6). Geographically, people in the Southern (4.1), North Central (4.2), Eastern (4.3), Sabaragamuwa (4.6), North Western (4.6) and Western (4.6) provinces are most distrusting of members of other

social groups. People in the Northern Province (5.4) are the most trusting. Minority ethnic groups - Tamils (5) and Muslims (5.3) - are more trusting towards people of other social groups than the Sinhalese (4.5). By gender also, there are feelings of distrust towards people who belong to different social groups (males – 4.7 and females – 4.5).

- Sri Lankans (6.1) have moderate levels of political trust or trust in institutions. People in the Northern (5.1) and Eastern (5.3) provinces have less political trust than people in other provinces. People in the Southern Province (5.9) also have less trust of political institutions than others.

0.0 - Not at all trusting  
 2.5 - Distrusting  
 5.0 - Neither trusting nor distrusting  
 7.5 - Trusting  
 10 - Very Trusting





Figure vi: Social trust at national and provincial Levels (mean)




## DOMAIN: **EQUAL OPPORTUNITY**

- At the national level, people are mostly neutral (6.2) in views about whether everyone had equal opportunities. The Uva Province (7) was the only province that held a different view, leaning more towards agreement that people have equal opportunities in the country.
- By ethnic group, the Sinhalese are more neutral (6.2), while Muslims (5.4) and Tamils (5.8) have lower levels of agreement that all groups received equal opportunity.
- People in the estate sector (5.9) perceive slightly lower levels of equality of opportunity as compared to those in urban (6.1) and rural communities (6.2) who agreed that there is equality of opportunity.
- By gender, males (6.2) and females (6.2) have similar neutral views on equal opportunity.



**Figure vii:** Equal opportunity by ethnic group (mean)







## DOMAIN: **ACTIVE CITIZENSHIP**

- Active citizenship amongst Sri Lankans is 2.2, where many say they have never been active citizens, but would, if they had the opportunity. A similar pattern is seen by gender – males (2.5) and females (2).
- People in the Southern (1.8), North Central (1.8) and Sabaragamuwa (1.7) provinces are the least likely to engage in civic action. In comparison, people in the Northern Province (5.6) are the most active.
- When considering ethnicity, Tamils (4) and Muslims (2.8) are more likely to have engaged in or are willing to engage in civic participation than Sinhalese (2).
- People feel they have moderate levels of political efficacy (6.5), with similar views evident across gender and all ethnic and religious groups.

**0.0** - No, and would never do it  
**2.5** - No, but would if had opportunity  
**5.0** - Once or twice  
**7.5** - Often  
**10** - Regularly



**Figure viii:** Active citizenship at national and provincial levels (mean)



## DOMAIN: ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNANCE

- This domain considers the opportunities people have to participate in shaping governance, aspects of respect for diversity, and access to economic and political power. Sri Lankans have a neutral (6.8) view towards respecting others. People from the Northern (7.6), Uva (7.6), and Eastern (7.4) provinces agree more than others when it comes to respecting others..
- Nearly half of all Sri Lankans (43.3%) believe that a small group of political and business elites from all communities have the most economic

power while 33% think that such power is concentrated in the Sinhala community (majority and elites), while 23% feel that this power resides in a small group of elites from Muslim communities.

- In contrast, more than two-thirds of Sri Lankans believe that the Sinhala majority (59.6%) and a small group of Sinhala elites (8.5%) has the most political power. Meanwhile 30.1% thinks that this power is accumulated within a small group of political and business elites from all communities.




Figure ix: Who has the most economic and political power? – At national level (%)



## DOMAIN: SECURITY AND WELLBEING

- Perception of relative household well-being is 7.5, indicating people feel their wellbeing is somewhat better than that of other households. Provincially, people in most provinces indicate being relatively better off than other families in the rest of the country. Those directly affected by conflict in the Eastern (5.8), Northern (6.1) and North Central (6.6) provinces feel their households are at the same level of wellbeing when compared to other households. Muslims (6.8) and Tamils (6.2) feel their relative wellbeing is lower than the Sinhalese (7.7).
- The lived-poverty index, capturing perceptions on having gone without access to a broad range of basic needs, is 1.4 (never or once or twice). By province, the Northern (2), Southern (1.8), Uva (1.7), and Central (1.6) provinces have scores over the national average. By gender, males (1.4) and females (1.3) also have similar scores.
- The biggest threats to household wellbeing are the inability to earn an adequate income (26.4%), the high cost of living/ economic issues (16.4%), and the Covid-19 pandemic and its impacts (8.8%).
- Nationally, access to basic services was rated as being somewhat easy (6.4). While the Western Province leads as expected in ease of access to basic services and is higher than the national average, no province rates access to basic services as extremely difficult or extremely easy.
- Access to auxiliary services is considered more difficult at the national level (5.3), with people in most provinces indicating that it is somewhat difficult, while those in the Northern Province indicating it is difficult (4.1).




Figure x: Personal and community safety by ethnic group (mean)



DOMAIN:  
**SECURITY AND  
WELLBEING (cont.)**

- At the national level, people feel that the state is somewhat responsive (7.7) towards their needs. Provincially, Eastern (8.5), Northern (8.1) and Southern (8) provinces assessed the state officials as somewhat responsive, with levels higher than the national average. By gender, females (7.9) and males (7.5) are also of the view that the state is somewhat responsive.
- Nationally, people are neutral (6.6), with no differences in views by gender (females – 6.6 and males – 6.6), when asked about personal safety; people in the Northern (5) and North Central (5.5) provinces fall on the lower spectrum of neutral. Tamils (5.9) and Sinhalese (6.6) are more neutral on the issue than Muslims (7.1).
- With regards to community safety, people’s views nationally (8.5) are between feeling somewhat safe and very safe. Provincially, people in the Northern (5.2) and Eastern (6.2) provinces feel the least safe. Sinhalese (8.9) and Muslims (7.6) claim to have a higher level of community safety than Tamils (6.1).




# The Way Forward

- With the launch of the baseline report the Barometer secretariat has achieved a major milestone after almost three years of preparations, conceptualisation, implementation and analysis of the first iteration. At the same time, this launch is just a stepping stone on the road map planned for the coming years. Some of the key activities planned are as follows:
- The second iteration of the survey was initiated in June 2021 involving the preparation of the survey questionnaire, pilot study and data collection. The findings of this iteration, including a comparative analysis with the first iteration, will be completed by June 2022.
- Six thematic studies related to the barometer domains of “trust”, “identity” and “active citizenship” will be launched at different times during the first quarter of 2022.
- In parallel four think pieces will be published, adding critical views to the Barometer initiative and presenting thought-provoking opinions to the discourse on reconciliation and social cohesion.
- The Barometer website will be launched in early 2022 and will include all the material produced by the Barometer in the three languages. The website will have a data analysis tool enabling users to generate specific analysis using the data from the first iteration. The website will be regularly updated together with a social media presence that will help encourage a vibrant public discourse on reconciliation.
- The evidence generated from the Barometer will feed into the public discourse and include face-to-face discussions with key political and administrative stakeholders, citizens as well as local decision makers. In addition, consultations at the grassroots level will be done, including sessions that share survey findings, with the communities who were consulted during the formulation of the Barometer.
- Institutionally, the Barometer Consortium will continue to produce the annual Barometer and include a formal partnership with the Open University of Sri Lanka (OUSL) in the near future. Eventually, the Consortium will expand to include new members from Government organisations, universities and think tanks who will collectively carry forward the work of the Sri Lanka Barometer.

The Sri Lanka Barometer is work in progress. As the evidence base grows with periodic iterations of the survey, thematic studies, and discussion papers, there will be further analyses and research that needs to be done to better understand citizens' perceptions and aspirations over time.

Understanding “people’s voices, people’s choices”, which the Sri Lanka Barometer attempts to facilitate, will be of crucial importance for decision-makers at the national as well as local levels, and for researchers as well as activists, if Sri Lanka is to move towards a more reconciled and socially cohesive society.



# SRI LANKA BAROMETER

*OUR VOICES . OUR CHOICES*

අපේ හඬ . අපේ තීරණ

எங்கள் குரல்கள் . எங்கள் தேர்வுகள்

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2020 - 2021

# විධායක සාරාංශය

## ශ්‍රී ලංකා බැරෝමීටරයේ බුද්ධිමය

### පදනම: අපේ හඬ, අපේ තේරීම්

අභියෝග රැසක් එල්ල වුවත්, යුද්ධයේ නිමාව, ප්‍රතිසන්ධානය, යුද්ධයෙන් විපතට පත් ප්‍රජාවන් සහ සම්බන්ධතාවන් නැවතත් ගොඩනැගීමේ අවස්ථාව හා සමාජයක් වශයෙන් ඉදිරියට යාම යනාදිය පිළිබඳව බලාපොරොත්තුවක් ඇති කළේය. එසේ ප්‍රතිසන්ධානය සහ සමාජ ඒකාබද්ධතාවය සාක්ෂාත් කරගැනීම සඳහා රජයත් සිවිල් සමාජ සංවිධානත් ප්‍රතිපත්තිමය සහ වැඩසටහන්මය ප්‍රයත්නයන් දරා තිබේ. ශ්‍රී ලංකාවේ ප්‍රතිසන්ධානය, වගවීම සහ මානව අයිතීන් සුරැකීම ප්‍රවර්ධනය කිරීම සඳහා 2015 වර්ෂයේ ඔක්තෝබර් මස 1 වන දා මානව හිමිකම් කවුන්සිලය සම්මත කළ අංක 30/1 දරණ යෝජනාව මෙහි දී තබන ලද සුවිශේෂ ඉදිරි පියවරක් ලෙස සැලකිය හැක. කෙසේ වෙතත්, සම්පූර්ණ පරාසයක පවතින අධිකරණ සහ අධිකරණ නොවන ක්‍රියාමාර්ග ඇතුළත් කරමින් අතීතය සමඟ කටයුතු කිරීම සඳහා පුළුල් ප්‍රවේශයක් යෝජනාවෙන් අපේක්ෂා කළ පරිදි ලඟා කරගත නොහැකි විය.

2009 වර්ෂයේ සිට, රජයේ මූලිකත්වයෙන් දියත් වූ විවිධ ප්‍රතිසන්ධාන ප්‍රයත්නයන් අතරට පුරවැසි උපදේශන සහ ප්‍රතිසන්ධාන ක්‍රියාවලීන් වෙනුවෙන් ඔවුන්ගේ අදහස් පිළිගැනීම එක් විය. 2010 වර්ෂයේ දී ස්ථාපිත උගත් පාඩම් සහ ප්‍රතිසන්ධාන කොමිසම (LLRC) සහ වෙනත් විමර්ශන කොමිෂන් සභා කිහිපයක් මෙන්ම රට පුරා ගොස් සාක්ෂි

එක් රැස් කළ තවත් වැදගත් ප්‍රයත්නයක් වූ 2016 වර්ෂයේ ස්ථාපිත උපදේශන කාර්ය සාධක බලකාය (CTF), මේවාට ඇතුළත් වේ. CTF සහ 2018 වර්ෂයේ දී ප්‍රතිසන්ධානය සහ සහජීවනය සඳහා වූ ජාතික ප්‍රතිපත්තියක් අනුමත කිරීම රජය විසින් අතුරුදහන් වූවත් පිළිබඳ කාර්යාලයක් පිහිටුවීමට හේතු විය. නමුත්, වාර්ගික හා ආගමික සහජීවනය පිළිබඳ පාර්ලිමේන්තු තේරීම් කාරක සභාව විසින් 2019 වර්ෂයේ දී එළි දැක්වූ දියවන්නා ප්‍රකාශනය, පුරවැසියන්ගෙන් අදහස් ලබා ගැනීමේ වැදගත්කම හඳුනාගෙන අඛණ්ඩව සිදු කෙරෙන මත සමීක්ෂණයක අවශ්‍යතාවය පෙන්වාදුන්, රජයේ තවත් එක් මූලපිරීමක් ලෙස සැලකිය හැක. මෙය ක්‍රියාත්මක නොවූ නමුත්, මෙමගින් ප්‍රතිසන්ධානය පිළිබඳ රජයේ මූල පිරිමිවල දිශානතිය හැඩගැස්වීම සඳහා මෙහි ඇතුළත් ව තිබෙන අදහස් භාවිත කරන ලෙස නිර්දේශ කර ඇත.

එය එසේ වුවද, යුද්ධයට තුඩු දුන් බොහෝ හේතු සාධක මෙන්ම යුද්ධයෙන් සෘජුවම පීඩාවට පත් වූ ජනතාව මුහුණ දුන් බොහෝ බාධා කම්කටොළු තවම පවතී. කාලයාගේ ඇවෑමත් සමගම, ප්‍රතිසන්ධානයට මුලදී ලබාදුන් ගතිත්වයට ක්‍රමයෙන් බාධා පැමිණෙමින් තිබූ අතර මේ වනවිට එය වියැකෙමින් පවතී. එම නිසා, 2009 වර්ෂයේ යුද්ධය අවසන් වීමෙන් පසු ප්‍රතිසන්ධානය සහ සමාජ ඒකාබද්ධතාවය පිළිබඳ පුරවැසියන් අතර පවතින ගැටළු සහ ඔවුන්ගේ අත්දැකීම් පිළිබඳ අවබෝධයක් ලබා ගැනීමේ අවශ්‍යතාවය දිගින් දිගටම ඉස්මතු වී ඇත.

**“2019 වර්ෂයේ දී එළි දැක්වූ දියවන්නා ප්‍රකාශනය මගින් පුරවැසියන්ගේ අදහස් ලබා ගැනීමේ වැදගත්කම හඳුනාගෙන ඇති අතර ඒ සඳහා අඛණ්ඩව සිදු කෙරෙන මත සමීක්ෂණයක අවශ්‍යතාවය පෙන්වා දී ඇත.”**




## ශ්‍රී ලංකා බැරෝමීටරයේ ප්‍රධාන අංග

ශ්‍රී ලංකා බැරෝමීටරයේ අරමුණ වන්නේ ශ්‍රී ලංකාවේ ප්‍රතිසන්ධානය සහ සමාජ ඒකාබද්ධතාවය පිළිබඳ අවබෝධය ගැඹුරු කිරීමය. එසේ ගැඹුරු කරන්නේ අදාළ තොරතුරු මහජනයාට සපයා දී මහජන කතිකාව තව තවත් දැනුවත් කිරීමට සහ ඉදිරි කාලයේ දී ප්‍රතිසන්ධානය සහ සමාජ ඒකාබද්ධතාවය සාක්ෂාත් කරගැනීම සඳහා තීරණ ගන්නන්ට උපකාර කිරීමට ය.

ශ්‍රී ලංකා බැරෝමීටරය නිර්මාණය කර ඇත්තේ කාලයත් සමඟ වෙනස් වීමට ඉඩ ඇති ප්‍රතිසන්ධානය සහ සමාජ ඒකාබද්ධතාවය පිළිබඳව මහජනයා දරන විවිධ අදහස් නියෝජනය කිරීමට ය. ප්‍රතිසන්ධානය බහු විධ බවත්, සන්දර්භය විශේෂිත වන බවත් සහ පුළුල් පරාසයක් තුළ පවතින අත්දැකීම්, උත්සාහයන් සහ අවස්ථා ආවරණය කරන බවත් එය හඳුනා ගනී.

ශ්‍රී ලංකා බැරෝමීටරයේ ප්‍රධාන අංග හතර වන්නේ,


1. මහජන අදහස් මැනීම සඳහා ප්‍රමාණාත්මක ක්‍රමවේදයක් භාවිතා කරන වාර්ෂික, දීප ව්‍යාප්ත මහජන මත සමීක්ෂණය,
2. ප්‍රතිසන්ධානයට සහ සමාජ ඒකාබද්ධතාවය සම්බන්ධ ගැටළු වඩාත් ගැඹුරින් ගවේෂණය කිරීම සඳහා ගුණාත්මක ක්‍රමවේදයන් භාවිතා කරන තේමානුගත අධ්‍යයන මාලාව,
3. ප්‍රතිසන්ධානය සහ ඒ ආශ්‍රිත ගැටළු ආවරණය කරන සාකච්ඡා පත්‍රිකා සහ සංකල්ප සටහන් සහ,
4. මහජන කතිකාවත දැනුවත් කිරීම සඳහා සාක්ෂි මත පදනම් වූ ව්‍යාප්ති සංරචකයයි.



ශ්‍රී ලංකා බැරෝමීටරය ආරම්භ කරන ලද්දේ රජයේ, රජයේ නොවන සහ බිම් මට්ටමේ ප්‍රයත්න සඳහා සහාය දක්වන "ප්‍රතිසන්ධාන ක්‍රියාවලීන් ශක්තිමත් කිරීම" (SRP) නම් සිව් අවුරුදු වැඩසටහනක් හරහාය. අධිකරණ අමාත්‍යාංශයේ මහපෙත්වීම යටතේ ක්‍රියාත්මක වන SRP වැඩසටහන සඳහා යුරෝපා සංගමය සහ ජර්මානු ෆෙඩරල් විදේශ කාර්යාලය අරමුදල් සපයන අතර ශ්‍රී ලංකාවේ ජර්මානු තාක්ෂණික සහයෝගීතා ආයතනය (GIZ) සහ බ්‍රිතාන්‍ය කවුන්සිලය විසින් එය මෙහෙය වනු ලැබේ.

දශක දෙකක කාලයක් පුරා දකුණු අප්‍රිකානු ප්‍රතිසන්ධාන බැරෝමීටරය (SARB) මෙහෙයවන යුක්තිය සහ ප්‍රතිසන්ධාන ආයතනයේ (IJR) වටිනා අත්දැකීම් උකහා ගැනීම, ශ්‍රී ලංකා බැරෝමීටරය නිර්මාණය සඳහා පදනමක් සැපයීමට උපකාරී වී ඇත.

ප්‍රතිසන්ධානය සඳහා ක්‍රියා කරන සමාන අදහස් ඇති සංවිධාන ඇතුළත් හවුල්කරුවන්ගේ සමූහයක් බැරෝමීටරයට සහාය දක්වයි. බැරෝමීටරයේ මෙම අදියරේ දී, එහි හවුල්කරුවන්ගේ සමූහයට දර්ද්‍රතා විශ්ලේෂණ කේන්ද්‍රය (CEPA) සහ IJR ආයතනය ඇතුළත් වේ. SRP ව්‍යාපෘතියේ මිලඟ අදියරේදී වඩාත් ක්‍රියාකාරී දායකත්වයක් සහිතව, එහි හවුල්කරුවෙක් ලෙස සම්බන්ධ කරගැනීමට ශ්‍රී ලංකා විවෘත විශ්වවිද්‍යාලය සමඟ සාකච්ඡා කරමින් පවතී.



# ශ්‍රී ලංකා බැරෝමීටරයේ නිර්මාණය


ශ්‍රී ලංකා බැරෝමීටරය ශ්‍රී ලංකාවේ ප්‍රතිසන්ධානය ගවේෂණය කිරීමට උපකාර වන විෂය පථ අටක් හරහා ප්‍රතිසන්ධානය සංකල්පගත කරයි. ඒවා නම්:

- අතීතය සමඟ කටයුතු කිරීම
- සැමට යුක්තිය
- අන්තර්ජාතික සහ අයන්වීම
- අන්තර් පුද්ගල, සමාජ සහ දේශපාලන විශ්වාසය
- සමාන අවස්ථා
- ක්‍රියාකාරී පුරවැසිභාවය
- වගවිය යුතු පාලනය
- ආරක්ෂාව සහ යහපැවැත්ම

බැරෝමීටර සමීක්ෂණය ප්‍රමාණාත්මක ක්‍රමවේදයක් භාවිතා කළ අතර, එසේ කිරීමෙන් සංඛ්‍යාත්මක දත්ත රැස් කිරීම සහ සංඛ්‍යාත්මක විශ්ලේෂණය සිදු කිරීම තුළින් මහජන අදහස් මැනීමට හැකිවිය. මෙහිදී, පර්යේෂණ මෙවලම ලෙස ව්‍යුහගත ප්‍රශ්නාවලියක් භාවිතයෙන් දත්ත රැස් කළේය. එය බහු-අදියර අහඹු නියැදීමේ ක්‍රමය සහ ක්‍රමානුකූල අහඹු නියැදීමේ ක්‍රමය භාවිතා කරන ලදී. 3819 වන නියෝජිත නියැදියක් 2020 වර්ෂයේ ඔක්තෝබර් මාසය සහ නොවැම්බර් මාසය අතර සම්පූර්ණ කරන ලද අතර, එම නියැදිය 95% ක විශ්වාසනීය මට්ටමකින් යුතු අතර ජාතික වශයෙන් 2% කට වඩා අඩු දෝෂ මට්ටමක් ලබා දේ.

යෝජිත දර්ශක සහ ඒවායේ සංයුක්ත පරිමාණ මනෝමිතියට භාජනය කොට ඒවා වලංගු කිරීම සිදු කරන ලද්දේ නියාමන අධ්‍යයනයන් සහ ප්‍රධාන අධ්‍යයනයන් පැවැත්වූ කාලයේදීය. මනෝමිතික වලංගුකරණය මගින් බැරෝමීටරය භාවිතා කරන මිනුමේ ශක්තිමත්භාවය සහතික කෙරෙන්නේය. ඒ නිසාම ප්‍රස්තුත දර්ශක භාවිතා කරමින්

සිදුකරන ස්ථාවර විශ්ලේෂණය ද විශ්වසනීයත්වය ඇතිකරන්නේය, වලංගුවන්නේය. එලෙස පිරිසිදු කරගන්නා ලද දත්ත කුලක සියල්ල, 2002 වසරේදී ශ්‍රී ලංකාවේ ජනලේඛන සහ සංඛ්‍යාලේඛන දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින් ප්‍රකාශයට පත්කරන ලද ජනගහණ දත්ත භාවිතා කරමින්, ඒ ඒ දිස්ත්‍රික්කවල ජනගහණ නියෝජනය, ස්ත්‍රී පුරුෂ භාවය සහ වයස් ලක්ෂණ සමඟ කිරා බලනු ලැබීය.



i වන රූපය: බැරෝමීටරයේ ප්‍රතිසන්ධාන විෂය පථ අට

# ශ්‍රී ලංකා බැරෝමීටරයේ මූලික සොයාගැනීම්


සොයාගැනීම් ආකාර දෙකකින් ඉදිරිපත් කෙරේ. එනම්, සංයුක්ත දර්ශක සඳහා මධ්‍යන්‍ය ලකුණු (1 සිට 10 දක්වා) ලෙස හෝ තනි ප්‍රශ්න සඳහා සංඛ්‍යාත ලෙසින්ය.



## ප්‍රතිසන්ධානය

- ශ්‍රී ලාංකිකයින්ගෙන් බහුතරයක් ප්‍රතිසන්ධානය සම්බන්ධ කරන්නේ සමගිය හා එක්සත් ශ්‍රී ලංකාවක් සාක්ෂාත් කර ගැනීම සම්බන්ධ අර්ථයන් සමඟය (37.6%). 23.3% කට ප්‍රතිසන්ධානය පොදුවේ ධනාත්මක බවත් ශ්‍රී ලංකාවට යහපත් බවත් හැඟෙන බව ප්‍රකාශ කර ඇත. සමස්ථයක් ලෙස 11.3% කට ප්‍රතිසන්ධානයේ අඩුවක් ඇතැයි හැඟෙන බව පවසා ඇත. සමහර ශ්‍රී ලාංකිකයින්ට ද හැඟෙන්නේ මෙම යෙදුම කිසියම් විශේෂිත සිතුවම්ලක් ඇති නොකරන බව හෝ එහි අර්ථයක් නොමැති බවයි (9%).
- ප්‍රතිසන්ධානයේ ප්‍රගතියක් අත්පත් කරගැනීමට හැකි වීම පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලාංකිකයන් මධ්‍යස්ථ මතයක් දරයි (6.4). සියලුම ප්‍රධාන වාර්ගික, ආගමික, ස්ත්‍රී පුරුෂ කණ්ඩායම් මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් මධ්‍යස්ථභාවයක් දරයි. එසේම, ඊට සමගාමීව වාසය කරන ප්‍රදේශය, ස්ත්‍රී පුරුෂ භාවය, අදහන ආගම

- හෝ වාර්ගිකත්වය නොතකා ශ්‍රී ලාංකිකයින්ගෙන් ප්‍රතිසන්ධානය සඳහා දැඩි ඉල්ලුමක් පවතී (8.1).
- ප්‍රතිසන්ධානය සම්බන්ධයෙන් ඇති ආයතන සන්නද්ධ ගැටුමේ බලපෑමට මුහුණ දීමට ශ්‍රී ලාංකිකයින්ට උපකාර කිරීමේදී වැදගත් වන බව ශ්‍රී ලාංකිකයන් විශ්වාස කරයි (7.4).
- දේශපාලන අධිෂ්ඨානය සහ කැපවීම නොමැතිකම (25.8%), ජාතිකවාදය (20.2%), බෙදුම්වාදී දේශපාලනය (17.8%) සහ ආගමික සහ වාර්ගික වෙනස්කම් කිරීම (9.3%) ප්‍රබලම බාධාවන් ලෙස හඳුනා ගනිමින්, ප්‍රතිසන්ධානය සාක්ෂාත් කරගැනීමට බාධක ඇති බව ඔවුන් හඳුනාගෙන ඇත. නමුත්, තවත් සමහරුන්, තමන්ට ප්‍රතිසන්ධානයට බාධාවක් නැති බව හැඟෙන බව පවසා ඇත (4.2%).



0 - දැඩිලෙස එකඟ නොවේ 7.5 - එකඟ වේ 10 - දැඩිලෙස එකඟ වේ  
 2.5 - එකඟ නොවේ 10 - දැඩිලෙස එකඟ වේ  
 5 - එකඟවන්නේ නැත නොඑකඟවන්නේ නැත  
 ■ ප්‍රතිසන්ධානය කෙරෙහි ඇති ඉල්ලුම  
 ■ ප්‍රතිසන්ධානය සාක්ෂාත් කරගැනීමේ ප්‍රගතිය

ii වන රූපය: ප්‍රතිසන්ධානය වෙනුවෙන් ජනවාර්ගික කණ්ඩායම්වලින් තිබෙන ඉල්ලුම සහ එය සාක්ෂාත් කරගැනීමේ ප්‍රගතිය සම්බන්ධයෙන් ඔවුන්ගේ අදහස් (මධ්‍යන්‍ය අගය)



## විෂය පථය:

# අතීතය සමඟ කටයුතු කිරීම

• ජාතික මට්ටමින්, යුද්ධයේ සන්දර්භය තුළ අතීතය සමඟ කටයුතු කිරීම වැදගත් ලෙස ශ්‍රී ලාංකිකයන් (7.5), සහ ඒ හා සමානව ස්ත්‍රී පුරුෂ භාවය අනුව සලකන විට ද, ඔවුන් - පිරිමි (7.4) සහ කාන්තා (7.5) - පිළිගෙන ඇත. උතුරු (8.4) සහ නැගෙනහිර (8) පළාත්වල ජනතාව එහි වැදගත්කම පිළිබඳ ප්‍රබලම අදහස් දරයි.

• සියලුම ප්‍රධාන ජනවාර්ගික කණ්ඩායම්වල ජනතාව අතීතය සමඟ කටයුතු කිරීමේ වැදගත්කම හඳුනාගෙන ඇති අතර, දෙමළ ජනතාවගෙන් (8.1) එයට ඉහළම වැදගත්කමක් ලැබී ඇත. ඔවුන්ට පසු, සිංහල (7.4) සහ මුස්ලිම් (7.3) ජනතාව එහි වැදගත්කම පිළිබඳව අවධාරණය කර ඇත.


• සන්නද්ධ ගැටුමට අදාළ අතීත අසාධාරණයන් හඳුනා ගැනීම වැදගත් බව ශ්‍රී ලාංකිකයන් පිළිගෙන ඇත (7.4). උතුරු (8.6), නැගෙනහිර (7.9) සහ උළුව (7.7) පළාත්වල ජනතාවගෙන් අතීත අසාධාරණයන් හඳුනාගැනීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් ඉහළ වැදගත්කමක් ලැබී ඇත.

• ජාතික මට්ටමින්, අනුස්මරණ කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් ජනතාව මධ්‍යස්ථභාවයක් උසුළයි (6.8). පළාත් වශයෙන් ගත් කළ, උතුරු (8.3) සහ නැගෙනහිර

(7.5) පළාත්වල ජනතාවගෙන් අනුස්මරණ කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් වැඩි එකඟතාවයක් පළකර ඇත.


• ශ්‍රී ලාංකිකයන් විසින් හානිපූර්ණ සඳහා ඉදිරිපත් කළ ප්‍රධාන සාධාරණීකරණයන් අතරට ආදායම අහිමි වීම (25.3%), පදිංචි වී සිටි තැන්වලින් බලහත්කාරයෙන් ඉවත් කිරීම (22.7%) සහ ප්‍රජාවට අයත් ඉඩම් සහ දේපළ අහිමි වීම (21%) ඇතුළත් වේ. අතුරුදහන් කරවන ලද, අතුරුදහන් වී ගිය, නඩුවිභාග නොමැතිව දීර්ඝ කාලයක් රඳවාගෙන සිටින, වධහිංසාවලට භාජනය වූ වින්දිතයන් සහ ඔවුන්ගේ පවුල්වලට ද වන්දි ගෙවිය යුතු බව ඇතැමුන්ගේ අදහසයි.

• ජාතික වශයෙන්, අතීතය සමඟ කටයුතු කිරීමට ඇති විශාලතම බාධාව ලෙස සැලකෙන්නේ දේශපාලන බලපෑම් සහ ඇඟිලි ගැසීම (31.8%). දේශපාලනික කැපවීමක් නොමැතිකමට (7.9%) අමතරව පශ්චාත් යුධ සන්දර්භයක් තුළ ප්‍රශ්න ආමන්ත්‍රණය නොකිරීම (12.5%), කළමනාකාරිත්වය නොමැතිකම සහ රජයෙන් ලැබෙන සහයෝගයේ අඩු බව (8.7), ජාතිවාදය (6.7%) අතීතය සමඟ කටයුතු කිරීමට ඇති අනෙකුත් බාධක ලෙස ඇතැමුන් හඳුනා ගෙන ඇත.



- දේශපාලනික බලපෑම්/ මැදිහත්වීම්
- බාධා නැත
- පශ්චාත් යුධ සන්දර්භයක් තුළ ප්‍රශ්න ආමන්ත්‍රණය නොකිරීම
- නිසි කළමනාකරණයක් නැතිවීම/ රජයේ සහයෝගය නොලැබීම
- ජාතිවාදය
- අතීතය සමඟ කටයුතු කිරීම සඳහා දේශපාලනික කැපවීමක් නොමැති වීම
- තොරතුරු හිඟ වීම
- බටහිර බලපෑම්/ රාජ්‍ය නොවන සංවිධානවල බලපෑම්
- ආදායම/ රැකියා/ අධ්‍යාපන/ මූලික අවශ්‍යතා සපුරාගැනීම සඳහා පහසුකම් නොමැති වීම
- වෙනත්


iii වන රූපය : අතීතය සමඟ කටයුතු කිරීමට ඇති බාධක - ජාතික මට්ටමින්, පළමු සඳහන (%)




# විෂය පථය: සැමට යුක්තිය

• සන්නද්ධ ගැටුමේ වින්දිතයන් සඳහා යුක්තිය පසිඳලීමට ඇති විශාලතම බාධක වන්නේ දේශපාලනික කැපවීමක් නොමැතිකම (29%), දූෂණය/අස්ථාවර ආර්ථිකය (13%), දේශපාලන බලපෑම්/දේශපාලන මැදිහත්වීම් (11%), අනවශ්‍ය ප්‍රමාදයන්/නීති ක්‍රියාවලීන් ඇනහිටීම (6 %) සහ ජනතාව වින්දිතයන් බවට පත්කල පුද්ගලයින් දඬුවම් නොලබා බේරී යාමය (5%).

• සිවිල් වැසියන්ට එරෙහිව ප්‍රචණ්ඩත්වය භාවිතා කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් ශ්‍රී ලාංකිකයන් එකඟ නොවේ (2.8). සියලුම පළාත්වල ජනතාව සහ, ඔවුන්ට වඩා උතුරු පළාතේ (1.8) ජනතාව සිවිල් වැසියන්ට එරෙහිව ප්‍රචණ්ඩත්වය භාවිතා කිරීම පිළිබඳව එකඟ නොවන බව හෝ දැඩි ලෙස එකඟ නොවන බව දක්වා ඇත. කාන්තා (2.8) සහ පිරිමි (2.7) යන දෙපාර්ශවයම සිවිල් වැසියන්ට එරෙහි ප්‍රචණ්ඩත්වය භාවිතා කිරීම පිළිබඳව ඔවුන්ගේ විරුද්ධත්වය ප්‍රකාශ කර ඇත.



iv වන රූපය: යුක්තිය පසිඳලීමට ඇති විශාලතම බාධක - ජාතික මට්ටමින්, පළමු සඳහන (%)



විෂය පථය:

# අන්‍යතාවය සහ අයත් වීම


• ශ්‍රී ලාංකික අන්‍යතාවයක වැදගත්කම සහ එක් අන්‍යතාවයක් ගොඩනැගීමේ හැකියාව පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලාංකිකයන් එකඟතාවයකට පැමිණ ඇත (7.9). මෙම අදහස් පිරිමි (7.9) සහ කාන්තා (7.9) දෙපාර්ශවයම විසින් සමානව දරන අතරම ඒවා ප්‍රබල ලෙස ඉදිරිපත් වන්නේ සුළු ජාතීන්ගෙන් සහ උතුරු (8.3) සහ නැගෙනහිර (8.2) පළාත්වල ජනතාවගෙනි.

• වෙනත් සමාජ කණ්ඩායම්වලට වඩා තමන් අයත් වන ජනවාර්ගික කණ්ඩායම්වල අය සමඟ වැඩි සමීප බවක් දැනෙන බව ජනයා ප්‍රකාශ කර ඇත (24.7%). 7.4% ක් ඔවුන් අයත් වන භාෂා කාණ්ඩයේ පුද්ගලයන් සමඟ සමීප බවක් දැනෙන බව ප්‍රකාශ කර ඇති අතර, 14.2% ක් ශ්‍රී ලාංකිකයන් සමඟ

සමීප බවක් දැනෙන බව පවසා ඇත. පුද්ගලයන් දස දෙනෙකුගෙන් එක් අයෙක් කියා සිටියේ තමන් කිසිදු කණ්ඩායමකට අයත් පුද්ගලයන් සමඟ සමීප බවක් නොදැනෙන බවය. තවත් අය පැවසුවේ තමන් ආගම පදනම් කරගත් පුද්ගල කණ්ඩායම් (8%) සහ දුප්පත් පුද්ගලයින් (8%) සමඟ සමීප බවක් දැනෙන බවය. තමන් අයත් වන කුලයේ අය සමඟ සමීප බවක් දැනෙන බව ප්‍රකාශ ඇත්තේ 1.3% ක් පමණි.

• ජනතාව වෙනත් පුද්ගලයන්ට වෙනස් කොට සැලකීමේ ප්‍රධාන පදනමට ආර්ථික තත්ත්වය (28.1%), වාර්ගිකත්වය (26.9%), ආගම (10.4%) සහ භාෂාව (8.4%) ඇතුළත් වේ.

- 0 - දැඩිලෙසම එකඟවන්නේ නැත
- 2.5 - එකඟ නොවේ
- 5 - එකඟවන්නේ නැත නොඑකඟවන්නේ නැත
- 7.5 - එකඟ වේ
- 10 - දැඩිලෙසම එකඟ වේ



v වන රූපය : ශ්‍රී ලාංකික අන්‍යතාවයක් තීර්මාණය කිරීමේ වැදගත්කම පිළිබඳ අදහස - ජාතික සහ පළාත් මට්ටමෙන් (මධ්‍යන්‍ය අගය)



විෂය පථය:

# අන්තර් පුද්ගල, සමාජ සහ දේශපාලන විශ්වාසය


• බොහෝ ශ්‍රී ලාංකිකයන් යම් ප්‍රමාණයකට එකම අසල්වැසි/ආසන්න ප්‍රදේශයක ජීවත් වන ජනතාව විශ්වාස කරයි (64.3%). 13.3% ක් තම අසල්වැසියන්ව එතරම් විශ්වාස නොකරයි. 6.3% කට තම අසල්වැසියන් සම්බන්ධයෙන් කිසිම විශ්වාසයක් නැත. මේ අතර, ජනතාවගෙන් 13.5% ක් තම අසල්වැසියන් බෙහෙවින් විශ්වාස කරන අතර තවත් 2.5% ක් ඔවුන්ව දැඩි ලෙස විශ්වාස කරයි.

• සමාජ විශ්වාසය ගත් කළ, ශ්‍රී ලංකාවේ ජනතාව වෙනත් සමාජ කණ්ඩායම්වලට අයත් ජනයා කෙරෙහි විශ්වාසය තබන්නේ නැත (4.6). භූගෝලීය වශයෙන් ගත් කළ, දකුණු (4.1), උතුරු මැද (4.2), නැගෙනහිර (4.3), සබරගමුව (4.6), වයඹ (4.6), බස්නාහිර (4.6) පළාත්වල වාසය කරන ජනයා තමන් අයත් නොවන සමාජ කණ්ඩායම් කෙරෙහි කොහෙන්ම විශ්වාසය තබන්නේ නැත. එහෙත්, අනෙකුත් සමාජ කණ්ඩායම් කෙරෙහි වැඩියෙන් විශ්වාසය තබන්නේ උතුරු පළාතේ ජීවත්වන ජනයාය (5.4). සුළුතර වාර්ගික

කණ්ඩායම්වලට අයත් ජනයාට (සිංහල ජනතාවට (4.5) ට වඩා දෙමළ (5) සහ මුස්ලිම් ජනතාව (5.3)) වෙනත් සමාජ කණ්ඩායම්වලට අයත් ජනතාව කෙරෙහි වැඩි විශ්වාසයක් ඇත. ස්ත්‍රී පුරුෂ භාවය අනුව සලකන විට ද, පිරිමි (4.7) සහ කාන්තා (4.5) යන දෙපාර්ශවයම විවිධ සමාජ කණ්ඩායම්වලට අයත් පුද්ගලයින් කෙරෙහි අවිශ්වාසයක් ඇති බවට පෙනෙන්නට තිබේ.

• ශ්‍රී ලාංකිකයන් ආයතන කෙරෙහි ඇති විශ්වාසය හෝ දේශපාලන විශ්වාසය සම්බන්ධයෙන් මධ්‍යස්ථභාවයක් දරයි (6.1). අනෙක් පළාත්වල වෙසෙන ජනතාවට වඩා උතුරු (5.1) සහ නැගෙනහිර (5.3) පළාත්වල වෙසෙන ජනතාවට දේශපාලන විශ්වාසය තිබෙන්නේ අඩු ප්‍රමාණයකිනි. දකුණු පළාතේ (5.9) ජනතාව ද දේශපාලන ආයතන කෙරෙහි අන් අයට වඩා අඩු විශ්වාසයක් තබා ඇත.

- 0 - කොහෙන්ම විශ්වාස නොකරයි
- 2.5 - අවිශ්වාසයි
- 5 - විශ්වාසකරන්නේවත් අවිශ්වාසකරන්නේවත් නැත
- 7.5 - විශ්වාස කරයි
- 10 - ඉතාමත් විශ්වාසයි



vi වන රූපය: ජාතික සහ පළාත් මට්ටමින් සමාජ විශ්වාසය (මධ්‍යන්‍ය අගය)




# විෂය පථය: සමාන අවස්ථා

- ජාතික මට්ටමින්, සෑම කෙනෙකුටම සමාන අවස්ථා තිබේ ද යන්න පිළිබඳ අදහස්වලදී ජනතාව බොහෝ දුරට මධ්‍යස්ථභාවයක් දරයි (6.2). රට තුළ ජනයාට සමාන අවස්ථා ඇති බවට එකඟවීමට වැඩි නැඹුරුවක් දක්වමින් වෙනස් මතයක් දැරූ එකම පළාත උඹව පළාත (7) විය.
- ජනවාර්ගික කණ්ඩායම අනුව බලන විට, සිංහල ජනතාව වඩාත් මධ්‍යස්ථ (6.2) වන අතර, මුස්ලිම් (5.4) සහ දෙමළ ජනතාව (5.8) සියලු කණ්ඩායම්වලට සමාන අවස්ථා ලැබුණු බවට පිළිගන්නේ අඩුවෙනි.


- නාගරික (6.1) සහ ග්‍රාමීය ප්‍රජාවන් (6.2) සම අවස්ථා ලැබීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් එකඟ වූවන් ඊට සාපේක්ෂව වතු අංශයේ (5.9) ජනතාව සම අවස්ථා ලැබීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් එකඟ වන්නේ අඩුවෙනි.
- ස්ත්‍රී පුරුෂ භාවය අනුව ද, පිරිමි (6.2) සහ කාන්තා (6.2) දෙපාර්ශවයම සමාන අවස්ථා ලැබීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් මධ්‍යස්ථ අදහස් දරයි.

0 - දැඩිලෙසම එකඟවන්නේ නැත  
 2.5 - එකඟ නොවේ  
 5 - එකඟවන්නේ නැත නොඑකඟවන්නේ නැත  
 7.5- එකඟ වේ  
 10 - දැඩිලෙසම එකඟ වේ



vii වන රූපය: ජනවාර්ගික කණ්ඩායම අනුව සමාන අවස්ථා (මධ්‍යන්‍ය අගය)





විෂය පථය:


# ක්‍රියාකාරී පුරවැසිභාවය

• ශ්‍රී ලාංකිකයන්ගේ ක්‍රියාකාරී පුරවැසිභාවය 2.2 ක අගයක් ගන්නා අතර එහිදී බොහෝ දෙනෙක් පවසන්නේ ඔවුන් කිසි දිනක ක්‍රියාකාරී පුරවැසියන් නොවී ඇති බවත් අවස්ථාවක් ලැබුණේ නම් ඔවුන් එසේ කටයුතු කරන බවත්ය. දකුණු (1.8), උතුරු මැද (1.8) සහ සබරගමුව (1.7) පළාත්වල ජනතාව සිවිල් ක්‍රියාකාරකම්වල යෙදීමට ඇති ඉඩකඩ අඩුය. ඊට සාපේක්ෂව උතුරු පළාතේ (5.6) ජනතාව වඩාත් ක්‍රියාශීලීය. ඊට සමාන රටාවක් ස්ත්‍රී පුරුෂ භාවය - පිරිමි (2.5) සහ ගැහැණු (2) - අනුව ද දක්නට ලැබේ.


• ජනවාර්ගික කණ්ඩායම් අනුව බලන විට, සිංහල ජනතාවට වඩා (2) දෙමළ (4) සහ මුස්ලිම් ජනතාව (2.8) වැඩි සිවිල් සහභාගීත්වයක් පෙන්නුම් කිරීම හෝ එහි නියැලීමට වැඩි කැමැත්තක් දක්වා තිබීම පිළිබිඹු වේ.

• දේශපාලන ඵලදායීතාවය අතින්, ශ්‍රී ලාංකිකයන් (6.5) මධ්‍යස්ථ මට්ටමක සිටින බව පෙනෙන්නට තිබේ. ඊට සමාන අදහසක් ස්ත්‍රී පුරුෂ, සියලු ජනවාර්ගික හා ආගමික කාණ්ඩ වශයෙන් සලකා බලන විට ද පිළිබිඹු වේ.

- 0 - නැහැ කවදාවත් ඵයාකාරයෙන් කටයුතු කරන්නේ නැහැ
- 2.5 - නැහැ හැබැයි අවස්ථාවක් ලැබෙනවානම් එලෙස කටයුතු කරනවා
- 5 - වරක් දෙවරක් එලෙස කටයුතු කළා
- 7.5 - නිතරම වාගේ එලෙස කටයුතු කරනවා
- 10 - නීතිපතා ක්‍රියාකාරී පුරවැසියන් ලෙස කටයුතු කරනවා



viii වන රූපය: ජාතික සහ පළාත් මට්ටමින් ක්‍රියාකාරී පුරවැසිභාවය (මධ්‍යන්‍ය අගය)




# විෂය පථය: වගවියයුතු පාලනය

• මෙම විෂය පථය පාලනය හැඩගැස්වීම සඳහා ජනතාවට සහභාගී වීමට ඇති අවස්ථා, විවිධත්වයට ගරු කිරීම සහ ආර්ථික හා දේශපාලන බලය ලබාගැනීමට ඇති ප්‍රවේශය සලකා බලයි. ශ්‍රී ලාංකිකයන් අන් අයට ගරු කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් මධ්‍යස්ථ අදහසක් දරයි (6.8). අනෙක් පළාත් වල ජනතාවට වඩා උතුරු (7.6), උතුරු (7.6) සහ නැගෙනහිර (7.4) පළාත්වල ජනතාව මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් තම එකඟතාවය ප්‍රකාශ කර ඇත.

• සියලුම ශ්‍රී ලාංකිකයන්ගෙන් අඩකට ආසන්න ප්‍රමාණයක් (43.3%) සියලු ප්‍රජාවන්ට අයත් දේශපාලන හා ව්‍යාපාරික ප්‍රභූ කුඩා කණ්ඩායමකට ආර්ථික

බලය වැඩියෙන් ඇති බව විශ්වාස කරන අතර 33% කට හැඟෙන්නේ එම බලය සිංහල ප්‍රජාව (බහුතරය සහ ප්‍රභූ) තුළ සංකේන්ද්‍රණය වී ඇති බව ය. 23% කට හැඟෙන්නේ මෙම බලය මුස්ලිම් ප්‍රජාවේ කුඩා ප්‍රභූ කණ්ඩායමක් තුළ පවතින බවය.

• ඊට වෙනස්ව, ශ්‍රී ලාංකිකයින්ගෙන් තුනෙන් දෙකකට වඩා වැඩි පිරිසක් විශ්වාස කරන්නේ සිංහල බහුතරයට (59.6%) සහ කුඩා සිංහල ප්‍රභූ කණ්ඩායමකට (8.5%) දේශපාලන බලය හිමි බවය. නමුත්, 30.1% ක් සිතන්නේ මෙම බලය සියලු ජන කොටස්වලට අයත් දේශපාලන සහ ව්‍යාපාරික ප්‍රභූ කුඩා කණ්ඩායමක් තුළ පවතින බවය.



ix වන රූපය : ආර්ථික හා දේශපාලන බලය වැඩි වශයෙන් ඇත්තේ කාටද? - ජාතික මට්ටමින් (%)



# විෂය පථය: ආරක්ෂාව සහ යහපැවැත්ම


• ගෘහස්ථ යහපැවැත්ම පිළිබඳ අදහස සාපේක්ෂව ගත් කළ, ජාතික මට්ටමින් 7.5 ක අගයක් වාර්තා කර ඇති අතර, එමගින් පෙන්නුම් කරන්නේ ජනතාව රටේ අනෙකුත් ගෘහයන් හා සසඳන විට තමන්ගේ යහපැවැත්ම තරමක් හොඳ මට්ටමක පවතින බව විශ්වාස කරන බවය. පළාත් වශයෙන් ගත් කළ, බොහෝ පළාත්වල ජනතාව රටේ අනෙකුත් පවුල්වලට වඩා සාපේක්ෂව තම පවුලේ තත්ත්වය යහපත් බව විශ්වාස කරයි. නැගෙනහිර (5.8), උතුරු (6.1) සහ උතුරු මැද (6.6) පළාත්වල, ගැටුම්වලින් සෘජුවම පීඩාවට පත් වූවන්, අනෙකුත් පවුල් හා සසඳන විට තම පවුල්වල යහපැවැත්ම එකම මට්ටමක පවතින බව විශ්වාස කරයි. සාපේක්ෂව ගත් කළ, මුස්ලිම් (6.8) සහ දෙමළ ජනතාව (6.2) ඔවුන්ගේ යහපැවැත්ම සිංහල ජනතාවට (7.7) වඩා අඩු බව විශ්වාස කරයි.

• ජීවන දර්දතා දර්ශකය පුළුල් පරාසයක පවතින මූලික අවශ්‍යතා සපුරාගැනීම සඳහා ප්‍රවේශයක් නොලැබීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් අදහස් ග්‍රහණය කරගනු ලබයි. මෙම සමීක්ෂණයේ දත්ත වලට අනුව ජාතික මට්ටමින් එහි අගය 1.4 ක් (කිසිදා/ වරක් හෝ දෙවරක්) වේ. පළාත් අනුව ගත් කළ, උතුරු (2), දකුණ (1.8), උගුව (1.7) සහ මධ්‍යම (1.6) පළාත්වල අගය ජාතික සාමාන්‍යය අභිබවා ගොස් ඇත. ස්ත්‍රී පුරුෂ භාවය අනුව ද, පිරිමි (1.4) සහ කාන්තා (1.3) දෙපාර්ශවයේම අදහස් සමාන අගයන් වාර්තා කර ඇත.

• ගෘහස්ථ යහපැවැත්මට එල්ල වන විශාලම තර්ජන නම් ප්‍රමාණවත් ආදායමක් උපයා ගැනීමට නොහැකි වීම (26.4%), ඉහළ ජීවන වියදම්/ආර්ථික ගැටලු (16.4%) සහ Covid-19 වසංගතය සහ එහි බලපෑම් (8.8%) ය.

- 0 - කොහෙන්ම ආරක්ෂාවක් නැත
- 2.5 - තරමක් අනාරක්ෂිතයි
- 5 - ලැබෙන ආරක්ෂාව මධ්‍යස්ථයි
- 7.5 - තරමක් ආරක්ෂිතයි
- 10- ඉතාමත් ආරක්ෂිතයි

- ප්‍රජා ආරක්ෂාව
- පුද්ගලික ආරක්ෂාව



x වන රූපය: ජනවාර්ගික කණ්ඩායම අනුව පුද්ගලික සහ ප්‍රජා ආරක්ෂාව (මධ්‍යන්‍ය අගය)



විෂය පථය:

# ආරක්ෂාව සහ යහපැවැත්ම

• ජාතික වශයෙන් ගත් කළ, මූලික සේවාවන් ලබාගැනීම සඳහා ඇති ප්‍රවේශය තරමක් පහසු බවට තක්සේරු වී ඇත (6.4). බස්නාහිර පළාත මූලික සේවාවන් ලබාගැනීම සඳහා ප්‍රවේශවීමේ පහසුව සම්බන්ධයෙන් අපේක්ෂිත පරිදි ඉදිරියෙන් සිටින අතර ජාතික සාමාන්‍යයට වඩා ඉහළ අගයක් වාර්තා කරයි. කිසිදු පළාතක් තුළින් මූලික සේවාවන් ලබාගැනීම සඳහා ඇති ප්‍රවේශය අතිශය දුෂ්කර හෝ ඉතා පහසු බවට තක්සේරු වී නැත.


• සහායක සේවා ලබාගැනීම සඳහා ඇති ප්‍රවේශය වඩාත් දුෂ්කර බව ජාතික මට්ටමින් (5.3) දැකිය හැකිය. බොහෝ පළාත්වල ජනතාව එය තරමක් දුෂ්කර බව පෙන්වා දෙන අතර උතුරු පළාතේ ජනතාව එය දුෂ්කර බව පෙන්වා දෙයි (4.1).

• ජාතික මට්ටමින්, අවශ්‍යතා සපුරාලීම සම්බන්ධව රජය තරමක් දුරට ප්‍රතිචාර දක්වන බව තමන්ට හැඟෙන බව ජනතාව ප්‍රකාශ කර ඇත (7.7). පළාත් වශයෙන් ගත් කළ, නැගෙනහිර (8.5), උතුරු (8.1) සහ දකුණු (8) පළාත් ජාතික සාමාන්‍යයට වඩා ඉහළ අගයක් වාර්තා කරන අතර, ජනයාගේ අවශ්‍යතාවයන් සපුරාලීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් රජයේ නිලධාරීන් තරමක් දුරට ප්‍රතිචාර දක්වන බවට එම පළාත් තුළින් තක්සේරු වී ඇත. ස්ත්‍රී පුරුෂ භාවය

අනුව ද, කාන්තා (7.9) සහ පුරුෂ (7.5) දෙපාර්ශවයම අවශ්‍යතා සපුරාලීමේ දී රජය තරමක් දුරට ප්‍රතිචාර දක්වන බව පවසා ඇත.

• ජාතික මට්ටමින් පුද්ගලික ආරක්ෂාව ගැන විමසූ විට, ජනතාව මධ්‍යස්ථභාවයක් දරා ඇති බවට (6.6) පිළිබිඹු වන අතර ස්ත්‍රී පුරුෂ භාවය අනුව ද (කාන්තා - 6.6 සහ පිරිමි - 6.6) එම අදහස ඒ ආකාරයෙන්ම ඉදිරිපත් වී ඇත. නමුත්, උතුරු (5) සහ උතුරු මැද (5.5) පළාත්වල ජනතාවගේ අදහස් එම පරාසයේ පහළ අගයක් ගනී. මුස්ලිම් ජනතාව (7.1) ට වඩා දෙමළ (5.9) සහ සිංහල ජනතාව (6.6) මේ සම්බන්ධයෙන් මධ්‍යස්ථභාවයක් දරා ඇත.

• ප්‍රජා ආරක්ෂාව සම්බන්ධයෙන්, ජාතික මට්ටමින් (8.5) ජනතාවගේ අදහස් බලන කළ පෙනී යන්නේ ඔවුන් එය තරමක් ආරක්ෂිත සහ ඉතා ආරක්ෂිත යන අදහස් හා සම්බන්ධ කරන බවය. පළාත් වශයෙන් ගත් කළ, උතුරු (5.2) සහ නැගෙනහිර (6.2) පළාත්වල ජනතාවට ආරක්ෂිත බවක් දැනෙන්නේ අඩු වශයෙනි. දෙමළ ජනතාවට (6.1) වඩා සිංහල (8.9) සහ මුස්ලිම් ජනතාව (7.6) ප්‍රජා ආරක්ෂාව ඉහළ මට්ටමක පවතින බව විශ්වාස කරයි.



# ඉදිරි මග

වසර තුනකට ආසන්න කාලයක් පළමු අදියර සඳහා සූදානම් වීමෙන්, එය සංකල්පගත කිරීමෙන්, දියත් කිරීමෙන් සහ එහි දත්ත විශ්ලේෂණය කිරීමෙන් පසු මූලික වාර්තාව එළිදැක්වීම තුළින් බැරෝමීටර ලේකම් කාර්යාලය විශාල සන්ධිස්ථානයක් අත්කර ගෙන ඇත. ඒ අතරම, මෙම වාර්තාව එළිදැක්වීම ඉදිරි වසර සඳහා සැලසුම් කර ඇති මාර්ග සිතියමේ එක් පියවරක් පමණි. සැලසුම් කර ඇති ප්‍රධාන ක්‍රියාකාරකම් කිහිපයක් පහත දක්වා ඇත:

- සමීක්ෂණයේ දෙවන අදියර 2021 වර්ෂයේ ජූනි මාසයේ සිට ආරම්භ කරන ලද්දේ සමීක්ෂණ ප්‍රශ්නාවලිය සකස් කිරීම, නියමු අධ්‍යයනය සහ දත්ත රැස් කිරීම ආශ්‍රයෙනි. මෙම අදියරේ සොයාගැනීම්, පළමු අදියරේ සොයාගැනීම් හා සංසන්දනාත්මකව බලමින් එහි විශ්ලේෂණයක් ද සහිතව, 2022 වර්ෂයේ ජූනි මාසය වන විට ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමට හැකි වනු ඇත.
- “විශ්වාසය”, “අන්‍යන්‍යතාවය” සහ “ක්‍රියාකාරී පුරවැසිභාවය” යන බැරෝමීටර විෂයපථ වලට අදාළ තේමාත්මක අධ්‍යයන හයක් 2022 වර්ෂයේ පළමු කාර්තුව තුළ විවිධ කාලවලදී එළිදැක්වේ.
- ඊට සමගාමීව, බැරෝමීටර මූලපිරීම සඳහා ඉතා වැදගත් අදහස් එක් කරන, ප්‍රතිසන්ධානය සහ සමාජ ඒකාබද්ධතාවය පිළිබඳ කතිකාවතට ඉතා ප්‍රයෝජනවත් අදහස් ඉදිරිපත් කරන සංකල්ප සටහන් ප්‍රකාශයට පත් කෙරේ.
- බැරෝමීටර වෙබ් අඩවිය 2022 වර්ෂයේ මුල් භාගයේදී එළිදැක්වනු ඇති අතර එයට බැරෝමීටරය භාෂා තුනෙන්ම ප්‍රකාශයට පත් කරන සියලුම ලිපි ලේඛන ඇතුළත් වේ. පර්යේෂකයින්ට පළමු අදියරේ දත්ත භාවිතයෙන් නිශ්චිත විශ්ලේෂණයක් ජනනය කිරීමට හැකි වන පරිදි දත්ත විශ්ලේෂණ මෙවලමක් ද මෙම වෙබ් අඩවියේ අඩංගු වේ. ප්‍රතිසන්ධානය පිළිබඳ


උද්යෝගිමත් මහජන කතිකාවතක් ඇති කිරීමට උපකාරී වන සමාජ මාධ්‍ය පැවැත්මක් සමඟින් වෙබ් අඩවිය නීතිපතා යාවත්කාලීන කෙරේ.

• බැරෝමීටරයෙන් ජනනය වන සාක්ෂි මහජන කතිකාවත පෝෂණය කරනු ලබන අතර එයට ප්‍රධාන දේශපාලන සහ පරිපාලන පාර්ශවකරුවන්, පුරවැසියන් මෙන්ම ප්‍රාදේශීය තීරණ ගන්නන් සමඟ මුහුණට මුහුණ සිදු කරන සාකච්ඡා ද ඇතුළත් වේ. ඊට අමතරව, බැරෝමීටරය සැකසීමේදී අදහස් ලබාදීම තුළින් දායක වූ ප්‍රජාවන් සමඟ සමීක්ෂණ සොයාගැනීම් බෙදා ගැනීමේ සැසි ඇතුළුව බිම් මට්ටමේ උපදේශන සිදු කරනු ලැබේ.

• ආයතනික වශයෙන්, වාර්ෂිකව බැරෝමීටරය දියත් කිරීම බැරෝමීටරයේ හවුල්කරුන් විසින් අඛණ්ඩව සිදු කරනු ඇති අතර නුදුරු අනාගතයේ දී ශ්‍රී ලංකා විවෘත විශ්වවිද්‍යාලය (OUSL) එහි හවුල්කරුවෙක් ලෙස සම්බන්ධ වනු ඇත. අවසානයේදී, මෙම සමූහය ශ්‍රී ලංකා බැරෝමීටරයේ කාර්යය සාමූහිකව ඉදිරියට ගෙන යන රජයේ සංවිධාන, විශ්ව විද්‍යාල සහ බුද්ධිමණ්ඩල වල නව සාමාජිකයින් ඇතුළත් කරමින් පුළුල් වනු ඇත.

ශ්‍රී ලංකා බැරෝමීටරය පියවරෙන් පියවර වැඩි දියුණු වෙමින් ඉදිරියට යන ක්‍රියාවලියකි. සමීක්ෂණයේ කාලානුරූප අදියරයන්, තේමාත්මක අධ්‍යයනයන් සහ සාකච්ඡා පත්‍රිකාවන් ඔස්සේ සාක්ෂි පදනම වර්ධනය වන විට, කාලයත් සමඟ පුරවැසියන්ගේ අදහස් සහ අභිලාෂයන් වඩා හොඳින් අවබෝධ කර ගැනීම සඳහා වැඩිදුර විශ්ලේෂණයන් සහ පර්යේෂණ සිදු කිරීමේ අවශ්‍යතාවය ඉස්මතු වනු ඇත.

ශ්‍රී ලංකාව සමාජීය වශයෙන් එකමුතු සමාජයක් කරා ගමන් කිරීමට නම්, ජාතික මෙන්ම ප්‍රාදේශීය මට්ටමින් තීරණ ගන්නන්ට, පර්යේෂකයන්ට මෙන්ම ක්‍රියාකාරීන්ට ශ්‍රී ලංකා බැරෝමීටරය මගින් “ජනතාවගේ හඬ, ජනතාවගේ තේරීම්” අවබෝධ කර ගැනීම පහසු කරවීමට ගන්නා ප්‍රයත්නය ඉතා වැදගත් වේ.



# SRI LANKA BAROMETER

*OUR VOICES . OUR CHOICES*

අපේ හඬ . අපේ තීරණ

எங்கள் குரல்கள் . எங்கள் தேர்வுகள்

நிறைவேற்றுச் சுருக்கம்

இலங்கையில் நல்லிணக்கம்பற்றிய  
தேசியரீதியான பொதுமக்கள்  
கருத்துக்கணிப்பீட்டின் அடிப்படை  
அறிக்கை

2020 - 2021





# நிறைவேற்றுச் சுருக்கம்

இந்த அடிப்படை அறிக்கையானது, 2020 ஆம் ஆண்டில் முதன்முதலில் நடத்தப்பட்ட ஸ்ரீ லங்கா பரோமீட்டர் (Sri Lanka Barometer) எனும் தேசிய பிரதிநிதித்துவ பொதுக் கருத்துக்கணிப்பின் முடிவுகளை சமர்ப்பிக்கின்றது.

## ஸ்ரீ லங்கா பரோமீட்டரிற்கான (Sri Lanka Barometer) பகுத்தறிவுரீதியான காரணம்: எங்கள் குரல்கள், எங்கள் தெரிவுகள்

பல சவால்கள் இருந்தபோதிலும், யுத்தத்தின் முடிவானது நல்லிணக்கத்திற்கான நம்பிக்கையையும், போரால் பாதிக்கப்பட்ட சமூகங்களையும் உறவுகளையும் மீளக் கட்டியெழுப்புவதற்கான வாய்ப்பையும், மேலும் முன்னேறுவதற்கான வாய்ப்பையும் கொண்டு வந்தது. நல்லிணக்கம் மற்றும் சமூக ஒற்றுமையை அடைவதற்கு அரசு மற்றும் சிவில் சமூக அமைப்புகளால் கொள்கை மற்றும் வேலைத்திட்ட முயற்சிகள் உள்ளன. இலங்கையில் நல்லிணக்கம், பொறுப்புக்கூறல் மற்றும் மனித உரிமைகளை மேம்படுத்துவதற்காக 2015 ஆம் ஆண்டு ஒக்டோபர் 1 ஆம் திகதி மனித உரிமைகள் பேரவையின் 30/1 தீர்மானமானது நல்லிணக்கத்தை நோக்கியதான குறிப்பிடத்தக்க படியாகும். எவ்வாறாயினும், கடந்த காலத்தை கையாளுவதற்கான முழு அளவிலான நீதித்துறை மற்றும் நீதித்துறை அல்லாத நடவடிக்கைகளை உள்ளடக்கிய ஒரு விரிவான அணுகுமுறையானது அத் தீர்மானத்தில் எதிர்பார்த்தபடி நடைபெறவில்லை.

முக்கிய அரசு தலைமையிலான நல்லிணக்க முயற்சிகளில் குடிமக்களின் ஆலோசனையை பெறுதல் மற்றும் இந்த செயல்முறைகளுக்கு அவர்களின் உள்ளீடுகளை அங்கீகரித்தல் ஆகியன அடங்கும். இதில் 2010 ஆம்

ஆண்டின் கற்றுக்கொண்ட பாடங்கள் மற்றும் நல்லிணக்க ஆணைக்குழு (LLRC), பல்வேறு விசாரணைக் குழுக்கள் மற்றும் ஆலோசனை பணிக்குழு (CTF) ஆகியன நாடு முழுவதிலும் இருந்து சான்றுகளைக் கேட்பதற்கான மற்றொரு குறிப்பிடத்தக்க முயற்சியாகும். சமூகங்கள் மற்றும் மத நல்லிணக்கத்திற்கான பாராளுமன்ற விசேட குழுவால் 2019 ஆம் ஆண்டு வெளியிடப்பட்ட தியவன்னா பிரகடனம், குடிமக்களுடன் கலந்தாலோசிப்பதன் முக்கியத்துவத்தை அங்கீகரித்து, வழக்கமான கருத்துக் கணிப்புக்கு அழைப்பு விடுக்கும் அரசினால் தலைமைதாங்கப்படும் மற்றொரு முயற்சியாகும். நல்லிணக்கத்திற்கான அரசின் முன்னெடுப்புக்களின் திசையை வடிவமைக்க இந்தக் கருத்துக்கள் பயன்படுத்தப்பட வேண்டும் என்று பரிந்துரைக்கப்பட்டது.

ஆயினும் கூட, போரினால் நேரடியாகப் பாதிக்கப்பட்ட மக்கள் எதிர்கொள்ளும் பல தடைகள் போலவே, போரைத் தோற்றுவித்த பல நிலைமைகளும் தற்போதும் அவ்வாறே உள்ளன. நல்லிணக்கத்திற்கான ஆரம்ப வேகமும் காலப்போக்கில் தடைப்பட்டுள்ளது. மேலும், 2009 ஆம் ஆண்டு யுத்தம் முடிவடைந்ததிலிருந்து, நல்லிணக்கம் மற்றும் சமூக ஒற்றுமை தொடர்பான பிரச்சினைகள் அனுபவங்கள் பற்றிய குடிமக்களின் உணர்வை அடையாளங் காண்பதும் அவர்கள் அதனை எவ்வாறு பார்க்கிறார்கள் என்பதைப் புரிந்துகொள்வதும் தொடர்ச்சியான தேவையாக உள்ளது.

## ஸ்ரீ லங்கா பரோமீட்டரின் முக்கிய அம்சங்கள்

ஸ்ரீ லங்கா பரோமீட்டரானது (Sri Lanka Barometer), தீர்மானம் மேற்கொள்வோருக்கு ஒரு பொதுக் கருத்துரையை தெரிவிப்பதற்காகவும், காலப்போக்கில் அதை உணர்வைப்பதற்காகப் பணியாற்றுவதற்காகவும், இலங்கையில் நல்லிணக்கம் மற்றும் சமூக ஒருங்கிணைப்பு பற்றிய புரிதலை ஆழப்படுத்துவதை நோக்கமாகக் கொண்டுள்ளது.


இது நல்லிணக்கத்தின் பின்னணியில் உள்ள முக்கியமான பிரச்சினைகளை பிரதிநிதித்துவப்படுத்தும் வகையில் வடிவமைக்கப்பட்டுள்ளதுடன், காலப்போக்கில் மாறக்கூடிய நல்லிணக்கம் மற்றும் சமூக ஒற்றுமை பற்றிய மக்களின் பல்வேறுவிதமான கருத்துக்களைக் பெற்றுக்கொள்வதற்காக கருத்தாக்கம் செய்யப்பட்டுள்ளது. இது நல்லிணக்கம் மற்றும் சமூக ஒற்றுமையை அனுபவிப்பது சார்ந்ததாக கருதப்படும் முக்கியமான பிரச்சினைகளை ஆராய்கிறது. எனவே, நல்லிணக்கம் என்பது பன்முகத்தன்மை கொண்டதாகவுள்ளதுடன், அது சூழல் சார்ந்ததாகவும் மற்றும் பரந்த அளவிலான அனுபவங்கள், முயற்சிகள் மற்றும் வாய்ப்புகளை உள்ளடக்கியதாகவும் உள்ளது என்பதை அது அங்கீகரிக்கிறது.

இது பின்வரும் நான்கு முக்கிய கூறுகளை உள்ளடக்கியது:

1. மக்கள் நோக்கினை அளவிடும் ஒரு வருடாந்த, நாடளாவிய பொதுக் கருத்துக் கணிப்பு.
2. நல்லிணக்கம் மற்றும் சமூக ஒருங்கிணைப்பு தொடர்பான சிக்கல்களை இன்னும் ஆழமாக ஆராய்வதற்காக பெரும்பாலும் தரமான வழிமுறைகளைப் பயன்படுத்தும் கருப்பொருள் ஆய்வுகள்.

3. நல்லிணக்கம் மற்றும் அதனுடன் தொடர்புடைய பிரச்சினைகள் பற்றிய கலந்துரையாடல் பத்திரங்கள் மற்றும் கருத்துக் குறிப்புகளின் தொகுப்பு.
4. ஆதார அடிப்படை பற்றிய பொதுச் சொற்பொழிவைத் தெரிவிப்பதற்கான ஒரு அணுகல் கூறு.

இச்செய்முறையில் பிரதான பாத்திரமேற்கும் ஏழு விடயப் பரப்புக்களில் அரசாங்க, அரச சார்பற்ற மற்றும் அடிமட்ட முன்னெடுப்புக்களுக்கு ஆதரவளிப்பதன் மூலம் இலங்கையின் நல்லிணக்கச் செய்முறையை வலுப்படுத்துவதில் பங்களிப்புச் செய்வதற்காக, 2017 நவம்பரில் ஆரம்பிக்கப்பட்ட நான்கு வருட வேலைத்திட்டமான நல்லிணக்க வலுவூட்டல் செயல்முறைகள் (SRP) மூலம் இது ஆரம்பிக்கப்பட்டது. SRP வேலைத்திட்டமானது ஐரோப்பிய ஒன்றியம் மற்றும் ஜேர்மன் பெடரல் வெளியுறவு அலுவலகத்தால் கூட்டாக நிதியளிக்கப்படுவதுடன் இலங்கையிலுள்ள ஜேர்மன் தொழில்நுட்ப ஒத்துழைப்பு (GIZ) மற்றும் பிரிட்டிஷ் கவுன்சிலால் நீதி, மனித உரிமைகள் மற்றும் சட்ட சீர்திருத்த அமைச்சுடன் இணைந்து நடைமுறைப்படுத்தப்படுகிறது. மேலும், இந்த முன்னெடுப்பானது, சர்வதேச அனுபவங்கள் மற்றும் அதையொத்த ஏனைய முன்னெடுப்புக்களுடன் தொடர்பை கொண்டுள்ளது. நல்லிணக்கம் மற்றும் சமூக ஒற்றுமையை வலுப்படுத்துதல் தொடர்பில் தென்னாபிரிக்க அனுபவத்திலிருந்து பெற்று தென்னாபிரிக்க நல்லிணக்க பரோமீட்டர் (South Africa Reconciliation Barometer) கருத்துக் கணிப்பினை இரண்டு தசாப்தங்களாக அமுல்படுத்துதலானது, இலங்கையிலும் ஸ்ரீ லங்கா பரோமீட்டருடனான (Sri Lanka Barometer) முயற்சிகளுக்கு அடித்தளத்தை வழங்க உதவியது.



## ஸ்ரீ லங்கா பரோமீட்டரின் வடிவமைப்பு

பரோமீட்டரானது, இலங்கையில் நல்லிணக்கத்தை ஆராய உதவும் எட்டு களங்களின் மூலம் நல்லிணக்கத்தை ஆராய்கிறது. இந்த கருத்தியல் கட்டமைப்பானது பரோமீட்டருக்கான அடிப்படை அடித்தளத்தை உருவாக்குகிறது. ஒவ்வொரு களம் பற்றிய மேலதிக விவரங்களுக்கு அறிமுகப் பகுதியைப் பார்க்கவும்.

எட்டு களங்களாவன: அடையாளம் மற்றும் உடைமை; சம வாய்ப்பு; தனிப்பட்ட, சமூக மற்றும் அரசியல் நம்பிக்கை; செயலிலுள்ள குடியரிமை; கடந்த காலத்தை கையாளுதல்; அனைவருக்கும் நீதி; பொறுப்பான நிர்வாகம்; மற்றும் பாதுகாப்பு மற்றும் நல்வாழ்வு ஆகியனவாகும்.

பரோமீட்டர் (Barometer) கருத்துக் கணிப்பானது ஒரு அளவீர்தியான முறையைப் பயன்படுத்தியது. இது எண்ணியல் தரவைச் சேகரித்தல் மற்றும் எண்ணியல் பகுப்பாய்வை மேற்கொள்வதன் மூலம் உணர்வுகளை அளவிட உதவுகிறது. ஒரு கட்டமைக்கப்பட்ட வினாக்கொத்தினை ஆராய்ச்சிக் கருவியாகப் பயன்படுத்தி அளவிடக் கூடியதும் எண்ணக் கூடியமான தரவு சேகரிக்கப்பட்டது. இது ஒவ்வொரு களத்திலும் அடையாளம் காணப்பட்ட சில சிக்கல்களுக்கு ஏற்ப வடிவமைக்கப்பட்டுள்ளது. இது பல-கட்ட எழுமாறான மாதிரி நுட்பத்தையும் முறையான எழுமாறான மாதிரி முறையையும் பயன்படுத்தியது. எதிர்பார்க்கப்பட்ட 3880 பதில்தருனர்களை கொண்ட மாதிரியில் 3819 பதில்தருனர்கள் (95% நம்பிக்கை மட்டம்) தேசிய அளவில் பூர்த்தி செய்யப்பட்டனர் ஆய்வு முறை மற்றும்

மாதிரி பற்றிய மேலதிக விவரங்களுக்கு தயவுசெய்து அறிமுகப் பகுதியைப் பார்க்கவும்.

முன்மொழியப்பட்ட குறிகாட்டிகள் மற்றும் அவற்றின் கூட்டு அளவீடுகளின் மனோதத்துவ சோதனை மற்றும் சரிபார்ப்பானது, முன்னோடி கற்கை மற்றும் முக்கிய ஆய்வுக் கட்டங்களில் மேற்கொள்ளப்பட்டது. பரோமீட்டரில் (Barometer) பயன்படுத்தப்படும் அளவீடு வலுவானதாக இருப்பதை மனோதத்துவ சரிபார்ப்பு உறுதிசெய்தது. இதனால் இந்த குறிகாட்டிகளைப் பயன்படுத்தும் கணிசமான பகுப்பாய்வானது வலுவானதாகவும் நம்பகமானதாகவும் செல்லுபடியானதாகவும் மற்றும் நம்பிக்கைக்குரியதாகவுமுள்ளது. இலங்கைத் தொகைமதிப்பு மற்றும் புள்ளிவிபரத் திணைக்களத்தின் பிரசுரிக்கப்பட்ட 2012 ஆம் ஆண்டின் மக்கள்தொகைத் தரவுகளைப் பயன்படுத்தி, வழங்கப்பட்ட தரவுத் தொகுப்பானது மாவட்டங்களின் சனத்தொகைப் பிரதிநிதித்துவம், பாலினம் மற்றும் வயதுப் பண்புகள் ஆகியவற்றின் அடிப்படையில் அளவிடப்பட்டது .



உரு1: பரோமீட்டரில் உள்ள நல்லிணக்கத்திற்கான எட்டுக் களங்கள்

## ஸ்ரீ லங்கா பரோமீட்டரின் (Sri Lanka Barometer) அடிப்படைக் கண்டுபிடிப்புகள்


கண்டுபிடிப்புகள் இரண்டு வழிகளில் வழங்கப்படுகின்றன. அவற்றில் ஒன்று கலப்பு குறியீடுக்கான சராசரி மதிப்பெண்கள் (1 முதல் 10 வரை ஒரு மதிப்பெண்) அல்லது ஒற்றை கேள்விகளுக்கு பதிலுரைகள்.



### நல்லிணக்கம்

- பெரும்பான்மையான இலங்கையர்கள் நல்லிணக்கத்தை ஒற்றுமை மற்றும் ஒருமித்த இலங்கையை அடைதல் (37.6%) தொடர்பான அர்த்தங்களுடன் தொடர்புபடுத்துகின்றனர். நல்லிணக்கமானது பொதுவாக சாதகமானது என்றும் இலங்கைக்கு நல்லது என்றும் மக்கள் கருதுகின்றனர் (23.3%). ஒட்டுமொத்தமாக, 11.3% ஆனோர் நல்லிணக்கம் இல்லாதிருப்பதாகக் கருதுகின்றனர்(11.3%). சில இலங்கையர்கள் எதுவும் நினைவுக்கு வருவதில்லை/சொல்லுக்கு எந்த அர்த்தமும் இல்லை (9%) என்றும் நினைக்கிறார்கள்.
- நல்லிணக்கத்தை நோக்கிய முன்னேற்றம் ஏற்பட்டுள்ளதாக இலங்கையர்கள் நடுநிலையான பார்வையைக் கொண்டுள்ளனர் (6.4). அனைத்து முக்கிய இன மற்றும் மத குழுக்களும் பால்நிலையால் வழங்கப்பட்ட புள்ளிகளை போலவே நடுநிலை வகிக்கின்றன. அதே வேளை, இலங்கையர்களிடையே அவர்களின் இருப்பிடம், பால்நிலை, மதம் இனம் என்பவற்றை சாராது எல்லோரிடமும்

- நல்லிணக்கத்திற்கான கோரிக்கை வலுவானதாகவே (8.1) உள்ளது.
- ஆயுத மோதலின் தாக்கத்தை சமாளிக்க இலங்கையர்களுக்கு உதவுவதில் நிறுவனங்களை முக்கியமானதாக உள்ளதாக (7.4) இலங்கையர்கள் கருதுகின்றனர்.
- அரசியலில் விருப்பம் மற்றும் அர்ப்பணிப்பு இல்லாமை (25.8%), தேசியவாதம் (20.2%), மற்றும் பிரித்தானும் அரசியல் (17.8%) ஆகியன முக்கியமான தடைகளாக இருப்பதை அடையாளம் கண்டு, தடைகள் இருப்பதை அவர்கள் அங்கீகரிக்கின்றனர். சமய மற்றும் இனரீதியான பாகுபாடு (8.3%), சட்டரீதியான சவால்கள் (4.3%), ஊழல் (4.1%), தீவிரவாதம் (3.3%) மற்றும் பொருளாதார சமத்துவமின்மை (3.4%) ஆகியவையும் தடைகளாக அடையாளம் காணப்படுகின்றன. நல்லிணக்கத்திற்கு தடைகள் இல்லை என்று சிலர் (4%) நினைக்கிறார்கள். 10 பேரில் ஒருவரால் (10%) தடைகளை அடையாளம் காண முடியவில்லை.



படம் 2: இனக்குழுவின் நல்லிணக்கத்தை நோக்கிய முன்னேற்றத்திற்கான கோரிக்கை மற்றும் பார்வைகள் (சராசரி மதிப்பு)




களம்:

# கடந்த காலத்தை கையாளுதல்

- இலங்கையர்கள், போரின் பின்னணியில் கடந்த காலத்தை கையாளுவதை தேசிய அளவிலும் (7.5) ஆண்கள் (7.4) மற்றும் பெண்களும் (7.5) ஆகவும் முக்கியமானதாக கருதுகின்றனர் வடக்கு (8.4) மற்றும் கிழக்கு (8) மாகாணங்களில் உள்ள மக்கள் அதன் முக்கியத்துவம் குறித்து வலுவான கருத்துக்களைக் கொண்டுள்ளனர்.
- அனைத்து முக்கிய இனக் குழுக்களினதும் மக்கள் கடந்த காலத்தை கையாளுவதன் முக்கியத்துவத்தை உணர்ந்துள்ளனர், தமிழர்கள் (8.1) மிக உயர்ந்த முக்கியத்துவத்தை அறிக்கையிடுகின்றனர்

, அதைத் தொடர்ந்து சிங்களவர்கள் (7.4) மற்றும் முஸ்லிம் சமூகங்கள் (7.3) அவ்வாறு அறிக்கையிடுகின்றனர் .

- ஆயுத மோதல்கள் தொடர்பான கடந்தகால அநீதிகளை ஏற்றுக்கொள்வது முக்கியம் என்பதை இலங்கையர்கள் (7.4) ஒப்புக்கொள்கிறார்கள். வடக்கு (8.6), கிழக்கு (7.9) மற்றும் ஊவா (7.7) மாகாணங்களில் உள்ள மக்கள் கடந்தகால அநீதிகளை அதிக அளவில் ஏற்றுக்கொள்வதாகத் தெரிவித்துள்ளனர்.
- நினைவேந்தல் தொடர்பில் மக்கள் தேசிய ரீதியாக நடுநிலையில் (6.8) உள்ளனர். மாகாண ரீதியில், வடக்கு (8.3) மற்றும்



- அரசியல் இடையீடு அல்லது தலையீடு
- தடைகள் இல்லை
- போருக்கு பின்னரான சூழலில் உள்ள பிரச்சனைகளை கையாளாமை.
- அரசாங்கத்திடமிருந்தான மேலாண்மை / உதவியின்மை.
- இனவாதம்
- கடந்த காலத்தை கையாள்வதற்கான அரசியல் விருப்பமின்மை
- தகவல் பற்றாக்குறை
- அடிப்படைத் தேவைகளைப் பூர்த்தி செய்வதற்கான வருமானம், வேலைவாய்ப்பு, கல்வி, வசதிகள், என்பவற்றின் பற்றாக்குறை
- வெளிநாடுகளின் தலையீடு/ அரச சார்பற்ற நிறுவனங்களின் தலையீடு
- ஏனையவை

படம் 3: நீதிக்கு மிகப்பெரிய தடைகள் - தேசிய அளவில், முதலில் குறிப்பிடப்பட்டது (%)



களம்:

# கடந்த காலத்தை கையாளுதல்

கிழக்கு (7.5) மாகாணங்களில் உள்ள மக்களிடையே நினைவேந்தல் பற்றிய உயர் மட்ட உடன்பாடு உள்ளது.

- இலங்கையர்களின் இழப்பீடுகளுக்கான முக்கிய நியாயங்களில் வருமான இழப்பு (25.3%), கட்டாய வெளியேற்றம் (22.7%) மற்றும் சமூக நிலம் மற்றும் சொத்து இழப்பு (21%) ஆகியவை அடங்கும். காணாமல் ஆக்கப்பட்டவர்கள், விசாரணையின்றி தடுத்து வைக்கப்பட்டவர்கள், சித்திரவதையால் பாதிக்கப்பட்டவர்கள் மற்றும் குடும்பங்களுக்கு இழப்பீடு வழங்கப்பட வேண்டும் என்று சிலர் நினைக்கிறார்கள்.

- தேசிய அளவில், அரசியல் செல்வாக்கு மற்றும் குறுக்கீடானது (31.8%) கடந்த காலத்தை கையாளுவதில் மிகவும் குறிப்பிடத்தக்க தடையாக கருதப்படுகிறது. பாதிக்கப்பட்டவர்களின் தொடர்ச்சியான அதிர்ச்சி, கடந்தகாலத்தில்தாதிக்கப்பட்டவர்களுக்கு நீதியின்மை, அச்சம் மற்றும் சமத்துவமின்மை, நல்லிணக்கம், நினைவேந்தல், நம்பிக்கை மற்றும் புரிதல் போன்ற பிற பிரச்சினைகளுக்கு மேலதிகமாக கடந்த காலத்தை (7.9%) கையாளுவதற்கான அரசியல்ரீதியான விருப்பமின்மையை மற்றொரு தடையாக சிலர் அடையாளம் காண்கின்றனர்.



களம்:


# அனைவருக்கும் நீதி

## • ஆயுத மோதலில்

பாதிக்கப்பட்டவர்களுக்கான நீதிக்கான மிகப்பெரிய தடைகளாவன அரசியல் விருப்பமின்மை (29%), ஊழல்/நிலையற்ற பொருளாதாரம் (13%), அரசியல் செல்வாக்கு/அரசியல் தலையீடு (11%), தேவையற்ற தாமதங்கள்/சட்ட செயல்முறைகளை முடக்குதல் (6%); மற்றும் குற்றவாளிகள் எந்த விளைவும் இல்லாமல் தப்பிக்கின்றமை (5%) என்பனவாகும்.


## • அனைத்து மாகாணங்களிலும்,

பொதுமக்களுக்கு எதிராக வன்முறையைப் பிரயோகிப்பது இலங்கையர்கள் உடன்படவில்லை (10 இற்கு 2.8 மதிப்பெண்கள்) ஆனால் வட மாகாணத்தில் உள்ள மக்கள் கடுமையாக, பொதுமக்களுக்கு எதிராக வன்முறையைப் பயன்படுத்துவதில் உடன்படவில்லை அல்லது கடுமையாக உடன்படவில்லை. ஆண்கள் மற்றும் பெண்கள் இருபாலாரும் பொதுமக்களுக்கெதிராக வன்முறையை பிரயோகிப்பது தொடர்பில் எதிர்ப்பையே கொண்டிருக்கிறார்கள்.



உரு IV: அனைவருக்குமான நீதியை அடைவதில் உள்ள தடைகள்- தே சிய அளவில், முதலில் குறிப்பிடப்பட்டது (%)





களம்:

# அடையாளம் மற்றும் உரித்துடமை


- இலங்கையர் என்ற அடையாளத்தின் முக்கியத்துவம் மற்றும் அதனை உருவாக்குவதற்கான சாத்தியக்கூறுகள் குறித்து இலங்கையர்கள் உடன்பாடு (7.8) கொண்டுள்ளனர். இந்தக் கருத்துக்கள் ஆண்கள் (7.9) மற்றும் பெண்களிடம் (7.9) சமமாக காணப்படுவதோடு சிறுபான்மையினரிடமும் வடக்கு மற்றும் கிழக்கு மாகாணங்களில் உள்ளவர்களிடமும் வலுவானவையாகவுள்ளன.

அடையாளம் காணப்பட்டுள்ளனர். 14.2% பேர் தங்களை இலங்கையர்கள் என அடையாளப்படுத்திக் கொண்டனர். பத்து பேரில் ஒருவர் தாங்கள் எந்தக் குழுவையும் அடையாளம் காணவில்லை என்று கூறினார், மற்றவர்கள் மதத்தின் அடிப்படையில் (8%) மற்றும் ஏழைகளுடன் (8%) அடையாளம் காணப்பட்டதாகக் கூறினர். 1.3% ஆனோர் மட்டுமே தங்களைப் போன்ற சாதியினருடன் அடையாளம் காணப்பட்டுள்ளனர்.


- மக்கள் ஏனைய சமூகக் குழுக்களைக் காட்டிலும் தங்கள் இனக்குழுவைச் சேர்ந்த (24.7%) மற்றவர்களுடன் மிகவும் வலுவாக அடையாளம் காண்கின்றனர். 7.4% பேர் தங்கள் சொந்த மொழிக் குழுவைச் சேர்ந்தவர்களுடன்

- பொருளாதார நிலை (28.1%), இனம் (26.9%), மதம் (10.4%) மற்றும் மொழி (8.4%) ஆகியன மக்கள் ஏனைய மக்களைப் பாகுபடுத்தும் முக்கிய அடிப்படையாக மக்கள் கருதுகின்றனர்.

0.0 - கடுமையாக உடன்படவில்லை      இல்லை  
 2.5 - உடன்படவில்லை      7.5 - உடன்படுதல்  
 5.0 - உடன்படவோ அல்லது மறுக்கவோ      10 - வலுவாக உடன்படுதல்



உரு V: இலங்கையர் என்ற அடையாளத்தை உருவாக்குவதற்கான முக்கியத்துவம் பற்றிய உள்ளூர்- தேசிய மற்றும் மாகாண அளவு (சராசரிப்பெறுமானம்)



களம்:


# தனிப்பட்ட, சமூக மற்றும் அரசியல் நம்பிக்கை

• பெரும்பாலான இலங்கையர்கள் (64.3%) ஓரளவிற்கு ஒரே சற்றுவுட்டாரத்தில்/ அருகில் வாழும் மக்களை நம்புகிறார்கள்; 13.3% ஆன இலங்கையர்கள் தங்கள் அயலவர்களை அதீதமாக நம்புவதில்லை; மற்றும் 6.3% ஆனோருக்குத் தங்கள் அயலவர்கள் மீது எந்தவிதமான நம்பிக்கையும் இல்லை. 13.5% மற்றும் 2.5% மக்கள் முறையே தங்கள் அயலவர்கள் மீது அதீத நம்பிக்கையும், பெரிய அளவிலான நம்பிக்கையும் கொண்டுள்ளனர் என்று கூறுகிறார்கள்.

• சமூக நம்பிக்கையைப் பரிசீலிக்கும்போது, இலங்கையில் உள்ள மக்கள் தங்களிடமிருந்து வேறுபட்ட சமூகக் குழுக்களைச் சேர்ந்தவர்கள் (4.6) மீது அவநம்பிக்கை கொண்டுள்ளனர். புவியியல் ரீதியாக, தெற்கு (4.1), வடமத்திய (4.2), கிழக்கு (4.3), சப்ரகமுவ (4.6), வடமேல் (4.6) மற்றும் மேல் (4.6) மாகாணங்களில் உள்ள மக்கள் மற்ற சமூகக் குழுக்களின் உறுப்பினர்களை மீது மிகவும் அவநம்பிக்கை கொண்டுள்ளனர். வட மாகாணத்தில்

உள்ள மக்கள் ஏனையோரில் (5.4) அதிக நம்பிக்கைகொண்டுள்ளனர். சிறுபான்மை இனக்குழுக்கள் (தமிழர்களுக்கு 10 இற்கு 5 மதிப்பெண்கள் மற்றும் முஸ்லிம்களுக்கு 10 இற்கு 5.3 மதிப்பெண்கள்) மற்ற சமூகக் குழுக்களின் மக்கள் மீது அதிக நம்பிக்கை கொண்டுள்ள அதே சமயம் சிங்களவர்கள் மற்ற சமூகக் குழுக்களின் மக்கள் மீது (4.5) குறைவாக நம்பிக்கை உள்ளனர். பால் நிலை அடிப்படையிலும் வேறுபட்ட சமூக குழுக்களை சார்ந்த மக்களிடையே நம்பிக்கையற்ற தன்மையே காணப்படுகின்றது (ஆண்கள் - 4.7 மற்றும் பெண்கள் - 4.5)

• இலங்கையர்களுக்கு (6.1) மிதமான அளவிலான அரசியல் நம்பிக்கை அல்லது நிறுவனங்களில் நம்பிக்கை வைத்துள்ளனர். வடக்கு (5.1) மற்றும் கிழக்கு (5.3) மாகாணங்களில் உள்ள மக்கள் மற்ற மாகாணங்களில் உள்ள மக்களை விட குறைவான அரசியல் நம்பிக்கையைக் கொண்டுள்ளனர். தென் மாகாணத்தில் உள்ள மக்களும் (5.9) மற்றவர்களை விட குறைவான நம்பிக்கை கொண்டவர்கள்.





களம்:

# சம வாய்ப்பு

• தேசிய அளவில், அனைவருக்கும் சம வாய்ப்புகள் உள்ளதா என்பதைப் பற்றிய நோக்கில் மக்கள் பெரும்பாலும் நடுநிலையாக வே (6.2) உள்ளனர். ஊவா மாகாணம் (7) நாட்டில் மக்களுக்கு சமமான வாய்ப்புகள் உண்டு என்ற உடன்பாட்டின் பக்கம் சார்பான நோக்கினைக் கொண்ட வித்தியாசமான ஒரே ஒரு மாகாணமாகும்.


• அனைத்துக் குழுக்களும் சமமான வாய்ப்பைப் பெறுதல் தொடர்பாக இனக்குழுவின் அடிப்படையில், சிங்களவர்கள் மிகவும் நடுநிலை (6.2) உடன்பாட்டையும், அதே சமயம் முஸ்லிம்கள் (5.4) மற்றும் தமிழர்கள் (5.8)

குறைந்த அளவிலான உடன்பாட்டையும் கொண்டுள்ளனர்.

• சம வாய்ப்பு இருப்பதாக ஒப்புக்கொண்ட நகர்ப்புற (6.1) மற்றும் கிராமப்புற சமூகங்களுடன் (6.2) ஒப்பிடும்போது தோட்டத் துறையில் உள்ளவர்கள் (5.9) வாய்ப்புகளின் சமத்துவத்தை சற்று குறைவாகவே உணர்கிறார்கள்.

• பால் நிலை அடிப்படையிலும் சமவாய்ப்புக்கள் பற்றி ஆண்கள்(6.2) மற்றும் பெண்கள்(6.2) இருபாலாரும் ஒத்த தன்மையான நடுநிலை கருத்துக்களையே கொண்டிருக்கின்றனர்.

0.0 - கடுமையாக உடன்படவில்லை  
2.5 - உடன்படவில்லை  
5.0 - உடன்படவோ அல்லது மறுக்கவோ இல்லை  
7.5 - உடன்படுதல்  
10 - வலுவாக உடன்படுதல்



படம் vii: இனக்குழு மூலம் சம வாய்ப்பு (சராசரி)



களம்:


# செயலிலுள்ள குடியுரிமை

- இலங்கையர்களிடையே செயலில் உள்ள குடியுரிமை 10 இற்கு 2.2 என்ற அளவில் உள்ளது, அங்கு பலர் தங்களுக்கு வாய்ப்பு கிடைத்தால் செய்வோம் ஆனால் ஒருபோதும் வாய்ப்புக் கிடைக்கவில்லை என்றும் கூறுகிறார்கள். அதே போல ஆண்கள்(2.5) மற்றும் பெண்கள்(2) ஒத்த பிரதிபலிப்பையே கொண்டிருக்கிறார்கள்.
- தெற்கு (1.8), வடமத்திய (1.8) மற்றும் சப்ரகமுவ (1.7) மாகாணங்களில் உள்ள மக்கள் குடியுரிமை நடவடிக்கைகளில் ஈடுபடுவதற்கான வாய்ப்புகள் குறைவு என்றும் கூறுகிறார்கள். வட மாகாணத்தில்

உள்ள மக்கள் (5.6) ஏனையோருடன் ஒப்பிடுகையில் மிகவும் இயக்கபூர்வமாக உள்ளனர்.

- சிங்களவர்களை விட (2) தமிழர்கள் (4) மற்றும் முஸ்லிம்கள் (2.8) குடியுரிமை பங்கேற்பில் ஈடுபட்டிருக்கலாம் அல்லது ஈடுபடத் தயாராக உள்ளனர்.
- மக்கள் மிதமான அளவிலான அரசியல் செயல்திறனைக் கொண்டுள்ளனர் (6.5), அனைத்து இன , பால்நிலை மற்றும் மதக் குழுக்களிலும் ஒரே மாதிரியான பார்வைகள் தெளிவாக உள்ளன.

0.0 - கடுமையாக உடன்படவில்லை  
2.5 - உடன்படவில்லை  
5.0 - உடன்படவோ அல்லது மறுக்கவோ இல்லை  
7.5 - உடன்படுதல்  
10 - வலுவாக உடன்படுதல்



உரு VIII : தேசிய மற்றும் மாகாண அளவில் செயலிலுள்ள குடியுரிமை




களம்:

# பொறுப்பான நிர்வாகம்

- இந்தக் களமானது, ஆளுகையை வடிவமைப்பதில் பங்குபெறும் மக்களுக்கு உள்ள வாய்ப்புகள், பன்முகத்தன்மைக்கு மதிப்பளிக்கும் அம்சங்கள் மற்றும் பொருளாதார மற்றும் அரசியல் அதிகாரத்திற்கான அணுகல் ஆகியவற்றைக் கருதுகிறது. வடக்கு (7.6), ஊவா (7.6), மற்றும் கிழக்கு (7.4) மாகாணங்களைச் சேர்ந்தவர்கள் மற்றவர்களை விட அதிகமாக ஒப்புக்கொள்கிறார்கள்.
- அனைத்து இலங்கையர்களில் கிட்டத்தட்ட அரைவாசிப் பேர் (43.3%) அனைத்து சமூகங்களைச் சேர்ந்த அரசியல் மற்றும் வணிக உயரடுக்குகளின் ஒரு சிறிய குழு அதிக பொருளாதார சக்தியைக் கொண்டிருப்பதாக நம்புகிறார்கள், அதே நேரத்தில் 33% ஆனோர் அத்தகைய சக்தி

சிங்கள சமூகத்தில் (பெரும்பான்மை மற்றும் உயரடுக்குகள்) குவிந்துள்ளது என்று நினைக்கிறார்கள். 23% ஆனோர் இந்த அதிகாரம் முஸ்லிம் சமூகங்களைச் சேர்ந்த உயரடுக்குகளின் ஒரு சிறிய குழுவில் இருப்பதாக நினைக்கிறார்கள்.

- இதற்கு நேர்மாறாக, மூன்றில் இரண்டு பங்கு இலங்கையர்கள் சிங்கள சமூகம் (59.6% ஆன சிங்கள பெரும்பான்மை மற்றும் 8.5% ஆன சிங்கள உயரடுக்கின் சிறிய குழு) அதிக அரசியல் அதிகாரத்தைக் கொண்டிருப்பதாக நம்புகின்றனர். 30.1% ஆனோர் இந்த அதிகாரம் அனைத்து சமூகங்களைச் சேர்ந்த அரசியல் மற்றும் வணிக உயரடுக்குகளின் ஒரு சிறிய குழுவிற்குள் குவிந்துள்ளது என்று நினைக்கிறார்கள்.



உரு IX: யார் பொருளாதார மற்றும் அரசியல் சக்தியை அதிகமாக கொண்டுள்ளனர்- தேசிய அளவில் (%)



களம்:

# பாதுகாப்பு மற்றும் நல்வாழ்வு


• சார்பு குடும்ப நலன் பற்றிய கருத்து 10 இல் 7.5 மதிப்பெண்ணாக உள்ளது, இது மற்ற குடும்பங்களை விட மக்கள் தங்கள் நல்வாழ்வு ஓரளவு சிறப்பாக இருப்பதாக உணருவதைக் குறிக்கிறது. மாகாண ரீதியாக, பெரும்பாலான மாகாணங்களில் உள்ள மக்கள் நாட்டின் மற்ற குடும்பங்களை விட ஒப்பீட்டளவில் சிறப்பாக இருப்பதாகக் குறிப்பிடுகின்றனர். கிழக்கு (5.8), வடக்கு (6.1) மற்றும் வட மத்திய (6.6) மாகாணங்களில் மோதலால் நேரடியாகப் பாதிக்கப்பட்டவர்கள், மற்ற குடும்பங்களுடன் ஒப்பிடும் போது, தங்கள் குடும்பங்கள் அதே அளவிலான நல்வாழ்வில் இருப்பதாக உணர்கிறார்கள். முஸ்லிம்கள் (6.8) மற்றும் தமிழர்கள் (6.2) தங்களுடைய உறவினர் நலம் சிங்களவர்களை விட (7.7) குறைவாக

இருப்பதாக உணர்கிறார்கள்.

• வாழ்ந்த-வறுமைக் குறிகாட்டி பரந்த அளவிலான அடிப்படைத் தேவைகளுக்குக் கூட அணுகல் இல்லாது பலர் வாழ்ந்து மடிந்துவிட்டார்கள் என்பது பற்றிய உணர்வைக் காட்டுகின்றது, இது 1.4 மதிப்பெண்(ஒருபோதும் அல்லது இரண்டு முறை) ஆகும். மாகாணத்தின் அடிப்படையில், வடக்கு (2), தெற்கு (1.8), ஊவா (1.7) மற்றும் மத்திய (q.6) மாகாணங்கள் தேசிய சராசரியை விட மதிப்பெண்களைக் கொண்டுள்ளன. பால்நிலை அடிப்படையில் ஆண்கள் (1.4) பெண்கள் இருபாலாரும்(1.3) ஒத்த தன்மையான மதிப்பெண்களைக் கொண்டுள்ளனர்.

0.0 - கடுமையாக உடன்படவில்லை 5.0 - உடன்படவோ அல்லது மறுக்கவோ இல்லை  
2.5 - உடன்படவில்லை 7.5 - உடன்படுதல்  
10 - வலுவாக உடன்படுதல்

● சமூகப் பாதுகாப்பு  
● தனிப்பட்ட பாதுகாப்பு



உரு X: உரு : இனக்குழு அடிப்படையில் தனிப்பட்ட மற்றும் சமூகம் சார் பாதுகாப்பு



களம்:

# பாதுகாப்பு மற்றும் நல்வாழ்வு

- போதுமான வருமானம் ஈட்ட இயலாமை (26.4%), அதிக வாழ்க்கைச் செலவு/ பொருளாதாரப் பிரச்சினைகள் (16.4%), மற்றும் கொவிட்-19 தொற்றுநோய் மற்றும் அதன் தாக்கங்கள் (8.8%) ஆகியன குடும்ப நல்வாழ்வுக்கு மிகப்பெரிய அச்சுறுத்தலாகும்.
- தேசிய அளவில், அடிப்படைச் சேவைகளுக்கான அணுகல் ஓரளவு எளிதானது என மதிப்பிடப்பட்டது (6.4). அடிப்படை சேவைகளை எளிதாக அணுகுவதில் எதிர்பார்த்தபடி மேல் மாகாணம் முன்னணியில் உள்ளது மற்றும் தேசிய சராசரியை விட அதிகமாக உள்ளது, எந்த மாகாணமும் அடிப்படை சேவைகளுக்கான அணுகலை மிகவும் கடினமானதாகவோ அல்லது மிகவும் எளிதானதாகவோ மதிப்பிடுவதில்லை.
- துணைச் சேவைகளுக்கான அணுகல் தேசிய மட்டத்தில் மிகவும் கடினமாகக் கருதப்படுவதுடன் (5.3) மற்றும் பெரும்பாலான மாகாணங்களில் உள்ள மக்கள் இது ஓரளவு கடினமானது என்று சுட்டிக்காட்டினர், அதே சமயம் வட மாகாணத்தில் உள்ளவர்கள் அது கடினமானது (4.1) எனக் குறிப்பிட்டனர்.
- தேசிய அளவில் (7.7) மக்கள் தங்கள் தேவைகளுக்கு அரசு ஓரளவு பதிலளிக்கும் வகையில் இருப்பதாக உணர்கிறார்கள்.
- மாகாண ரீதியில், கிழக்கு (8.5), வடக்கு (8.1) மற்றும் தென் (8) மாகாணங்கள், தேசிய சராசரியை விட மாகாண அதிகாரிகளை ஓரளவுக்கு பதிலளிக்கக்கூடியவர்களாக மதிப்பிடுகின்றனர். பால்நிலை அடிப்படையில் ஆண்கள் (1.4) பெண்கள் இருபாலாரும் அரசு ஓரளவு பதிலளிக்கும் வகையில் இருப்பதாக கருத்துரைக்கிறார்கள்.
- தேசிய அளவில் பால்நிலை அடிப்படையில் கருத்தில் வேறுபாடுகள் எவையும் இன்றி மக்கள் நடுநிலையாக உள்ளார்கள்தனிநபர் பாதுகாப்பு தொடர்பில் மக்களிடம் வினாவிய போது மக்கள் நடுநிலை (6.6) யாக உள்ளார்கள். வட (5) மற்றும் வட மத்திய (5.5) மாகாண மக்கள் நடுநிலையின் கீழ் மட்டத்தில் உள்ளனர். தமிழர்கள் (5.9) மற்றும் சிங்களவர்கள் (6.6) முஸ்லிம்களை விட (7.1) நடுநிலை வகிக்கின்றனர்.
- சமூகப் பாதுகாப்பைப் பொறுத்தவரை, தேசிய அளவில் (8.5) மக்களின் நோக்குகள் ஓரளவு பாதுகாப்பானதாகவும் மிகவும் பாதுகாப்பாகவும் உணரப்படுகின்றன. மாகாண ரீதியாக, வட (5.2) மற்றும் கிழக்கு (6.2) மாகாணங்களில் உள்ள மக்கள் மிகக் குறைவான பாதுகாப்பை உணர்கிறார்கள். சிங்களவர்களும் (8.9) முஸ்லிம்களும் (7.6) தமிழர்களை விட (6.1) சமூகப் பாதுகாப்பில் உயர்ந்த நிலை இருப்பதாகக் கூறுகின்றனர்.

# முன்னோக்கு

இறுதியாக, இந்த அறிக்கை மற்றும் முழு பரோமீட்டர் (Barometer) முயற்சியும் இந்த பரப்பெல்லையில் மேலும் பணிகளை மேற்கொள்வதற்கு ஆராய்ச்சியாளர்களால் பரிசீலிக்கக்கூடிய ஆராய்ச்சி இடைவெளிகளை வெளிப்படுத்துகிறது.

அடிப்படை ஆய்வு செயற்படுத்தப்பட்டவுடன், பரோமீட்டர் செயலகமானது மூன்றாண்டுகால தயார்ப்படுத்தலின் பிற்பாடு பின்வரும் மைல்கற்களை அடைந்துள்ளது. அடிப்படை ஆய்வு செயற்படுத்தப்பட்டவுடன், பரோமீட்டர் செயலகமானது மூன்றாண்டுகால தயார்ப்படுத்தல், கருத்துருவாக்கம், முதற்சுற்று ஆய்வு நடாத்தல் மற்றும் பகுப்பாய்வு அடிப்படையில் பின்வரும் மைல்கற்களை அடைந்துள்ளது. அதே வேளை இந்த முன்னோட்டமானது வரவிருக்கும் ஆண்டுகளுக்காக திட்டமிடப்பட்டிருக்கும் வழிகாட்டி வரைபிற்கான முதற்படியே ஆகும். சில பிரதான செயற்பாடுகள் பின்வருமாறு திட்டமிடப்பட்டுள்ளன.

ஆய்வின் இரண்டாம் சுற்றானது ஆய்வு வினாக்கொத்து தயாரிப்பு, முன்னாய்வு, மற்றும் தரவு சேகரிப்பு ஆகியவற்றை உள்ளடக்கியதாக 2021 ஆம் ஆண்டு ஆனி மாதம் ஆரம்பிக்கப்பட்டது. இச்சுற்றின் கண்டுபிடிப்புகளானவை முதற் சுற்றின் ஒப்பீட்டு பகுப்பாய்வை உள்ளடக்கியதாக 2022 ஆம் ஆண்டு ஆனி மாதம் பூர்த்தியாக்கப்படும். பரோமீட்டர் களங்களான நம்பிக்கை, அடையாளம் மற்றும் செயற்படும் குடியுரிமை என்பவற்றுடன் தொடர்புபட்ட

ஆறு கருப்பொருள் கற்கைகள் 2022 ஆம் ஆண்டின் முதலாவது காலாண்டுப்பகுதியின் நேரகாலத்தில் முன்னோட்டம் இடப்படும்.

இதற்கு சமாந்தரமாக பரோமீட்டர் முயற்சிக்கு விமர்சனப்பார்வையை சேர்ப்பதோடு சிந்தனையை தூண்டும் அபிப்பிராயங்களை நல்லிணக்கம் மற்றும் சமூக ஒருங்கிணைவின் மீதான கருத்துரையில் முன்வைக்கும் 4 எண்ணக்கருக்கள் வெளியிடப்படும். பரோமீட்டர் இணையத்தளமானது பரோமீட்டரால் தயாரிக்கப்பட்ட மூன்று மொழிமூல ஆவணங்கள் அனைத்தும் உள்ளடக்கியதாக 2022ம் ஆண்டின் முன்பகுதியில் முன்னோட்டம் செய்யப்படும். இணையத்தளமானது முதற் சுற்றில் பெறப்பட்ட தரவுகளை கொண்டு பயனர்கள் குறிப்பிட்ட பகுப்பாய்வுகளை நடாத்த இயலுமான தரவுப்பகுப்பாய்வு மென்பொருளை கொண்டிருக்கும். இணையத்தளமானது நல்லிணக்கத்தின் மீதான துடிப்புடன் கூடிய பொதுக்கருத்தரையை ஊக்குவிக்க உதவி செய்யும் சமூக ஊடகத்துடன் இணைந்ததாக, கிரமாமாக புதுப்பிக்கப்படும்.

பரோமீட்டர் மூலம் பெறப்பட்ட ஆதாரங்களானது முக்கியமான அரசியல் மற்றும் நிர்வாக பங்குதாரர்கள், குடிமக்கள் மற்றும் உள்ளூரின் தீர்மானம் மேற்கொள்வோரின் நேர்முக கருத்தாடல்கள் என்பவற்றை உள்ளடக்கியதாக பொதுக்கருத்துரையில் உள்வாங்கப்படும். மேலதிகமாக, பரோமீட்டர் உருவாக்கத்தில் ஆலோசனைக்கு அணுகப்பட்ட சமூகங்களிடம், பரோமீட்டர் ஆய்வின் கண்டுபிடிப்புகளை பகிரும் அமர்வுகள் உள்ளடங்கலாக அடிமட்டநிலை ஆலோசனைகள் செய்யப்படும்.




நிறுவன ரீதியாக பரோமீட்டர்  
கூட்டுச்சங்கமானது , அண்மித்த  
எதிர்காலத்தில் இலங்கை திறந்த  
பல்கலைக்கழகத்தின் பங்காண்மையை  
உள்ளடக்கியதாக தொடர்ந்து  
ஆண்டுரீதியான பரோமீட்டரை தயாரிக்கும்.  
இறுதியாக இலங்கை பரோமீட்டர்  
கூட்டுச்சங்கமானது பரோமீட்டர்  
செயற்பாட்டை முன்னெடுத்துச்செல்லத்தக்க  
அரசு நிறுவனங்கள், பல்கலைக்கழகங்கள்  
மற்றும் சிந்தனைக்குழுக்களை உள்ளடக்கிய  
புதிய அங்கத்தவர்களை உள்வாங்கி  
விஸ்தீரிக்கப்படும்.

இலங்கை பரோமீட்டரானது இன்னமும்  
செயற்பாட்டு நிலையிலேயே உள்ளது.மேலும்  
ஆதாரங்களின் அடிப்படையானது பல  
சுற்று ஆய்வுகள் கருப்பொருள் கற்கைகள்  
மற்றும் கலந்துரையாடல் ஆவணங்களுடன்

வளர்ந்து வருவதால் காலப்போக்கில்  
ஏற்படும் குடிமக்களின் எண்ணங்கள்  
மற்றும் அபிலாஷைகளை சிறப்பாக புரிந்து  
கொள்வதன் பொருட்டு மேலதிக பகுப்பாய்வு  
மற்றும் ஆராய்ச்சி என்பன செய்யப்பட  
வேண்டும்.

இலங்கை பரோமீட்டர் மூலம் வசதிப்படுத்த  
முயற்சிப்படுத்தப்படும் மக்களின்  
குரல்கள் மற்றும் தெரிவுகளை புரிந்து  
கொள்வதானது. தேசிய மற்றும் உள்ளூர்  
மட்டத்திலுள்ள தீர்மானம் மேற்கொள்வோர், ,  
ஆராய்சியாளர்கள் மற்றும் இலங்கையிலுள்ள  
செயற்பாட்டாளர்களுக்கு நல்லிணக்கமான  
மற்றும் ஒருங்கிணைவுடன் கூடிய சமூகத்தை  
நோக்கி செல்வதற்கு மிகவும் முக்கியத்துவம்  
வாய்ந்ததாகவுள்ளது.





# Baseline Report of a National Public Perception Survey on Reconciliation in Sri Lanka

2020 - 2021

# 1. Introducing the Sri Lanka Barometer

## 1.1. Historical overview

The Sri Lankan civil war ended in 2009 after decades of violence and destruction. Over a period of twenty-six years, the conflict between the state and the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) movement resulted in widespread displacements, human rights abuses, disappearances, and the loss of thousands of lives (Lonergan 2017). Despite promises of national peace and prosperity, the country is still deeply divided, and many communities remain affected.

Sri Lanka has a long history of conflict between the majority Sinhala and minority Tamil ethnic groups. Tamils were favoured in economic and social life under British colonial rule, including in appointments to the civil and judicial services. When the country gained its independence in 1948, members of the Sinhala majority sought to rectify this imbalance and reassert their own rights and privileges. In the years that followed, Sri Lanka cemented its national identity as a majoritarian, Sinhala Buddhist state. The 1972 Constitution guaranteed the protection of the Buddha Sasana, which minority groups decried as a threat to both state secularism and a culture of religious pluralism (Vanniasinkam et al. 2018). Despite attempts by political leaders to broker a lasting peace, violent clashes broke out and brought about the rise of the LTTE. These culminated in the 1983 riots – known as Black July – and the launch of a pogrom targeting ethnic Tamils. The fighting between the forces and the LTTE was largely in the North and East of the country with intermittent violent incidents in other parts of the country, including the capital city. Personnel for the armed forces was recruited

from other parts of the country resulting in war related impacts being felt across the provinces to varied degrees.

After the end of the war, Sri Lankan society continues to be shaped by ethnic and religious tensions, prevailing socio-economic inequalities, and the lasting influence of its historical struggles. As these prevail the country and its people are also faced with new challenges. Both religion and ethnicity remain factors for renewed violence. Nationalist extremist Buddhist groups have formed in the post-war period, and the minority Muslim, Christian and Hindu communities have been the targets of hate speech, rioting and attacks on places of worship (Lonergan 2017; Vanniasinkam et al. 2018; Herath 2019). Significant challenges remain in addressing the legacy of the past and preventing any further violence.

## 1.2. Prospects for reconciliation

Internationally, truth-telling and reconciliation processes have supported peaceful transitions in post-war societies and assisted in transforming group identities formed during conflict into ones defined during times of peace. Both theory and practice from elsewhere demonstrate that effective reconciliation processes depend on structural and institutional changes, through which the root causes of conflict are identified and addressed, cycles of violence are broken, and further conflict is prevented. These also require a combination of both top-down and bottom-up approaches that take into local cultures and contexts and foster community ownership (The Peacebuilding Initiative 2007-2008; Herath 2019; Lonergan 2017).

Since the civil war ended, Sri Lanka has established a number of dedicated institutions that aim to promote lasting peace and advance national reconciliation. As shown in Box 1, these initiatives range from the launch of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) in 2010 to investigations of past injustices and violations, eliciting and documenting public testimonials, and outlawing enforced disappearances.

However, despite these institutional interventions, many of the conditions that gave rise

to the war still remain (Wakkumbura and Wijegoonawardana 2017) and the reconciliatory agenda envisaged in UNHCR Resolution 30/1, the national policy framework and other supporting plans, has not yet been fully realised. Momentum in pursuing national reconciliation appears to have dwindled with successive changes in government, and in the face of events such as the 2019 Easter terror attacks<sup>1</sup> and the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic. Work is still needed to ensure better-functioning institutions that support improved relationships between citizens (ICG 2011;

### Box 1: National and international reconciliation instruments and institutions

**Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission:** The Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) was established in 2010 as one of the key national institutions responsible for investigating the underlying causes of the Sri Lankan civil war.

**Office of National Unity and Reconciliation:** The Office of National Unity and Reconciliation (ONUR) was set up in 2015 and tasked with the development of a national reconciliation policy.

**UN Human Rights Council Resolution 30/1:** On 1 October 2015, the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) adopted Resolution 30/1 on “Promoting reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka”.

**Peacebuilding Priority Plan:** In 2016, the government launched the Peacebuilding Priority Plan outlining four main pillars of interventions by state and non-state entities: transitional justice; reconciliation; good governance; and resettlement and durable solutions.

**Consultation Task Force:** In 2016, the Consultation Task Force (CTF) began hearing public testimonies from thousands of citizens about their experiences during the civil war in 2016.

**Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances:** Sri Lanka signed the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (ICPPED) in December 2015 and ratified it in May 2016. The Government gazetted the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance Bill in February 2017 (CPA 2017) and outlawed enforced disappearances by Act No. 5 of Parliament in March 2018.

**National Policy for Reconciliation and Coexistence:** The policy was approved in 2018 leading to the establishment of the Office of Missing Persons.

**Offices of Missing Persons and Reparations:** The Offices of Missing Persons and Reparations were both established in 2018.

**Commissions of Inquiry:** Several commissions of inquiry have also been appointed to investigate [past] injustices and violations, in response to calls for accountability.

**Diyawanna Declaration:** Launched by the Parliamentary Select Committee for National and Religious Harmony in 2019.

Sources: Lonergan 2017; UNHRC 2015; Office on Missing Persons online; Unauthored 2018

1. On April 21, 2019 a series of suicide bombings by Muslim extremists, targeting three churches and five hotels, killed at least 269 people in three districts. As a consequence, Muslims across the country became targets of violence and hate. "<https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/04/two-years-after-easter-attacks-sri-lankas-muslims-face-backlash>"

Loneragan 2017).

### 1.3. Our Voices, Our Choices: Tracking public perceptions on reconciliation

As evidenced by the many institutions and policies described in the previous section, reconciliation has been the subject of national dialogue in Sri Lanka for more than a decade (Loneragan 2017; Herath 2019). However, while government and civil society-led initiatives have been launched, implemented, and assessed, efforts to measure public opinion on this critical national process have been limited.<sup>2</sup> This is despite recurring calls for active consultations that place Sri Lankan citizens at the centre of the reconciliation process (see Box 2), culminating with the recommendations contained in the Diyawanna Declaration. Launched by the Parliamentary Select Committee for National and Religious Harmony in 2019, the

Declaration called for regular perception surveys and recommended that these be used to shape the direction of state-led reconciliation efforts.<sup>3</sup> The Sri Lanka Barometer comes at a critical time in the country's journey to national reconciliation and aims to fill an important gap in understanding people's experiences in the post-war period, their perceptions about progress made to date and their expectations about the work that remains. This purpose is signified in the selection of the name, "Our Voices, Our Choices".

The Barometer is an initiative of the Strengthening Reconciliation Processes (SRP) programme, which began in November 2017 and supports the Sri Lankan government as well as non-governmental and grassroots organisations and movements, in seven areas critical to the reconciliation process. The SRP is jointly funded by the European Union and the German Federal Foreign Office; and implemented by the German Technical Cooperation (GIZ) and the British Council in Sri

#### Box 2: Mandates for citizen consultation and inclusion in reconciliation

2011: The concluding report of Sri Lanka's Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) is made public, highlighting that "A culture of respect for human rights and human diversity needs to be developed creating an environment where each citizen becomes an active participant in society and feels a sense of belonging, of being Sri Lankan." (para 8.137, p. 288).

2017: The report of the Consultation Task Force on Reconciliation Mechanisms (CTF) is released, noting that "In the context of healing, the act of telling, for all sides of a conflict, is an important step in the process of reconciliation, building understanding and empathy for the other and non-recurrence of violence. Many personal 'truths' exist and they need to be shared." (p. 80). The CTF received over 7,000 submissions from citizens through public meetings, focus groups, and written submissions.

2019: The Diyawanna Declaration by the Parliamentary Select Committee for National and Religious Harmony identifies the importance of reconciliation initiatives being informed by public perceptions on a regular basis. The Declaration states that "A comprehensive island-wide survey to gauge public perceptions and expectations on national unity and reconciliation while reviewing new developments must be conducted with the support of the relevant line ministries..." and that future proceedings of the Parliamentary Select Committee are organised on the basis of the survey results. (Recommendation X)

Sources: de Silva 2011; Muttetuwegama et. al 2017; unauthored 2019, Parliamentary Series No. 58

2. As conceptualised in the Strengthening Reconciliation Processes in Sri Lanka Project documentation and in its work with its related ministry over the course of the project lifespan.  
3. See <https://www.parliament.lk/en/committee-news/view/1701> for information on the launch of the Declaration. The availability of information on the Declaration and its implementation is limited, particularly after the change of government in 2019 and 2020.

Lanka, in partnership with the Ministry of Justice.

The Barometer comprises four key components:

1. **An annual, island-wide public opinion survey** that provides a holistic, time-bound view of people's experiences of reconciliation, perceptions on the progress made thus far, and their identification of persistent obstacles and impediments to its achievement. This report presents the findings of the first round of the survey, which is the baseline survey that will be compared in later years with subsequent rounds conducted over time.
2. **Thematic studies using largely qualitative methodologies** to explore issues related to reconciliation in more depth, building on the survey's conceptualisation and results. To date, six studies have been undertaken in partnership with local researchers and are at various stages of completion. These studies focus on topics such as: the Easter Sunday terrorist attacks in April 2019 and the retaliatory violence against Muslims; exploring trust amongst identity groups and political institutions; livelihoods amongst displaced Muslim women who returned to the Northern Province; youth discourses on reconciliation; and exploring the views of Buddhist monks in post-conflict reconciliation.
3. A set of **discussion papers and concept notes** on reconciliation and related issues to broaden the understanding of key concepts and to define approaches further. The discussion papers focus on the eight domains and issues related to memory and history, grief of loved ones, bystander behaviour and non-intervention, and transitional justice.<sup>4</sup>

4. A programmatic **outreach component** based on the data and evidence generated, using dialogue and communication events and activities to inform public discourse on reconciliation. These are conducted in all three languages and at all levels of society, including broad public consultations and specific initiatives targeting media and other stakeholders such as government officials, academics, and practitioners.

The Barometer is implemented through a Consortium that seeks to generate evidence on citizens' understanding and expectations about reconciliation and social cohesion to inform public discourse.

Together with SRP, the Consortium currently includes the Centre for Poverty Analysis (CEPA) in Sri Lanka<sup>5</sup>; and the South African Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR).<sup>6</sup> Discussions are underway to include the Open University of Sri Lanka (OUSL) in the next phase of the Barometer, starting from 2022.

## 1.4. Conceptualising the Sri Lanka Barometer

As a starting point for conceptualising the Sri Lanka Barometer, a series of Community Consultations was held across the country in mid-2019. These Consultations showed that perceptions and experiences of reconciliation are diverse, dynamic, and very personal. A total of 14 sessions were held across all the provinces, covering 10 districts, and involving 243 participants. The results were used in conceptualising the eight domains of reconciliation, some of which are measured through indicators in the survey (see section 1.5) and informed the design of the research questions. A selection of quotes from these Consultations are also in-

4. Please see Barometer website [www.thebarometer.lk](http://www.thebarometer.lk).

5. <https://www.cepa.lk/>

6. <https://www.ijr.org.za/>


cluded in each of the domain analysis sections.

Once identified, papers were commissioned on each of the eight domains of reconciliation, which provided overviews of the key concepts and debates and analysed these in relation to the Sri Lankan context.<sup>7</sup> Researchers and other experts working in the areas of reconciliation and social cohesion were also consulted. Their inputs, together with the domain papers, were used as the basis for the survey's conceptual framework.

Experts from the IJR in South Africa also provided technical support and guidance during the conceptualisation phase and the first round of the survey. The IJR has conducted the South African Reconciliation Barometer for the past two decades and the Barometer draws from this experience.

## 1.5. Eight domains of reconciliation

Reconciliation is a complex and multi-faceted concept that differs according to context and encompasses a wide range of experiences and perceptions (Herath 2019; SRP Community Consultations 2019) As such, no single definition is possible. Using the results of the Community Consultations, domain papers and expert inputs described in Section 1.4, the Sri Lanka Barometer was developed based on eight conceptual domains of reconciliation, as illustrated in Figure 1. The domains, together with their intended outcomes and the indicators used in the survey, are detailed in Table 1.



**Figure 1:** Eight domains of reconciliation in Sri Lanka in the Barometer

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7. These papers are available on the Barometer website [www.thebarometer.lk](http://www.thebarometer.lk)



**Table 1: Reconciliation domains, outcomes, and indicators**

Domain	Realising the domain	Survey indicators for questions
<p><b>1. Dealing with the past</b></p>	<p>All Sri Lankans, regardless of identity group:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Have the opportunities and freedoms to remember, memorialise and mourn the past and the lives lost during the war.</li> <li>● Have access to psychosocial support services and alternative ways of healing.</li> <li>● Have the opportunity to receive information about the past and to learn from history – with multiple narratives being respected.</li> <li>● Have the opportunity to share their truths of how they experience the armed conflict, in a context which acknowledges that there are multiple truths.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Importance of dealing with the past related to the armed conflict</li> <li>● Recognition of past injustices</li> <li>● Memorialisation</li> <li>● Barriers to dealing with the past Providing reparations</li> </ul>
<p><b>2. Justice for all</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Communities devastated by armed conflict are restored and justice for war-related injustices is delivered.</li> <li>● Victims have adequate access to fair reparations: property losses are recognised and compensated; land is returned to its rightful owners; and loss of income is compensated.</li> <li>● People whose loved ones disappeared [or went missing] learn the truth about what happened to them and are supported in coming to terms with their losses.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Justification/non-justification of the use of violence against civilians</li> <li>● Barriers to justice</li> </ul>
<p><b>3. Identity and belonging</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Recognition that members of all social groups have needs and aspirations.</li> <li>● Feelings of Sri Lankan identity despite differences related to social groups.</li> <li>● No people or groups feel that they are “second-class” citizens.</li> <li>● People have the freedom to embrace their own identities, and these are accepted and respected with dignity, despite differences.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Sri Lankan identity</li> <li>● Groups you identify with strongly</li> <li>● What prevents talking to or associating with people of different ethnic groups/religious group?</li> </ul>
<p><b>4. Interpersonal, social, and political trust</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● People trust democratic processes and institutions to meet their needs and function in an unbiased manner.</li> <li>● Being part of a safe, peaceful and just society regardless of belonging to a particular social group.</li> <li>● People trust each other irrespective of group affiliation or identity.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Interpersonal trust</li> <li>● Social trust</li> <li>● Political trust</li> </ul>

<p>5. <b>Equality of opportunity</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Equal access to opportunities (financial, economic, social, cultural, educational, natural resources) irrespective of group affiliation or identity.</li> <li>● Shared belief that all Sri Lankans have the right to equal opportunities and to enjoy their achievements.</li> <li>● All people are able to obtain services in their own language and regional disparities in service provision diminish.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Equality of opportunity</li> </ul>
<p>6. <b>Active citizenship</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Willingness and the space to contribute to positive change in the country.</li> <li>● Equal opportunities for civic engagement.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Active citizenship (awareness and willingness to engage in civic action)</li> <li>● Political efficacy (ability and confidence to engage with social and political issues)</li> </ul>
<p>7. <b>Accountable governance</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Governance systems and institutions work for all communities irrespective of group affiliation or identity.</li> <li>● Power imbalances in favour of political, social, or economic elites have been corrected.</li> <li>● Ethno-religious dominance has been eliminated through measures to counter these forces and effects and ensure accountability.</li> <li>● People of all social groups can be heard by the government and by each other.</li> <li>● All social groups are equally represented in decision making and have the same opportunities for participation in public bodies.</li> <li>● Systems are transparent and accountable (to citizens and international commitments).</li> <li>● Systems are in place to address and actively prosecute bribery and corruption.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Respect for others</li> <li>● Who has most economic and political powers</li> </ul>
<p>8. <b>Security and wellbeing</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● All Sri Lankans live free from violence and feel safe and secure. Men, women, and children are able to live without fear.</li> <li>● Media and human rights defenders are free from fear and able to engage in their work.</li> <li>● Freedom of speech prevails.</li> <li>● Basic needs are fulfilled, including adequate nutrition, sanitation, and quality health and education services.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Personal freedoms</li> <li>● Personal and community safety</li> <li>● Access to basic services</li> <li>● Access to auxiliary services</li> <li>● State responsiveness to needs</li> <li>● Household relative wellbeing</li> <li>● Lived poverty index</li> <li>● Threats to household wellbeing</li> <li>● Basis for discrimination</li> </ul>



## 2. The Sri Lanka Barometer – The 2020-2021 Public Opinion Survey

This section details the survey methodology, sampling, and data analysis approaches used in Round One of the Barometer Survey.

### 2.1. Survey methodology

The Barometer Survey used a quantitative methodology and opinion data was collected through one-on-one interviews using a structured questionnaire as the research instrument.

#### 2.1.1. Developing a baseline

The first round of the survey serves as baseline for the Barometer. It presents data and analysis and will be used as a fixed point of reference that will be used for comparison with future rounds of the survey. People's perceptions are measured at one point in time, which is the baseline number for each of the measures identified. The baseline serves as the starting point against which all future results will be compared against.

#### 2.1.2. Survey questionnaire

The Barometer Survey questionnaire was developed using the conceptual framework, eight reconciliation domains and the key indicators identified (see Table 1). The survey uses the following types of close-ended questions to test each of the reconciliation domains:

- Five-point Likert scales, in which people rate the strength of their opinion (such as agreement/disagreement, ease/difficulty etc.);
- Multiple response items;
- Selected open-ended survey items which were post-coded after data collected; and
- Demographic questions.

The questionnaire was translated from English into Sinhala and Tamil and then piloted and refined to ensure an understandable and user-friendly instrument. The indicators used and their composite scales were also tested and validated (see also Sections 2.2 and 2.3).

#### 2.1.3. Data collection

Final questionnaires in all three languages were scripted to a CAPI (Computer Aided Personal Interviewing) platform named *SurveyToGo*, which was used for data collection. The CAPI method was used to ensure data quality, monitor accurate sample selection using GPS coordinates and save time on data entry.

The survey was conducted through face-to-face individual interviews. Within each set of questions, statements were randomised to minimise error and response fatigue. Interviewers paid close attention to the sequencing of questions to maximise people's engagement during the survey.

The following quality control measures were taken in the data collection process:

- Supervisor accompaniment. Supervisors observed the first 10 interviews and established a standardised interviewing process.
- Back-checks. 30% of interviews by each interviewer were re-checked by supervisors, who re-visited respondents and verified their demographic details.
- Spot-checks. Field managers conducted unannounced visits to observe data collection.
- Telephonic back-checks. An independent data collection team authenticated each survey respondent and confirmed the amount of time spent for the interview.

- Recording checks. Portions of interviews were recorded by the CAPI system, with respondents' consent. These recordings were reviewed by an independent quality control team to confirm that the data was accurately captured into the system.
- Map checks. GPS locations for all interviews were used to check the accuracy with which primary sampling units, starting points and households were selected.

#### 2.1.4. Sampling

The total sample size for the study was determined based on a few factors. The first of these was the sample universe, consisting of Sri Lankans 18 years of age or older. As published by the Census and Statistics Department in 2012,<sup>8</sup> the national population is 20,359,439 of which 75% (15,320,021) is 18 years or older. The second factor taken into consideration was the adequacy of the sample size for data analysis at the overall level, as well as by geographical cluster – including by urban, rural and estate respondents, as well as by province, district clusters with a 95% confidence level. The third factor was ensuring fair representation of the different groups within the population, including on the basis of gender, age, ethnicity, religion, and other social groups. Taking these into account, a sample size of 3,880 respondents was selected, resulting in a 95% confidence level and a margin of error (MoE) of less than two percent (1.57%) at the national level.

The total sample was then distributed across 25 districts proportionate to population size (PPS). Through this process, sample sizes in some less populous districts were found to be too low for the minimum level of representation (30 respondents). On this basis, the PPS sample was adjusted to ensure acceptable levels of sample proportion variance when compared with the universe. Variances that arose through this adjustment pro-

cess were corrected using data weighting at district level, by factors of between 0.5 to 1.5 – considered acceptable in comparable research contexts.

The adjusted sample was distributed across urban, rural, and estate strata; and then to the District Secretariat (DS) level within each stratum based on PPS. This process helped to prevent under-representation or over-representation of any sub-groups in the universe.

A multi-stage random sampling technique was then used to select the primary sample units (PSU), households and eligible respondents:

**Stage 1: Random selection of Grama Niladhari Division.** A list of all Grama Niladhari (GN) was obtained from the Census and Statistics Department. GNs were systematically randomly selected using regular interval pattern of five. A maximum of 10 households was selected at each GN division to gather adequate representation at the PSU level. Accordingly, 388 GNs were chosen across the country for the sample of 3,880.

**Stage 2: Household (HH) selection.** For the purposes of the study, a household was defined as family members who have common arrangements for the provision of food and/or eat from the same kitchen.<sup>9</sup> If more than one such family lives in a single housing unit, each family was considered as a separate household in the sample selection. Ten households were selected per GN using the left-hand rule, where households are selected from the left-hand side from the starting point. Interviewers were provided with pre-identified starting points – often including landmarks such as schools, churches, temples, hospitals, and government offices – and lists of the households for random selection. The household skipping pattern was applied to households on the left-side of the road after a successful interview to establish a fair spread of the sample at the PSU level. The household skipping pattern applied was two

8. <http://www.statistics.gov.lk>

households in urban and estate areas, considering the proximity of the houses. The three-household skipping pattern was applied in rural areas as well.

**Stage 3: Respondent selection.** Respondents were defined as anyone aged 18 years or older, who lives in the selected housing unit, eats from the same kitchen, and returns to the household at least weekly. All individuals meeting these criteria in the selected households were recorded sequentially in the CAPI system, along with their gender and age. A respondent was then selected from the household through the CAPI using the Kish Grid<sup>9</sup> method.

If the respondent selected was not available for the interview at the time of the first visit, two more attempts at contact were made. If unsuccessful, the original respondent was replaced by a person of the same gender and age within the same PSU from another household selected using the left-hand rule method.

This random sampling approach guaranteed all eligible Sri Lankans an equal chance of selection in the sample and ensured representation according to the strata. Any variation in this representation was corrected through data weighting.

All data collection was completed in 2020. However, the original total sample was not reached due to the Covid-19 lockdown and related restrictions. A sample completion of 95% was ensured and spread across the country in order to maintain the representation of the sample. Of the intended sample of 3,880 respondents, 3,819 were completed.

### 2.1.5. Data cleaning and weighting

Consistent with the questionnaire development methodology (see Section 2.1.2), the survey dataset was assessed using psychometric testing and the validation of all indicators and composite scales. The cleaned dataset was weighted using

the variables of district, gender and age based on the 2012 census results.

### 2.1.6. Psychometric validation of indicators

Following the data processing, the substantive analysis was undertaken beginning with the psychometric validation of the Barometer indicators. The aim of the psychometric testing and validation was to ensure that the measurement used in the survey was robust and that the substantive analysis employing these indicators is credible, valid, and reliable (Govender 2021).

The following methodology was used in the validation process:

1. The indicators that formed the part of the validation were compiled into composite scales. Each scale was composed of several different survey questionnaire items that have substantive relevance and statistical validity.
2. Missing values that resulted when a response was not provided (no data) or did not communicate a meaning useful to the analysis, were considered as part of the psychometric validation and analysis. A critical threshold of 5% was established for missing values in the validation work. If the missing values exceeded 5%, it suggested some substantive or measurement problem with the formulation of the survey item, and hence the item needed revision or exclusion from the composite analysis.
3. In the analysis, missing values were considered for each item when presenting the analysis for the composites (in addition to the testing) as well as for the single item questions. In the case of the latter, the proportion of missing values was also considered as part of the substantive analysis where relevant (Govender 2021).

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9. The Kish Grid method is used in household surveys to randomise the selection of a respondent in the household. This method helps avoid selection bias and provides a systematic approach to selecting a respondent. Through this each survey participant has an equal probability or chance for selection.

A detailed report of the validation of the measurement scales used in the pilot and main study is available for further reference on the Barometer website.<sup>10</sup>

### 2.1.7. Data analysis and interpretation

This is a baseline study and as such presents an analysis of the current situation on the identified issues related to reconciliation in Sri Lanka. As a first study of this kind, it identifies the perceptions of Sri Lankans and this is considered a starting point of tracking these views of Sri Lankans across the diverse populations. Future rounds of the survey will be compared to this survey to presented changes in opinions of Sri Lankans over time.

The data collected and analysed in the Barometer public perceptions survey refers to people's perceptions on the focus issues, within each domain. These views do not refer to factual information such as the availability of certain services in their location nor do views present a verifiable assessment.

The analysis is presented as composite indices. A composite analysis and related scoring help to present data that are in small sets but highly related to one another, conceptually and statistically. This is determined through the psychometric validation. Combining and presenting these items as a single score reduces the potential for information overload.

Two open-ended questions were included in the survey. These questions were post-coded and code lists were developed for each response set.


## 2.2. Sample profile

As described in Section 2.1.4., interviews were conducted with a total sample of 3,819 Sri Lankans over the age of 18 years. As a nationally representative survey, the sample reflected the overall demographic composition of the country as follows:


- Close to an equal split between males (52.5%) and females (47.5%), as shown in Figure 2.
- As shown in Figure 3, the age group spread across the sample is as follows – Less than 20 years (4.6%), 20-29 years (21.6%), 30-39 years (21.4%), 40-49 years (18.7%), 50-59 years (16%) and 60 years and over (17.7%).
- Just over a third attended primary education (32.8%, Grades 1-10) and a further 29.2% passed primary education (GCE ordinary level O/L), while about 5% attained a university degree or higher (see Figure 4).
- The majority (78.2%) identified their religious affiliation as Buddhist, followed by Hindus (10.9%), Muslims (5.9%), Roman Catholics (4%) and Christians of other denominations (0.9%) (see Figure 5).
- Consistent with national population demographics, 78.5% described their ethnicity as Sinhalese, followed by 15.5% Tamil and 5.5% Muslim (see Figure 6).
- In terms of occupation, the largest percentage of people (27%) described themselves as unemployed and not looking for a job. Just under a fifth (16.9%) were own-account workers without employees, followed by paid employees in the private sector (12.9%) or government (10.1%) and daily wage labourers (8.3%) (see Figure 7).
- More than three quarters (77.8%) lived in rural areas, followed by 17.4% in urban centres and 4.8% on estates (see Figure 8).
- In line with the national population distribution, the largest percentage of people lived in the Western province (25.4%), followed by the Central (13.0%), Southern (12.7%), North Western (11.3%) and Sabaragamuwa (9.7%) provinces. Comparatively, about six to seven percent lived in the Northern, Eastern, North Central and Uva provinces, as shown in Figure 9.

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10. [www.thebarometer.lk](http://www.thebarometer.lk)




**Figure 2:** Male/female sample breakdown (%)




**Figure 3:** Age category (%)





**Figure 4:** Educational attainment (%)



**Figure 5:** Religious affiliation (%)<sup>11</sup>

<sup>11</sup> 'Other Christian' is referred to as Christians throughout the report




Figure 6: Ethnicity (%)







Figure 7: Occupation (%)



**Figure 8:** Spatial Breakdown (%)



**Figure 9:** Province (%)



### 3. Reconciliation in Sri Lanka

Reconciliation is a complex social concept without a single universal definition. As described by Cole (2007), the concept of reconciliation can be understood “as a spectrum, rather than a fixed definition”. Although the term is commonly used in international discourse on peacebuilding, it does not always translate across languages, cultures, and contexts. However, successful reconciliation processes require the active participation and engagement of a range of actor including citizens, politicians, policymakers, and civil society representatives. As such, local concepts and terminologies may be invoked to ensure a shared understanding of reconciliation (The Peacebuilding Initiative 2007-2008).

#### 3.1. Meaning of reconciliation for Sri Lankans

The Barometer hypothesised that for reconciliation to advance in Sri Lanka, more information is needed about how people understand the concept and the meanings they attach to it. People were asked about their own understanding of reconciliation and were asked to give two answers (only the first response is analysed in this report).

##### Survey question

What comes to your mind when thinking of reconciliation in Sri Lanka?

##### Survey findings

Barometer results show that the largest percentage of Sri Lankans (37.6%) understand reconciliation to relate to achieving national unity, as

shown in Figure 10. This association of unity with reconciliation was even higher among people from minority ethnic and religious groups. Close to two-thirds of Tamils (64.8%) answered in this way, as well as more than half of all Christian (50.5%), Muslim (59.6%) and Hindu (66.6%) people. A further one-fourth (23.3%) of Sri Lankans answered that they thought of reconciliation as good for the country.




Figure 10: Meaning of reconciliation (% , first mention)

Responses were not all positive, however. About one in 10 (11.3%) answered that reconciliation is still lacking in Sri Lanka: a finding explored further in subsequent sections of the report. Some responses were also ambiguous and taken together, over a fifth of Sri Lankans (21.8%) answered either that they don't know or didn't understand (10.8%), that nothing came to mind when thinking of reconciliation (9.0%) or that the term had no meaning (2.0%).

### **Interpretation of results**

Results of Round One of the Barometer suggest that a majority of Sri Lankans are familiar with the word reconciliation and associate it with national unity or a positive process for the country. However, cumulatively about a third of Sri Lankans either felt reconciliation has not taken place, were unsure or felt it didn't mean anything – pointing to a potential opportunity for stakeholders such as government and civil society to explore innovative ways of furthering public discourse and understanding, promoting national unity, and making these notions more tangible for Sri Lankans.

## **3.2. Views on progress towards reconciliation**

In addition to exploring people's understanding of the meaning of reconciliation, the Barometer also asked Sri Lankans about their perceptions of progress to date. Survey items probed progress in reconciliation overall, as well as in relationships between social and identity groups based on ethnicity, religion, and language. These items were also used to develop a 10-point composite scale, in which zero represents strong disagreement that there has been progress in reconciliation and 10 represents strong agreement that there has been a great deal of progress.

### **Survey questions**

Since the end of the armed conflict in 2009, do you think:

- There has been progress in reconciliation?
- Relationships between different ethnic groups have improved?
- Relationships between different religious groups have improved?
- Relationships between groups who speak different languages have improved?

### **Composite Scale: Progress in Reconciliation**

**0** - Strong disagreement/  
low progress in reconciliation

**10** - Strong agreement/  
high progress in reconciliation

### **Survey findings**

Analysis of the survey results suggests that overall, Sri Lankans are moderate in their assessments of progress with an average score of 6.4 – just above the mid-point of the composite scale. Further disaggregation showed minimal variation in this score between people of different religions, ethnic groups, or province, as shown in Figure 11.

### **Interpretation of results**

Despite the national focus on reconciliation over the past 12 years, and the many interventions implemented in the intervening years (see Section 1.2.), Sri Lankans of all different social groups are consistently moderate in their assessments of progress. These findings may be indicative of opportunities to intensify efforts to ensure reconciliation, as well as ensure communication, engagement and buy-in from citizens.




Figure 11: Progress in reconciliation by province (mean)

### 3.3. Demand for reconciliation

The Barometer hypothesised that Sri Lankans' demand for reconciliation may be an important determinant of the likelihood that it takes place. Sri Lankans were asked about both the desirability and necessity of national reconciliation in Sri Lanka. These items were used to develop a composite scale measuring demand for reconciliation.

#### Survey questions

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

- It is desirable to achieve reconciliation in Sri Lanka.
- It is necessary to achieve reconciliation in Sri Lanka.

#### Composite Scale: Progress in Reconciliation

**0** - Strong disagreement/  
low progress in reconciliation

**10** - Strong agreement/  
high progress in reconciliation

### Survey findings

In comparison with the moderate assessments of progress discussed in Section 3.2, the Barometer found a strong demand for reconciliation among Sri Lankans, with a national mean score of 8.1. Demand was even slightly higher in the Northern (8.9) and Eastern (8.8) provinces, as shown in Figure 12. Notably, data analysis showed little variation in the survey results on the basis of either religion or ethnicity; in the latter case, average in-group scores ranging from 8.0 among Sinhalese people to 8.8 among Tamils (see Figure 13).

### Interpretation of results

Demand for reconciliation is robust and cuts across Sri Lankan society, regardless of ethnicity and religion. This is an encouraging finding from a social cohesion perspective.




Figure 12: Demand for reconciliation by province (mean)




Figure 13: Reconciliation demand and progress by ethnicity (mean)

### 3.4. Post-conflict institutions

Reconciliation processes depend on supportive institutional frameworks and as discussed in section 1.2, this has constituted a national policy priority in Sri Lanka since the war ended in 2009. These interventions have provided opportunities for a range of actors to enter and engage in the reconciliation process in practical and collaborative ways.

Sri Lankans were asked about the importance of a number of institutions established to address the impact of the armed conflict and promote reconciliation.<sup>12</sup> Analysed together, these questions were used to develop a composite scale measuring the importance of institutions involved in reconciliation.

#### Survey questions

How important do you feel are the following institutions in helping Sri Lankans deal with the impact of the armed conflict:

- Judicial system (courts/mediation boards)?
- Consultation Task Force?
- Human Rights Commission?
- Office on Missing Persons?

#### Composite Scale: Importance of Reconciliation Institutions

- 0 - Not important at all
- 10 - Very important




Figure 14: Importance of institutions for reconciliation by ethnic group (mean)

12. Although the survey also asked about the importance of the LLRC, results showed a high proportion of missing values (26%) in response and therefore this item was excluded from the analysis. However, this finding is important in itself and suggests the need for greater public awareness and understanding of the role of this key institution.



## Survey findings

Analysis of the survey results using the composite scale showed that overall, Sri Lankans perceive these post-conflict institutions to be important, with a mean score of 7.4, as shown in Figure 14. Perceived importance was slightly higher than the national mean in the Uva (8.0) and Eastern (7.8) provinces. There was very little difference in results according to ethnicity. When disaggregated according to religious affiliation, average scores ranged slightly from 6.8 amongst Christians to: 7.3 for Buddhists; 7.4 for Roman Catholics; 7.5 for Hindus; and 7.6 for Muslims.

## Interpretation of results

Survey results suggest that there is relatively strong agreement over the importance of institutions established to support reconciliation, and this is consistent across different groups in the country. However, the high proportion of missing data for this composite – 21.8% overall, or about one in five people – also points to the possibility of low levels of awareness of these institutions, their functions, and their effectiveness and achievements.

### 3.5. Barriers to achieving reconciliation in Sri Lanka

In their 2017 study, Menik Wakkumbura and Nirmali Wijegoonawardana (2017) identified a number of barriers to reconciliation in Sri Lanka, including weak institutional mechanisms, politicisation, the devolution of power, and the slow pace of change, particularly for those directly affected by the conflict. Overcoming these barriers, the authors suggest, requires a social justice approach in which human rights are protected and an environment is created that is conducive for meaningful change (Wakkumbura and Wijegoonawardana 2017).

The Barometer Survey also asked Sri Lankans about what they perceived to be the main barriers to

achieving reconciliation in the country. Each person was asked to provide two responses, and these were recorded using a code list. Their first response were analysed for the purposes of this report.

### Survey questions

What would you indicate as the biggest barrier to achieving reconciliation in Sri Lanka?

And what would you say is the second biggest barrier to reconciliation in Sri Lanka?

## Survey findings

Sri Lankans identified numerous barriers to achieving reconciliation in the country. As shown in Figure 15, the responses given by the highest percentages of people were: lack of political will or commitment (25.8%); nationalism (20.2%); divisive politics (17.8%); and religious and ethnic discrimination (cumulatively 9.3%). Some people (4.2%) feel there are no barriers to reconciliation.




Figure 15: Barriers to reconciliation (% first mention)

## **Interpretation of results**

The survey results show that Sri Lankans believe there are numerous barriers to reconciliation. Just as Wakkumbura and Wijegoonawardana (2017) found obstacles related to politicisation, cumulatively more than two-fifths (43.6%) of Sri Lankans identified divisiveness and the lack of will/commitment as leading political problems. Nationalism, as well as discrimination on the basis of ethnicity and religion, are also viewed as barriers.

### **3.6. Conclusion**

Survey results show that cumulatively more than half of the adult population views reconciliation as good for Sri Lanka or associates the term with national unity, which is a positive finding. Demand for reconciliation is also consistently strong across different groups in the country. These findings suggest a foundation of support for the continuing national reconciliation agenda.

Most Sri Lankans, however, are moderate in their assessments of progress since the end of the armed conflict and this is a reason for some concern. About one in four people are unaware of the institutions mandated to address the root causes of the armed conflict and advance reconciliation, although these are viewed as important by those who are familiar with the various organisations and structures tasked with this work.

Finally, despite the economic challenges faced by the country and the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic, survey results reveal that most Sri Lankans believe the obstacles to reconciliation to be political or related to persistent discrimination on the basis of ethnicity and religion.

***"Sri Lanka is a multi-cultural country - reconciliation is attainable if friendly relations among groups are established; this will in turn help nation-building."***

Community Consultation, Kandy District

***"The thought that the majority should get the priority – that thought is a hindrance."***

Community Consultation, Ratnapura District

***"Reconciliation is a peaceful mind."***

Community Consultation, Matara District

***"Reconciliation can happen only when people FEEL it. When you are treated differently you can't feel it. When you don't get equal treatment, you can't feel the urge to live in harmony."***

Community Consultation, Mullaitivu District





## 4. Constructively Dealing with the Past

As evidenced in many post-conflict societies around the world, reconciliation can be effectively supported and advanced through focused efforts to understand and address the past. This often involves acknowledging the abuses that have taken place; holding perpetrators responsible; creating opportunities for grieving and memorialisation; rehabilitation; and compensation for victims. Those affected by conflict require access to information, psychosocial services, and support in finding ways to heal. It is also important that within post-conflict societies more broadly, people can share their own stories, hear multiple narratives, and learn from history: processes that can lead to improved relationships, resilience, and reduced risk of future violence (Sisson 2010; Lonergan 2017; de Silva 2019).

Conversely, failure to adequately deal with the past, or the use of inappropriate means to do so, can also have the opposite effect and result in further mistrust and conflict (Lonergan 2017). For this reason, it is critical that such measures are carefully thought out, contextually appropriate and inclusive of all affected constituencies and parties.

### 4.1. Importance of dealing with the past

Dealing with the past is a complex and far-reaching process that encompasses a wide range of issues and requires involving diverse groups. Despite these challenges, the experiences of other post-conflict contexts suggest that broader reconciliatory efforts have limited prospects for success unless and until this constructively takes place. The Barometer survey asked Sri Lankans about the importance of eight different interventions

aimed at dealing with the past and these were used to develop a composite scale measuring their importance.

#### **Survey questions**

When thinking about dealing with the past, how important would you say are the following?

- Improving relationships between armed forces in the North and East?
- Past perpetrators being brought to justice for their actions?
- Past victims forgiving past perpetrators?
- Establishing the truth of the past?
- Making appropriate reparations for victims?
- Remembering the collective past through memorialisation?
- Those affected by the armed conflict are able to share their experiences with others?
- Providing psychosocial support to victims?

#### **Composite Scale:**

Importance of Dealing with the Past

0 - Not important at all

10 - Very important

## Survey findings

The survey found that overall, Sri Lankans consider it to be important to deal with the country's past, with an overall mean score of 7.5 (see Figure 16). Evaluations of the importance of dealing with the past was relatively consistent across different groups and geographic areas:

- Agreement about the importance of the past was consistent across Sri Lankans of different ethnic groups, ranging slightly from an average score of 7.3 among Muslims to 7.4 among Sinhalese and 8.1 among Tamils.
- Among religious groups, mean scores ranged from 7.3 for Muslims and 7.4 for Buddhists, to 7.6 for Christians, 7.8 for Roman Catholics and 8.1 for Hindus.
- Across the different provinces, mean scores ranged from a low of 6.9 in the Southern Province to highs of 8.7 in Northern and 8.0 in the Eastern provinces (in other provinces, means were 7.5, Western; 7.5, Sabaragamuwa; 7.6, Uva; 7.6, North Western).

## Interpretation of results

Analysis of the Barometer results show moderately high agreement of the importance of dealing with Sri Lanka's past. This may suggest underlying support for truth-seeking processes and other interventions related to the country's history of conflict.

### 4.2. Recognising past injustices

Internationally, both human rights principles and reconciliation discourse posit that victims of armed conflict, their families and society in general, have the right to know the truth about the past, including what happened to people who disappeared. Furthermore, States are often assigned a role or duty in uncovering the truth and preserving collective memory (Sisson 2010).

The Barometer explored people's views on past injustices by asking the extent to which they agreed or disagreed that some groups suffered more than others; and that victims should be recognised by all groups in Sri Lanka. A composite scale was developed measuring agreement over the recognition of past injustices.





Figure 16: Importance of dealing with the past by ethnic group (mean)



**Figure 17:** Recognition of past injustices by ethnic group (mean)

Overall, the survey found moderately high agreement over the importance of recognising past injustices, with a mean national score of 7.4. There was little variation in this mean score according to religious affiliation or between ethnic groups (see Figure 17). When disaggregated according to provinces, mean scores ranged from 6.9 in the Central Province to 7.5 in Sabaragamuwa and North Western provinces, 7.7 in Uva province, 7.9 in the Eastern province and 8.6 in the Northern province.

### **Interpretation of results**


Analysis of the Barometer results show moderately high agreement of the importance of dealing with injustices that occurred during the armed conflict, with little variation according to religion, ethnicity or province.

### **4.3. Memorialisation**

It is common practice in Sri Lanka to memorialise the dead and this takes both physical and non-physical forms. People have different reasons for memorialising: to engage in spiritual aspects, to help healing, and to ensure their loved ones are not forgotten (de Silva 2019).

Some families and communities have already undertaken to memorialise those who lost their lives during the war. At the State level, activities have been sporadic aside from the annual Day of Remembrance on May 18, which marks the end of the conflict and commemorates fallen members of the tri-forces, as well as erecting statues and graveyards (de Silva 2019). Other initiatives by various non-state actors to facilitate non-physical memorialisation include archiving (online or physically) in the national archives, gathering and preserving the stories of the people affected by violence, and mobile exhibits.

The Barometer explored people’s views on these issues by asking about the extent to which they agreed with the importance of memorialisation and that there should be a day dedicated to commemorating the lives lost during the war. These questions were used to develop a composite scale measuring the importance of memorialisation.



**Figure 18:** Importance of memorialisation by ethnic group (mean)

### Survey questions

Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements:

- It is important that different groups who have been affected by the armed conflict have the opportunity to memorialise?
- There should be a single day to commemorate the death of loved ones on all sides of the armed conflict?

### Composite Scale:

Importance of Memorialisation

- 0 - Not important at all
- 10 - Very important

### Survey findings

Barometer survey results show that Sri Lankans are relatively neutral towards memorialisation, with an overall mean score of 6.8 (see Figure 18). Mean scores varied slightly between people of different ethnic groups, ranging from 6.5 among Muslims to 6.6 among Sinhalese and 8.0 among Tamils.

### Interpretation of results

Although often identified as a means of recognising loss and past injustices in post-conflict societies, survey results found only moderate support for memorialisation among Sri Lankans.

### 4.4. Reparations

Reparations refer to a set of legal remedies used to provide justice to victims of conflict. In many contexts, States are assigned the legal obligations of both recognising victims and providing/seeking reparations for citizens. This demonstrates the commitment of a government and society as a whole to acknowledging past abuses and injustices, addressing their root causes and ensuring non-recurrence (de Greiff 2010; de Silva 2019; ICTJ 2021).

Reparations can take many forms – both material and otherwise. Although financial compensation is a common practice, other forms of reparations include restoring civil and political rights, rehabilitation, access to land, and the provision of services, such as health and education. These can be delivered programmatically and/or through the enforcement of laws and regulations.

Non-material reparations include truth-seeking, guarantees of non-recurrence, and symbolic interventions such as memorials and commemorations (de Silva 2019; ICTJ 2021).

Reparations can also help foster and improve inter-personal relationships between people as well as trust in state institutions, as an indication that past abuses are taken seriously and that the wellbeing and quality of life of survivors is important. However, de Greiff (2010) cautions that reparations should form only part of the overall endeavour of ensuring access to justice, so they are not viewed as attempts to buy the silence of victims and their families.

The Barometer Survey asked Sri Lankans about the reasons for which reparations should be provided. Each person was asked to provide two responses. Only the first item mentioned is analysed in this report.

### Survey question

Thinking about events related to the armed conflict, for what kinds of things should we provide reparations?




Figure 19: Reasons for reparations (% first mention)

## Survey findings

In response, the highest percentages of people identified loss of income (25.3%), forced evictions (22.7%), and loss of communal land and property (21.0%) as reasons for reparations. A further 12.3% answered that reparations should be made in cases of disappearances, detention without trial and torture or death, as shown in Figure 19.

## Interpretation of results

Cumulatively, when asked about when reparations are warranted, about two-quarters (46.3%) of Sri Lankans mentioned circumstances related to loss of livelihoods and tenure in the first instance. Forced evictions and displacement (22.7%) are also considered as requiring reparations.

## 4.5. Barriers to dealing with the past

Despite evidence of its benefit in other post-conflict societies, the subject of dealing with the past remains contentious and challenging in Sri Lanka. As with the question of reconciliation, the Barometer asked people about the main barriers to dealing with the country's past. Once again, this was an open-ended question and answers were post-coded, with only first responses analysed.



### Survey question

What do you think are the two most important barriers to dealing with the past?

### Survey findings

Echoing the findings on reconciliation (see Section 3.5), the largest percentage of Sri Lankans (31.8%) described political concerns (influence/interference) as the main barrier to dealing with the country's past as shown in Figure 20, with an additional 7.9% mentioning a lack of political will. Close to one in five (17.3%), however, felt there are no barriers to dealing with the past.

### Interpretation of results

Taken together, about two out of every five Sri Lankans (39.7%) identified political concerns as barriers to addressing the past in the country, consistent with views on the obstacles to reconciliation.

## 4.6. Conclusion

Realising reconciliation requires dealing with the past in a constructive manner. This would require recognition and acknowledgement that the armed conflict had widespread impacts on many different groups of people, that historic injustices still prevail, and that Sri Lankans deserve the opportunity to move forward.

Results of the Barometer survey suggest that there is strong agreement over the importance of dealing with the past and recognising the injustices that occurred. Sri Lankans appear to view memorialisation with some ambivalence; however, results also suggest that there is support for more direct forms of reparations, particularly for people whose livelihoods and/or tenure (through evictions, displacements, and loss of property) was affected by the war.





Figure 20: Barriers to dealing with the past (% first mention)

***"Preventing the darkness of the past from darkening the present."***

Community Consultation, Southern Province



## 5. Justice for All

Research conducted by Human Rights Watch (HRW) in 2021 found that justice features prominently in the demands of conflict-affected people in the North and the East in particular. Satkunanathan (2019) suggests that following the regime change in January 2015, the new government did not fully deliver on a number of planned initiatives for dealing with the past, including the truth seeking and accountability mechanisms.

Together with accountability, justice constitutes a critical component of the reconciliation discourse nationally (Ganguli 2021). The meaning of justice extends well beyond retribution for criminal acts; rather, it is part of the foundation underlying social interactions between individuals. The desire for a sense of justice is a shared feature across societies and is the basis for shared principles, values, and the rule of law (Rawls 1963).

There are two opposing narratives about justice and reconciliation in post-war Sri Lanka: the first conceptualises justice as an outcome of forgetting about the past, forgiveness and moving on. The second calls for justice together with truth-seeking and accountability for historical events and actions. The proponents of the first narrative, generally associated with the South of the country, oppose punishing those who fought and won the war and view justice in this sense as inimical to lasting peace. In contrast, Sri Lankans in the North have demanded the truth about past disappearances and called for investigations, prosecutions and the release of detainees held without charge under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Satkunanathan 2019).

However, despite these divergent perspectives, there is also a desire for social justice<sup>13</sup> and fairness that is shared among many Sri Lankans and was explored through the Barometer survey.

### 5.1. Barriers to justice

Just as with reconciliation and dealing with the past, the survey asked Sri Lankans about what they view about the biggest barriers to justice in the post-war period.

#### **Survey question**

What do you think are the biggest barriers to providing justice for victims of past injustices related to the armed conflict?

#### **Survey findings**

In response, once again political concerns came to the fore. Almost one in three (29.0%) identified the lack of political will as the biggest barrier to for victims, and a further 11.0% cited political influence/interference. As shown in Figure 21, 13.0% identified issues related to corruption and economic instability as barriers. Taken together, almost one in ten people mentioned unnecessary delays (5.0%) and biased judiciary (4.0%). One in ten Sri Lankans, however, say there are no barriers to justice.

13. Social justice is a type of justice rooted in the idea that all people should have equal rights, opportunities, and treatment.




Figure 21: Barriers to justice (% first mention)

## Interpretation of results

Survey results suggest that once again the largest percentage of Sri Lankans identify political issues as leading obstacles in reconciliatory efforts and in this case, specifically access to justice for victims of past crimes. Responses also suggest broader critiques of justice institutions and mechanisms overall, including perceptions that these are affected by corruption, interference, bias, unnecessary delays and even incompetence.

## 5.2. Justification of the use of violence

Sri Lankans throughout the country have been deeply affected by decades of violent conflict. Historically the Northern and Eastern provinces – populated mainly by Tamil and Muslim Sri Lankans – have experienced the most violence.<sup>14</sup> In the post-war period, women, and children in particular have been disproportionately affected. Violence surrounding elections has also occurred

in the Southern, Sabaragamuw and Uva<sup>15</sup> provinces – sometimes directly involving the police.

Recent years have also seen an increasing presence by law enforcement authorities in the lives of Sri Lankans throughout the country. The military has also been engaged to control the spread of the Covid-19 pandemic. Civilian institutions have also become increasingly militarised since the change of government in November 2020, predominantly in areas not directly affected by the war. Research by Jayasundara-Smits (2018) has variously linked rising militarisation with post-war crime and violence, low institutional capacity, corruption, youth unemployment and the circulation of weapons.

After more than a decade after the end of the war, the Barometer sought to explore how Sri Lankans feel at present about the use of violence by state authorities as well as between civilians. Using three survey items, a composite scale was developed measuring justification of the use of violence against civilians.

14. F. Fonseka and E. Schultz, 2018, Gender and Transformative Justice in Sri Lanka, Centre for Women, Peace and Security.

15. Centre for Monitoring Election Violence (CMEV), 2018, "Communiqué on Nine Incidents of Post-Election Violence".

### Survey questions

How much would you agree or disagree with the following?

- It is sometimes justified for the military to use violence against civilians.
- It is sometimes justified for the police to use violence against civilians.
- It is sometimes justified for civilians to use violence against civilians.


**Composite Scale:** Justification of the use of violence against civilians

0 - Strong disagreement  
10 - Strong agreement


### Survey findings

Overall, survey results show that Sri Lankans disagree with the use of violence against civilians, with a national mean score of 2.8. Between the provinces, mean scores ranged from a low of 1.8 in the Northern province and Sabaragamuwa to a high of 3.7 in Uva, as shown in Figure 22.

Mean scores in agreement over the justification of violence against civilians were also analysed according to several other variables. Results showed that males were marginally less likely (2.7) to agree with the use of violence than females (2.8). Variation was also slight according to ethnic groups, with mean scores ranging from 2.7 among Sinhalese Sri Lankans and 2.9 among Tamils, to 3.2 among Muslims (see Figure 23). Mean scores also differed little between people in urban, rural and estate areas.



**Figure 22:** Justification of violence against civilians, by province (mean)



**Figure 23:** Justification of violence against civilians by ethnic group (mean)

### **Interpretation of results**

Barometer survey results show that there is consistent disagreement that using violence against civilians is justified, either by state authorities or other people in Sri Lanka, across different groups and areas in the country.

### **5.3. Conclusion**


The armed conflict normalised violence in daily life for many Sri Lankans. Therefore, despite multiple national perspectives on the paths to justice

and reconciliation, the finding that people of all different groups reject the use of violence is an encouraging sign.

However, the perception that justice is impeded by politics – including undue influence and interference and a lack of will/commitment – is reason for concern. These findings may also have consequences related to public trust in the integrity and efficacy of leadership and the institutions established to pursue and uphold justice.

***"Law and justice need to function without corruption and without differences; through that all affected people get equal justice."***

Community Consultation, Northern Province



## 6. Identity and Belonging

Social identity refers to how people define themselves. According to Silva (2019) most Sri Lankans define themselves by multiple different identities, including by religion, ethnicity, gender, language, and socio-economic class. These may assume greater or lesser importance at different times and in relation to specific events or circumstances. For instance, Sri Lankan society was sharply divided along ethno-religious lines during the war; while comparatively, people strongly identified strongly with others of the same class and ideology during the two Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) uprisings (Unauthored 1976).<sup>16</sup>

Belonging refers to when an individual or a group asserts the personal or collective identity as their very essence. Belonging can signal strong association with a specific identity, which is the basis for a group formation, connectivity and collective decision making (Silva 2019). Belonging is also mutable and adapts to changes in social identity. For instance, while in the immediate post-war period some Sri Lankans identified themselves as ‘former combatants’, ‘ex-cadres’ and ‘old leftists’; more recently, such individuals may increasingly use other identities, including based on occupation, as students, parents, social workers etc.

Historically ethnicity has been and remains a significant source of identification for Sri Lankans – still often outweighing identification according to caste, gender, political belief, or hometown. Yet committing reconciliation requires each ethnic group – Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim – to accept the rights of others to express their cultural and religious identities without being perceived as a threat. The LLRC Commission Report (2011, para 8.228) also found that “the tardiness of Govern-

ments in giving effect to [the] implementation [of its recommendations] has further alienated the Tamil people, exacerbating their feelings of marginalization. This has resulted in a perception prevailing among the Tamil people of being second class citizens in their own country”. Challenges remain ahead in creating a multi-ethnic society and polity that recognises and respects diversity; and in which multiple identity groups co-exist irrespective of their differences (Silva 2019).

### 6.1. Sri Lankan national identity

The Barometer assessed the importance people ascribe to a shared national Sri Lankan identity, as well as whether or not they believe this to be possible. A composite scale was developed measuring the importance of a national Sri Lanka identity.

#### Survey questions

Thinking about yourself as a Sri Lankan, how much do you agree or disagree with the following statements:

- Being a Sri Lankan is an important part of how you see yourself.
- People should realize we are Sri Lankans first and not think of themselves in terms of other groups they belong to.
- It is possible to create one united Sri Lanka although we belong to different groups.

**Composite Scale:** Justification of the use of violence against civilians

- 0 - Strong disagreement
- 10 - Strong agreement

16. The JVP insurrection was an armed revolt led by the Marxist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna against the Government of Sri Lanka from 1987–1989. The revolt, like a previous insurgency in 1971, was unsuccessful. The JVP resorted to violence, assassinations, raids, and attacks on military and civilian targets. The Sri Lankan government reacted with an operation to suppress the revolt.

## Survey findings

The Barometer found that at the national level, there was strong agreement about the importance of creating a national Sri Lankan identity, with a mean score of 7.9. Further analysis showed that there was very little variation in agreement between Sri Lankans of different ethnic groups (see Figure 24). Mean scores in relation to the importance of national identity differed slightly

between provinces, ranging from a low of 7.5 in the Northern Central province to highs of 8.3 in Uva and Northern province (see Figure 25).

## Interpretation of results

Barometer survey results show that despite the diversity of social identity groups in the country, there is relatively strong and consistent agreement over the importance of a shared national identity.




Figure 24: Importance of creating a Sri Lankan identity by ethnic group (mean)




Figure 25: Importance of creating a Sri Lankan identity by province (mean)

## 6.2. Determining social group identity

Sri Lankans were also asked about which group they identify most strongly with and the second group they identify strongly with. Their responses were coded using a code list. This report presents the findings for the first response.

### Survey question

When you think of yourself and your daily interaction with others, which group do you identify with most strongly? Which would you say is the second group you identify with most strongly?

### Survey findings

Barometer results show that the largest percentage of Sri Lankans still identify first with others of the same ethnic group (one in four, or 24.7%) as shown in Figure 26. Looking at historic lines of division, a further 8.0% identify most strongly

with those who share their religion. Notably, 14.2% responded that they already identify as Sri Lankans first, while one in ten (10.3%) did not identify as a member of any group. Less than two percent identified with others mainly on the basis of attending the same school or university (1.7%), being a sociable person (1.6%) or caste (1.3%).

### Interpretation of results

Overall, the majority of Sri Lankans still identify strongly with others who share their ethnic identity, even in the post-war period. This may relate to, as found by the LLRC (2011, para 8.228), delays on the part of the government in implementing measures to increase equality and overcome the divisions of the past.

There is a minority but still-important group of people who already view themselves as Sri Lankans first, before other sources of identity or group belonging. Notably, caste – another historically entrenched source of division – was found to be one of the least common sources of feelings of group belonging.




Figure 26: Sources of group identity (% first mention)



### 6.3. Perceptions on the nature of discrimination

Given historic divisions and the differential treatment of the diverse groups in the country, the Barometer survey also asked about sources of discrimination in Sri Lanka today. Their responses were coded using a code list. This report presents the findings for the first response.

#### Survey Question:

**Thinking about Sri Lankan society today, what do you think are the main bases on which people discriminate against other people?**

#### Survey findings

Figure 27 shows that the largest percentage of Sri Lankans view economic status as the main basis of discrimination in the country today (28.1%), followed closely by ethnicity (26.9%). A further one in ten (10.4%) answered that religion is a leading source.

### Interpretation of results

Taken together, a third (33.0%) of Sri Lankans view economic status and poverty as the leading bases for discrimination in the country today. This may relate in part to the timing of the interviews, which were conducted between two successive Covid-19 lockdowns that resulted in job losses and business closures. The World Bank (2020) projected that poverty rates in Sri Lanka increased from 9.2% in 2019 to 11.7% in 2020. Questions of whether or not economic discrimination has superseded other forms temporarily or on a long-term basis may be explored in future Barometer rounds or other research. Perceptions of economic deterioration and/or marginalisation may also have implications for peace and social cohesion.

At the same time, Barometer results also confirmed that more than one in four Sri Lankans still view ethnicity as the leading basis for discrimination in the country.




Figure 27: Main basis for discrimination (%. first mention)

## 6.4. Respect for other language and religious groups

As in many other societies around the world, religion has been a source of historic conflict and intolerance in Sri Lanka. Religious divisions have also provoked hate speech and even violent clashes between different groups in the country.

The Barometer explored perceptions of tolerance and respect for different religions and languages in Sri Lanka, using a composite scale.

### Survey questions

In general, people in Sri Lanka today have respect for the mother-tongue of others.

In general, people in Sri Lanka today have respect for the religious beliefs of others.

### Composite Scale: Respect for Others

0 - Strong disagreement with respect for others

10 - Strong agreement with respect for others




Figure 28: Respect for others by ethnic group (mean)

## Survey findings

At the national level, there was moderate agreement that Sri Lankans respect others, with a mean overall score of 6.8. This ranged marginally from 6.7 among Sinhalese people to a high of 7.5 among Tamil people, as shown in Figure 28. Further analysis showed minimal differences according to other variables, including religion, gender, and province.

## Interpretation of results

Sri Lankans across different identity groups and parts of the country consistently agree that there is respect for others in the country; however, this agreement was moderate rather than strong.

## 6.5. Conclusion

The Barometer survey found that most Sri Lankans agree about the importance of constructing a shared national identity, although the majority do not currently view this as their main personal identity. Rather, the largest percent continue to feel a sense of belonging with others of the same ethnic group; this, for about a fourth of Sri Lankans, is also viewed as the leading basis for discrimination in the country.

It was notable that economic status was named as the leading source of discrimination in the country today, and future rounds of the survey may provide insight into whether this finding relates to the current moment of economic decline, rising poverty and successive lockdowns; or rather is a lasting trend.

Finally, while there is general agreement about respect for other groups in Sri Lanka – specifically on the basis of religion and language – this was moderate and there is room for improvement, particular if the country intends to adopt a more inclusive national identity (Silva 2019). Given the Barometer findings in relation to discrimination, further exploration may be warranted into tolerance along socioeconomic lines.

***"A person may have his own language, ethnicity or religion, but in the end he/she will always be a citizen of the nation."***

Community Consultation, Central Province



## 7. Interpersonal, Social, and Political Trust

Trust is a central determinant of the quality of social interactions. It involves expectations of consistency in thoughts, beliefs, and behaviours based on past experiences. Greiff (2010) suggests that trust between people may be strengthened by shared norms and values; these in turn contribute to positive group relationships and cooperation.

Sri Lanka has been challenged by a historic lack of trust dating back to the colonial period and the differential rights and privileges afforded to the various groups in the country. Low levels of trust have aggravated ethnic tensions that resurface as promises of interventions for greater equality are broken (O’Brian 2012). More recently trust has also wavered between religious groups as a result of discriminatory practices towards minorities (Imtiyaz 2020; Silva et al. 2020).

However, according to Lonergan (2017), trust between groups may also lead to greater receptiveness to reconciliation. In conflict-affected contexts, establishing trust between groups early on can support transitional justice processes, healing, and the avoidance of further conflict (de Greiff 2010). The Barometer survey explored the extent of three forms of trust in Sri Lanka: interpersonal, social and political.

### 7.1. Interpersonal trust

Interpersonal, or “particularised” trust refers to trust in people within an individual’s close circle. Such relationships are characterised by familiarity and predictability in thought, behaviour, and engagement (Ramasamy 2019).

The Barometer survey measured interpersonal trust through three questions about relationships

between individuals and their family members, neighbours (in the immediate local community) and people they work or study with. In this case a composite scale was not constructed, because psychometric validation analysis found low reliability and validity for the survey items on trust in family members and colleagues. Instead, the report presents the survey results in response to the single item on trust in neighbours.

#### **Survey questions**

In general, how much do you trust the following groups of people? Your neighbours (in your local community)

#### **Survey findings**

In response, close to two-thirds (64.3%) of Sri Lankans trust their neighbours “to some extent”, while 13.3% did not trust them very much and 6.3% had no trust at all.

#### **Interpretation of results**

Barometer survey results indicate moderate levels of interpersonal trust between Sri Lankans and others living in their immediate community.

### 7.2. Social trust

Social, or “generalised” trust, refers to trust between people of different identity groups. Strong inter-group trust has been associated with greater cooperation and working together for the common good. Low levels of social trust, which may deepen with unequal distribution of resources, have been linked to greater prospects

for discrimination, marginalisation, and nepotism (Ramasamy 2019).

The Barometer survey measured the extent to which Sri Lankans trust people of other ethnic groups/races, religions, genders, and language groups. These survey items were used to develop a composite scale of social trust.

### Survey questions

From your experience/interactions, how much would you say you trust people from a different...?

- Ethnicity/race
- Religion
- Gender
- Language group

### Composite Scale: Social Trust

0 - Not trusting at all of people of other groups  
10 - Very trusting of people of other groups

## Survey findings

Survey findings found that Sri Lankans are moderately distrustful of people belonging to other social groups, with an overall mean score of 4.6. Average trust scores ranged marginally according to geographic location from lows of 4.1 in the Southern and 4.2 in the North Central provinces, to a high of 5.4 in the Northern province (see Figure 29).

Further analysis also showed only marginal variation in mean social trust according to different variables:

- Among Sri Lankans of different ethnic groups, mean social trust ranged slightly from a low of 4.5 among Sinhalese people, to 5.0 among Tamils and 5.3 among Muslims.
- When disaggregating according to religion, mean social trust ranged slightly from a score of 4.7 among Buddhists and Christians, to 5.1 among Roman Catholics and 5.3 among Muslims.
- Spatially, on average Sri Lankans living in estate areas scored marginally higher (5.4) than those in urban (4.5) or rural (4.6) areas.




Figure 29: Social trust by province (mean)

About one in ten (10.2%) Sri Lankans either declined to answer this question or stated that they did not know; comparatively, only 3.2% answered questions on political trust in these ways.

### Interpretation of results

Barometer survey results confirm that after many decades of inequality, discrimination and conflict, Sri Lankans are moderately distrusting of people who belong to other social groups in the country.

### 7.3. Political trust

Political trust refers to confidence in the validity and legitimacy of institutions. Often when people ascribe to the values represented through an institution, this leads to both trust and greater compliance with its rules (de Greiff 2010).

The Barometer survey measured the extent of political trust in a range of Sri Lankan institutions. Results related to the national government, police and courts were used to develop a composite scale on political trust. Sri Lankans were also asked about trust in the armed forces, Human Rights Commission (HRC) and OMP but the results were not sufficiently valid or reliable to be included in the scale, as determined through psychometric testing. Items testing trust in the HRC and OMP also resulted in a high percentage

of missing values, suggesting that many people may have a limited awareness or understanding of these institutions.

#### Survey questions

How much trust do you have in each of the following institutions?

- National government
- Police
- The courts

#### Composite Scale: Political Trust

0 - Not trusting at all of institutions  
10 - Very trusting of institutions

#### Survey findings

Overall, the survey found moderate levels of political trust, with a mean score of 6.1 across all Sri Lankans. As shown in Figure 30, there was little variation in scores between people of different ethnic groups. Further analysis showed that mean political trust ranged from lows of 5.1 in the Northern and Eastern (5.3) provinces to highs of 6.5 in Sabaragamuwa and 6.9 in Uva provinces.




Figure 30: Political trust by ethnic group (mean)

## ***Interpretation of results***

Barometer survey results show that overall, Sri Lankans are only moderately trusting of key national institutions. In conducting research and developing the Barometer domain paper in this area, Ramasamy (2019) drew links between this ambivalence and questions related to the fairness, impartiality, and effectiveness of public institutions – although these were not directly explored in the survey itself.

### **7.4. Conclusion**

Trust is an important factor underpinning relationships between people, social groups and with the State. As Ramasamy (2019) notes, Sri Lanka's history and the armed conflict impeded the development of trust and gave rise to nationalism and identity politics.

The findings of the first round of the Barometer survey identified only moderate levels of interpersonal (with neighbours/community members) and political trust, and moderately low levels of social trust between different groups in the country. High percentages of missing data in response to survey items measuring social trust also suggest the possibility of some reticence among Sri Lankans to answer these questions. Further in-depth research beyond this scope of this study may be warranted for greater insight into these low to moderate levels of trust in relation to issues such as: regional experiences; perceptions of homogeneity versus heterogeneity; the impact of divisive rhetoric; and other barriers to the development of trust.

***"We can do things in future if we do not think ill of others and work with them by trusting them little by little."***

Community Consultation, Western Province



## 8. Equality of Opportunity

From the 1970s onwards, poverty and inequality in Sri Lanka were closely associated with the divisions between groups in the country. This is despite the fact that Chapter Three, Article 12 of the Sri Lankan Constitution (1978) enshrines the right to equality as follows:

*“No citizen shall be discriminated against on the grounds of race, religion, language, caste, sex, political opinion, place of birth, or any one of such grounds.”<sup>17</sup>*

While not a fundamental right, the Constitution also calls for state policies that lead to socioeconomic justice and equality, through the:

*“Realisation by all citizens for an adequate standard of living for themselves and their families, including adequate food, clothing and housing, the continuous improvement of living conditions and the full enjoyment of leisure and social and cultural opportunities.” (Chapter VI, Article 27.2.C)*

Even with these protections, many Sri Lankans remain far from an adequate standard of living for themselves and their families. These differences are referred to as formal equality, in which legal rights are enshrined; and substantive equality, which refers to whether or not opportunities are available and accessible to all people, irrespective of ethnicity, gender, socioeconomic status or area of residence (Gunatilleke 2019). Inequality has in fact increased<sup>18</sup> as the results of factors such as the unavailability of decent work as well

as uneven access to education, infrastructure and public services. Nanayakkara (2018)

Low levels of access to services and amenities – for example, ranging from quality education to justice institutions, housing, health care, job opportunities and financial credit for businesses – affects people and their choices throughout their lives. The failure of successive governments since independence to improve both formal and substantive equality has been identified as an important contributing factor to violent conflict in Sri Lanka (Gunatilleke 2019). While some inroads have been made to meeting the infrastructure needs of the Northern and Eastern provinces, serious issues remain in the areas of job creation, education, access to agricultural land, and addressing the concerns of women-headed households.

### 8.1. Access to opportunities

The Barometer survey focused on issues of substantive equality and measured the extent to which people believe that different social groups in the country enjoy equal access to opportunities, irrespective of differences on the basis of religion, language, ethnicity, or gender.

For context, it is important to once again note that interviews were conducted between successive national lockdowns: periods in which constitutionally guaranteed rights were affected, including the rights of association, assembly, and religious observance.<sup>19</sup>

17. Sri Lanka Constitution 1978 Chapter 3 Art. 12; Art. 27 2 [b] and [f]; Art. 27 2 [c]

18. The Gini-coefficient 2009 36.10 ;2012,38.70; 2016, 39.30

19. The 1994 Human Development Report introduces a new concept of human security, which equates security with people rather than territories, with development rather than arms. It examines both the national and the global concerns of human security. The Report seeks to deal with these concerns through a new paradigm of sustainable human development, capturing the potential peace dividend, a new form of development co-operation, and a restructured system of global institutions. See: UNDP, 1994, Human Development Report: New Dimensions of Human Security. <http://www.hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-report-1994>.



Sri Lankans were asked about the extent to which they agreed or disagreed that different communities have equal opportunities in the country, and the results were used to create a composite scale.

### Survey questions

In practice, how much do you agree or disagree that the following communities have equal opportunity in Sri Lanka today?

- All religious communities
- All ethnic communities
- All genders/diverse genders
- All language groups

### Composite Scale: Equality of Opportunity

0 - Strong disagreement in equality of opportunity  
10 - Strong agreement in equality of opportunity

### Survey findings

The Barometer survey found that overall, Sri Lankans were relatively neutral about the extent of substantive equality in the country today, with a mean score of 6.2. Average scores ranged from a low of 5.1 in the Eastern Province to a high of 7 in Uva Province, as shown in Figure 31. Data analysis also showed some marginal differences according to ethnic groups, ranging from a low of 5.4 among Muslims to 5.8 among Tamils and 6.2 among Sinhalese Sri Lankans (see Figure 32).

When disaggregated by spatial location, people in estates (5.9) were slightly less likely to agree that all groups in Sri Lanka have equal opportunities, when compared with those in urban (6.1) and rural communities (6.2). Average scores were the same for men and women (6.2).





Figure 31: Equality of opportunity by province (mean)



**Figure 32:** Equality of opportunity by ethnic group (mean)

### **Interpretation of results**

The Barometer survey found that on average, Sri Lankans are very moderate in their agreement over the extent of substantive equality in the country. This finding is relatively consistent across demographic groups and geographic areas.

### **8.2. Conclusion**


Equality of opportunity is a critical building block for durable peace and meaningful reconciliation

in Sri Lanka. However, while formal equality is upheld through the provisions of the 1978 Constitution, Sri Lankans agree only moderately that substantive equality exists in the lived experiences of different groups of people in the country. Writing in 2009, Gunatilake recommended some remedies to persistent inequality, including public awareness campaigns on the constitutional rights; and ensuring that socially marginalised groups participate in the setting of social policy priorities that are likely to increase equality.

***Equal opportunities for all despite religious, ethnic, linguistic and gender differences.***

Community Consultation, North Central Province





## 9. Active Citizenship

Active citizenship refers to the willingness of citizens to participate in and contribute to positive change in a country. It also refers to citizens' freedom to choose to take part in civic action and engagement without fear of repercussions. Many factors can influence levels of active citizenship. On the part of the state, these include a receptiveness within political and governance systems and balanced power relations. In contrast, an inaccessible, closed body politic can foster apathy, disengagement and even fear (Moro 2010; Gomez 2019).

Active civic engagement can be a powerful force in bring people together and recognising their shared humanity. As such can transcend political differences and polarisation in public discourse. When rooted in empathy, equity, and understanding, modes of active citizenship can help societies to examine the past, current realities and their collective future. In post-conflict societies, active citizenship can involve recognising and raising marginalised voices. According to Dirksen (2018), civic engagement should be rooted in efforts to achieve reconciliation and involve dealing with issues directly impacting on the present.

Such forms of engagement can empower citizens to critique the status quo, challenge ineffective and unjust systems and bring about improvements in their communities. Ideally, citizens should increasingly recognise and pursue their rights and obligations as opposed to being passive subjects (Gomez 2019; Changes 2021).

### 9.1. Engaging in civic action

The Barometer survey measured Sri Lankans' recent experiences, as well as willingness to engage in a range of different types of civic actions including contacting the media, civil society organisations and government officials. The survey included six items, five of which were used to develop a composite scale of active citizenship. One question on the payment of bribes was excluded after psychometric testing.

#### **Survey questions**

Have you personally done any of these things during the past year or would you consider doing them in the future:

- Contact the media (radio, TV, or a newspaper) to complain about a problem?
- Contact an official in your community about a problem (local state actors)?
- Contact civil society organisations such as NGOs and other non-state actors?
- Contact the local police about a problem?
- Participate in legal and peaceful protest?

#### **Composite Scale: Active Citizenship**

0 - Strong disagreement in equality of opportunity  
10 - Strong agreement in equality of opportunity

## Survey findings

Analysis of the survey results found low levels of active citizenship overall with a mean score of only 2.2 (see Figure 33) – although this result was in the range of willingness to engage in the types of actions suggested if opportunities arose to do so. A comparison of results showed a higher mean score in the Northern province (5.6) than other areas of the country. When disaggregated according to ethnic groups, mean scores ranged from a low of 2.0 among Sinhalese people, to 2.8 among Muslims and 4.0 among Tamils. Looking at religious groups, mean scores ranged from a low of 1.9 among Buddhists to: 2.4 for Christians; 2.7 for Muslims; 3.4 for Roman Catholics; and 3.9 for Hindus. Finally, when analysed according to sectors, Sri Lankans in estate areas (3.8) recorded slightly higher mean scores in civic action than those in urban (2.3) or rural (2.1) areas.

## Interpretation of results

Overall, Barometer survey findings suggest that Sri Lankans' direct recent experiences of civic action through the modes presented are limited.

### 9.2. Political efficacy – Engaging with social and political issues

Political efficacy refers to peoples' confidence and ability to engage with social and political issues. Levels of efficacy may allude to the extent that people feel connected to or alienated from a country's political structures and processes.

The Barometer measured political efficacy using three survey items, which were combined to develop a composite scale. A fourth item, which asked people about the extent to which they agreed that "voting is the best way for me to influence the policies of the country", was excluded due to low reliability and validity as determined through psychometric testing.





Figure 33: Active citizenship by province (mean)



**Figure 34:** Political efficacy by ethnic group (mean)

### Survey questions

Thinking about political or social issues, to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following:

- You have enough knowledge to engage with social and political issues.
- You are confident to engage with social and political issues.
- You vote because it makes a difference.

### Composite Scale: Political Efficacy

0 - Strong disagreement  
10 - Strong agreement

### Survey findings

Survey results showed that at the national level, people have moderate levels of political efficacy (6.5), with similar views evident across all ethnic

and religious groups (see Figure 34). Average agreement was slightly higher among people in the Northern (8.3) and Uva (7.4) provinces that at the national level, as well as among those in the estate sector (7.2).

### Interpretation of findings

The finding of overall moderate levels of political efficacy suggests there may be opportunities to strengthen Sri Lankans' awareness and understanding of social and political issues.

### 9.3. Conclusion

Overall, the Barometer survey results show that Sri Lankans are moderately confident in their own political efficacy, in areas such as the knowledge and ability to engage with political and social issues and confidence in the value of voting during elections. However, most report low recent levels of civic engagement and participation, although this finding should also be considered in the context of restrictions under successive Covid-19 lockdowns.

**Good governance depends on all stakeholders,  
not only politicians are responsible.**

Community Consultation, Sabaragamuwa Province





# 10. Accountable Governance

Governance is defined as the

*“exercise of economic, political, and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels. It comprises mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations, and mediate their differences.” (Weiss 2000, p. 797)*

Holding governments accountable involves making sure that these various mechanisms, processes and institutions operate within the law and for the benefit of citizens, both vertically and horizontally. The latter refers to the

*“system of checks and balances among executive, legislative and judicial branches, while vertical accountability entails the relationship between citizens and decision-makers that is marked by transparency, enforceability and answerability.” (OECD 2014, p. 23)*

Citizens should always be located at the centre of accountable governance structures. Public engagement, therefore, is required in defining governance agendas and ensuring that people feel their views are heard. This can strengthen trust between government representatives and citizens, and lead to greater social cohesion, adherence to the rule of law and conflict mitigation.

During the community consultation phase of the research, Sri Lankans across all provinces discussed the importance of responsive leaders, who are accountable and answerable for their actions. In measuring public perceptions on accountability, the Barometer survey also tested four key themes: respect for diversity; access to

economic and political power; equal access to services and livelihood opportunities; and responsiveness of state institutions. The first two themes focus on perceived opportunities to participate in governance and are analysed in this section of the report, while the latter two are presented in Section 11.

## 10.1. Respect for others

The Barometer assessed perceptions of the extent of mutual respect between Sri Lankans, with a focus on mother tongue languages and religious beliefs. These two survey items were used to develop a composite scale measuring respect for others.

### Survey questions

In general, do you think people in Sri Lanka today have respect for:

- The mother tongue of others?
- The religious beliefs of others?

### Composite Scale: Respect for Others

- 0 - Strongly disagree/a limited degree of respect
- 10 - Strongly agree/a high degree of respect

### Survey findings

The survey found that overall, Sri Lankans are moderate in their agreement over the extent of respect for others in the country today, with a mean national score of 6.8. Average scores were slightly higher in the Eastern (7.4), Northern (7.6) and Uva (7.6) provinces. When analysed according to ethnic groups, scores ranged from 6.7



among Sinhalese people to 6.8 among Muslims and 7.5 among Tamils, as shown in Figure 35.

### Interpretation of results

Sri Lankans are moderate in their agreement that there is respect for others in the country today, suggesting potential room for improvement through interventions to build acceptance and improve relationships.

## 10.2. Access to economic and political power

Political power is an important dimension of governance. Responsible, accountable leadership is crucial to building social cohesion and ensuring peace in post-conflict societies. When power relations are viewed as biased or unfair, disadvantaged, and marginalised groups may act to resist systemic deprivation and exclusion through any means available to them.

The Barometer explored public perceptions about which groups in Sri Lanka hold the most power today. This was measured through two separate items that tested economic power and political power.

### Survey questions

In Sri Lanka, some groups of people may have different amounts of political and economic power. Thinking about the following groups of people, who do you believe has the most..

- The Sinhala majority
- A small group of Sinhala elites
- A small group of elites from the Tamil community
- A small group of elites from the Muslim community
- A small group of political and business elites from all communities
- None of the above





Figure 35: Respect for others by ethnic group (mean)



**Figure 36:** Perceived holders of economic and political power (%)

## Survey findings

Barometer results show that the largest percentages of Sri Lankans believed that both economic power (43.3%) and political power (59.6%) are held by elites from all communities, rather than ascribing these to people of any specific ethnic group, as shown in Figure 36.

The second greatest response to both survey items was that these are concentrated in the Sinhalese majority, as the main holders of economic (26.6%) and political (30.1%) power. Just over a fifth (22.9%) of Sri Lankans also answered that economic power is held mainly by a small group of elites from the Muslim community, although perceptions of the political power of this group were lower (8.5%) in comparison.

## Interpretation of results

Survey results show that most Sri Lankans ascribe both political and economic power to be mainly

concentrated among elites from all different communities in the country.

## 10.3. Conclusion

Overall, survey findings show a moderate assessment of respect for others in Sri Lanka today. As such, there may be opportunities to acknowledge and promote the role and value of the diverse languages and religious beliefs in the country as integral parts of Sri Lankan society, culture, and identity.

The finding that most political and economic power is held by elites from across different communities may be viewed as positive in that these are not necessarily seen as concentrated within one particular social group. However, accountable citizen-centred governance means striving to ensure that both economic and political opportunities and resources are accessible to all people across different communities in the country, and not only elites.

**Understand the aspirations of all citizens and act accordingly.**

Community Consultation, North Western Province





# 11. Security and Wellbeing

Internationally, political, and good governance theory have shifted from focusing on state security to the security of people and communities.<sup>20</sup> This change has seen the increasing prioritisation of livelihoods, and human dignity for all persons – including non-victors (those who “lost the war”) in post-conflict societies.

Sri Lanka, however, has remained in the “nation at risk” paradigm even after the end of the armed conflict, and the Prevention of Terrorism Act and emergency regulations have taken precedence over the Constitution. The rights and freedoms of citizens have been restricted for almost thirty years. Human security has also been threatened by post-war economic policies, which have focused on financing development and infrastructure but also brought about over indebtedness, a lack of decent work, and poor social security (Civil Society Shadow Report to the Committee on ESCR 2017).

Feelings of safety and dignified treatment make unity and peace possible and sustainable. They take away fear and nourish trust between communities, thus underpinning security and wellbeing for all people, irrespective of ethnicity, language, religion, or gender. From this perspective, security and wellbeing are important prerequisites for reconciliation.

## 11.1. Relative household wellbeing

During the war many Sri Lankans experienced profound insecurity. In the North and East in particular, people lost their homes, land and valuables including critical documentation such as identity papers, bank documents and property deeds. Many were displaced multiple times and for prolonged periods. These conditions were antithetical to feelings of wellbeing.

The Barometer survey assessed Sri Lankans’ feelings of wellbeing at present, specifically relative to that of other families in their communities and the rest of the country. These two survey items were used to develop a composite scale of relative wellbeing.

### Survey questions

How would you rate the overall wellbeing of your family when compared to other families in your local community?

How would you rate the overall wellbeing of your family when compared to other families in the rest of the country?

### Composite Scale: Relative Wellbeing

0 - Household much worse off than others  
10 - Household much better off than others

20. The 1994 Human Development Report introduces a new concept of human security, which equates security with people rather than territories, with development rather than arms. It examines both the national and the global concerns of human security. The Report seeks to deal with these concerns through a new paradigm of sustainable human development, capturing the potential peace dividend, a new form of development co-operation, and a restructured system of global institutions. See: UNDP, 1994, *Human Development Report: New Dimensions of Human Security*. <http://www.hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-report-1994>.

## Survey findings

Overall, most Sri Lankans viewed their household as worse off than others, with a national mean score of 2.8. Averages ranged from lows of 1.8 in the Northern and Sabaragamuwa provinces to a high of 3.7 in Uva province, as shown in Figure 37.

## Interpretation of results

Survey findings suggest that Sri Lankans throughout the country and across different social groups consistently consider their own families to be worse off than others. Further future research could be considered to explore any possible variation in these findings according to variables such as socioeconomic class; as well as perceptions about which families/households in Sri Lanka are better off and why.

## 11.2. Threats to household wellbeing

Sri Lankans were also asked about what they believed to be the biggest threats to the wellbeing of their households. Their responses were coded using a code list. This report presents the findings for the first response.

### Survey questions

What do you feel are the biggest threats to the wellbeing of your household at the present time?

### Survey findings

Analysis of the survey results showed that the highest percentages of Sri Lankans believe the biggest threats to their livelihoods to be the inability to earn an adequate income (26.4%); the high cost of living (16.4%); and Covid-19 and its impacts (8.8%).





Figure 37: Relative household wellbeing by province (mean)



**Figure 38:** Biggest threats to household at the present time (% , first mention)

### Interpretation of results

At the time the survey was conducted most Sri Lankans indicated that their livelihoods were most threatened by structural economic factors, namely the inability to earn enough and/or the high cost of living in the country. As discussed in Section 6, this finding is consistent with the World Bank’s assessment that poverty rates increased between 2019 and 2020. In addition, national lockdowns in response to the Covid-19 pandemic have had further economic consequences, including the losses of jobs and businesses.

### 11.3. Access to services


Household wellbeing and economic security depend on access to basic services including water and sanitation, housing, healthcare, and education. Table 2 provides an overview of the current status of some of these services.

The Barometer asked Sri Lankans about their ease of access to both basic and auxiliary services. These survey items were used to develop two composite scales measuring: (1) access to basic services; and (2) access to auxiliary services. It is important to note that results are based on people’s perceptions and experiences and not on verified primary data, such as proximity to schools, healthcare facilities, etc.

#### Survey questions

How would you rate the ease of access that you and your family have to the following:

- Water and sanitation
- Housing facilities
- Education & training skills development
- Health services



**Figure 39:** Access to basic and auxiliary services by province (mean)

### Survey questions (cont.)

How would you rate the ease of access that you and your family have to the following auxiliary services:

- Extension services<sup>21</sup>
- Access to law enforcement agencies
- Livelihood resources such as land and fishing rights

### Composite Scales:

Access to Basic Services  
Access to Auxiliary Services


0 - Extremely difficult  
10 - Extremely easy

### Survey findings

Survey results show that Sri Lankans reported moderate ease of access to services overall, although mean access to basic services (6.4) was slightly higher than auxiliary services (5.3), as shown in Figure 38. When analysed according to province, average ease of access scores ranged from a low of 5.3 in the Northern province to highs of 6.7 in the Eastern and Western provinces.

The survey items measuring access to auxiliary services results in high percentages of missing values, possibly because these are in lower demand when compared with more universal basic services. Consistent with results for basic services, average access to auxiliary services was lowest in the Northern province (4.1) and ranged to a high of 5.7 in the Northern Central province.

21. Extension services are provided by offices who visit homes, such as midwives to advice women on pre- and post-natal care or child nutrition or farmers on growing crops and animal husbandry.



**Figure 40:** Ease of access to basic and auxiliary services by ethnic group (mean)

Results for ease of service access were also disaggregated according to ethnic groups. Figure 39 shows that average access to basic services ranged from a low of 5.7 among Tamils, to 6.4 among Muslims and 6.5 among Sinhalese. Following a similar pattern, average access to auxiliary services ranged from a low of 4.8 among Tamils, to 5.0 among Muslims and 5.4 among Sinhalese people. No differences were found in average levels of access between males and females.

### Interpretation of results

Overall, Sri Lankans reported moderate access to both basic and auxiliary services, with slightly lower average scores in respect to the latter.

### 11.4. Personal and community safety

The Barometer survey also assessed Sri Lankan's perceptions about their own safety in a number of different settings, specifically prior to the Covid-19 pandemic: at home; in public places (parks, halls, markets); in places of worship; and while using public transport. Using these survey items, a composite scale was developed measuring personal safety.

People were also asked about how safe they feel with the presence of a range of law enforcement authorities present in their communities: the police, military, and the state intelligence operatives. These items were specifically included based on fears expressed by Sri Lankans in the community consultations, and particularly in the North and East given the proximity to military camps and outposts set up during the war. A second composite scale was developed measuring community safety.

#### Survey questions

Before the start of Covid-19 in Sri Lanka, how safe did you feel in the following places:

- At home?
- In public places (parks, halls, markets)?
- In places of worship (church, mosque, temple)?
- In public transportation?
- At work?



### Survey questions (cont.)

How safe do you feel having the following in your community?

- The police?
- The military?
- State intelligence operatives?

### Composite Scales:

Personal Safety  
Community Safety

0 - Not safe at all  
10 - Very safe

### Survey findings

The Barometer found that Sri Lankans felt moderately safe in personal settings prior to the pandemic, with an overall mean score of 6.6. As shown in Figure 40, when analysed according to ethnic group, average personal safety scores ranged from

a low of 5.8 among Tamils to 6.6 among Sinhalese and 7.1 among Muslim Sri Lankans.

Overall, survey results showed higher average community safety scores than personal safety, with a national mean of 8.5 (see Figure 40). Here, average scores ranged from a low of 6.1 among Tamils to 7.6 among Muslims and 8.9 among Sinhalese Sri Lankans.

### Interpretation of results

Given that Sri Lankans have experienced sporadic outbursts of hate speech and violence in the post-conflict period, the finding that most Sri Lankans felt only moderately safe in personal spaces prior to the pandemic is perhaps to be expected. Notably, although texts from the community consultations surfaced feelings of fear and insecurity around the presence of and proximity to state authorities. Survey results found high reported levels of average community safety among Sinhala people (8.9), while the community safety among the Tamils (6.1) was less safe.




Figure 41: Personal and community safety by ethnic group (mean)

## 11.5. Freedom of expression and association

The Barometer also assessed perceptions about the extent of freedom of expression and association in Sri Lanka today. Six survey items were used to develop a composite scale.

### Survey questions

Citizens enjoy different freedoms in their countries. In Sri Lanka, do you agree or disagree that you are free to:

- Say or write what you think
- Join any political organisation
- Practice your religion
- Join a peaceful protest
- Use the language of your choice
- Follow a livelihood of your choice

### Composite Scale: Personal Freedom

0 - Strong disagreement

10 - Strong agreement

### Survey findings

Overall Sri Lankans reported moderate levels of personal freedom, with a mean national score of 6.5. There was very little difference in average scores between provinces, ranging from a low of 6.3 in the Eastern province to a high of 6.9 in Uva province, as shown in Figure 41.

### Interpretation of results

Barometer findings suggest that Sri Lankans feel they are moderately free in their abilities to express themselves and associate with others. With the proposed new bill, under the National Cyber Security Strategy, to control social media, now being drafted, the picture may change. It will be important to assess the extent of change in future survey rounds.




Figure 42: Personal freedoms by province (mean)

## 11.6. State responsiveness

As an additional component of security and wellbeing, the Barometer measured Sri Lankans' perceptions of the responsiveness of the State. This was measured using three survey items asking about different levels of government, which were used to develop a composite scale.

### Survey questions

Based on what you know and what you have heard from others, how responsive would you say are the following government institutions and officials to looking after the needs of you and your family:

- Divisional Secretariat?
- Local authorities (urban council, pradeshiya sabha)?
- Grama Niladhari (village administrative officer)?

### Composite Scale: State Responsiveness

0 - Unresponsive  
10 - Very responsive

### Survey findings

Results show that Sri Lankans perceive state institutions/officials to be somewhat responsive, with a mean overall score of 7.8. Average scores ranged from a low of 7.1 in the Central province to 8.5 in Eastern province, as shown in Figure 42.

Higher percentages of missing values were recorded in questions on Divisional Secretariats and local authorities, suggesting that Sri Lankans may be less familiar with these institutions/officials than local GNs.




Figure 43: State responsiveness by province (mean)

## Interpretation of results

The Barometer found moderately high assessments of state responsiveness overall, with only slight variation between provinces.

### 11.7. Lived Poverty Index

The Lived Poverty Index (LPI) was developed by Afrobarometer as an “experiential measure that is based on a series of survey questions about how frequently people actually go without basic necessities during the course of a year” (Mattes 2020, p. 3). A version of the LPI was implemented in the Sri Lanka Barometer using five survey items measuring frequency, based on five-point scales.

#### Survey questions

Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family?

- Without enough food to eat
- Without clean water
- Without medicines /medical treatment
- Without enough fuel
- Without a cash income

#### Lived Poverty Index

0 - Never

5 - Always




Figure 44: Lived Poverty Index by province (mean)

## Survey findings

Survey results found low levels of lived poverty overall, with a national score of 1.4. Provincial means varied slightly from a low of 1.1 in Sabaragamuwa to a high of 2.0 in the Northern Province, as shown in Figure 43.

## Interpretation of results

Barometer findings suggest that most Sri Lankans have rarely experienced the lived poverty represented through the LPI. Recent research conducted by UNICEF/UNDP found households reporting income losses as the Covid-19 pandemic continues<sup>22</sup> and may foreshadow possible future changes in LPI results in subsequent Barometer rounds.

## 11.8. Conclusion

Although theory and practice in some contexts has begun prioritising human livelihoods and wellbeing over state security concerns, this is not necessarily the case in Sri Lanka. The Barometer sought to assess Sri Lankans' perceptions about their security and wellbeing using a wide range of variables and composite measures.

Survey results show that Sri Lankans felt moderately safe in their daily lives (pre-pandemic), at places such as their homes, workplaces and on public transport. Survey data shows that members of the Tamil community who are most likely to live in proximity to military camps felt less than safe in their communities, while the other communities felt more safe. People also felt moderately free in their abilities to express themselves and associate with others.

Furthermore, Sri Lankans reported moderate ease of access to the basic services they need, and relatively high levels of responsiveness from state institutions/officials.

Most Sri Lankans rarely experienced the types of deprivation measured through the LPI. However, the majority view themselves as relatively worse off than their compatriots. In addition, economic concerns related to the inability to earn an adequate income and the high cost of living were identified as leading threats to well-being and these are likely exacerbated by lockdowns during the Covid-19 pandemic.

***By ensuring security and wellbeing, all citizens can live in a society free of fear and suspicion.***

Community Consultation, Southern Province

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22. See *Covid-19 Crisis Household Impact 2020 Telephone Survey*, UNICEF/UNDP, 2020.

# 12. Reflections and Conclusions

The end of the war in 2009 brought about new hopes for reconciliation, rebuilding relationships and communities, and moving forward as a country towards a sustainable peace. Despite the various efforts and interventions by the government, civil society organisations and others, many challenges and barriers remain.

The Sri Lanka Barometer project posits that prospects for reconciliation and peace are more likely to succeed if citizens' needs and expectations are clearly understood and taken into account. The process of designing the Barometer began with wide ranging public consultations to identify and conceptualise the main domains of reconciliation. This consultative approach, and the overall prerogative of measuring progress in reconciliation, follows on the recommendations made by the LLRC, CTF and in the 2019 Diyawanna Declaration.

The Sri Lanka Barometer survey was developed to measure public perceptions, identify issues of critical importance, assess relationships between people in the country, and inform leaders and policymakers going forward. The Barometer responds to the diverse nature of the Sri Lankan polity, accommodates the multi-faceted aspects of reconciliation, and helps capture the changing needs and aspirations of people everywhere.

## 12.1. Reflections on the research process

The Barometer survey was the first of its kind in the country, and as such a significant amount of time and effort went into reviewing relevant literature and putting in place measures to ensure the rigour and validity of its findings. The views and experiences of experts, as well as local communities, were used to inform the survey design.

The eight conceptual domains that were identified include a multitude of issues and conditions that are important for achieving reconciliation; but these do not provide a singular definition. The design of the survey questionnaire itself was guided by specialist research in each thematic area and taking into account qualitative texts from the focus groups.

Data collection took place in 2020 between pandemic lockdowns. Despite concerns about the pandemic and its far-reaching consequences, Sri Lankans took the time to participate and carefully consider all of the research questions posed to them.

## 12.2. Key conclusions

The Barometer provides a baseline picture of the extent of reconciliation among Sri Lankans today, as conceptualised through the eight domains identified.

Overall, Sri Lankans **view reconciliation positively and associate it with national unity**. Although most still feel a sense of belonging among others of the same ethnic group, there is also general agreement that it is important to construct a shared national identity.

At the same time, **levels of mutual respect are moderate and social trust between groups is low** in the country. Many Sri Lankans believe ethnicity to be a leading source of discrimination. Work may remain to improve the quality of these relationships if an inclusive, shared national identity is to be accepted.

The Barometer also found **demand for reconciliation among Sri Lankans**, and this was relatively consistent throughout the country despite the disproportionate impact of the armed conflict in some areas. However, many people are both **unaware of the institutions** charged with advancing implementation and unsure of the progress that the country has made so far.

The majority of Sri Lankans agree that it is important to recognise and address the events that occurred in the past. However, there was **greater support for direct reparations** to people whose livelihoods and property tenure was affected by the war, than for symbolic gestures such as memorialisation.

After many decades of conflict, **most Sri Lankans reject the use of violence** between and against civilians, across all the different groups in the country. In the period prior to the Covid-19 pan-

demic, most people felt safe in their communities despite the presence of military and law enforcement authorities. Yet Sri Lankans only felt moderately safe in more personal spaces, such as their homes, workplaces and places of worship; and only moderately free in their abilities to express themselves openly and associate with others.

Notably, the survey found that Sri Lankans view **political issues – including influence, interference, and a lack of will – to be the leading obstacles to effectively addressing the past, achieving reconciliation and delivering justice** to victims of past abuses. Trust in key political institutions is also moderate. Although Sri Lankans are moderately confident in their own abilities to engage with the political and social issues of the day, most have not recently taken part in civic actions – although opportunities were also limited by national lockdowns. Political power is viewed as concentrated among a small group of elites originating from all different groups in the country.

Sri Lankans also identified a number of **critical economic concerns** through the Barometer. Despite worsening poverty levels, most do not regularly experience the types of deprivation measured through the LPI and reported moderate ease of access to the basic services they need. At the same time, the **inability to earn an adequate income and the high cost of living** were identified as leading threats to well-being, and most Sri Lankans view themselves as relatively worse off than others in their communities and throughout the country. Economic status is seen as a leading source of discrimination, and there is only moderate substantive equality between the lived experiences of different groups of people in the country. Economic power, like political, is thought to be concentrated with elites rather than distributed among all Sri Lankans.

# 13. Way Forward

This report presents the baseline findings from the first round of the Sri Lanka Barometer perception survey. The study aims to capture public perceptions on reconciliation and related issues over time to inform public discourse in Sri Lanka. Subsequent survey rounds will allow for comparison and the tracking of changes in views on reconciliation over time.

The Sri Lanka Barometer initiative also intends to continue commissioning thematic studies using qualitative methodologies that allow greater depth of exploration than the quantitative survey. This will be an ongoing process that increases understanding of reconciliation and the evidence base of the Barometer. To help stimulate further work in this area, this section points out gaps in the research and areas for further explanation, drawing on the Barometer findings and presented within the eight reconciliation domains.

## Reconciliation

<p><b>Conceptualising reconciliation in Sri Lanka</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How adequate are the domains in capturing the factors that condition reconciliation i.e., lie at the heart or form the foundation of this issue?</li> <li>• In the expressions of “unity”, “peace”, “harmony”, which first comes to mind for most people describe a desired state when discussing reconciliation? Is it simply a response that describes a normative state or does it carry a deeper meaning for respondents? What does “unity” really mean in Sri Lanka’s multi-ethnic polity?</li> <li>• The Barometer defines progress in reconciliation as improved relations between different ethnic religious and language groups. Are there other definitions of progress? What are these?</li> </ul>
<p><b>Stakeholder approaches to achieving reconciliation</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reconciliation is deeply personal. Do the current approaches to reconciliation by the state and civil society actors and peacemakers address this aspect or do interventions generally focus on programmes, policies, and activities?</li> <li>• When institution, policies, and programmes are created to deal with the impact of the armed conflict on people fail, how does its success/ failure affect victims, society, and the nation at large?</li> </ul>
<p><b>Experiencing reconciliation</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How do Sri Lankans who have not experienced a war-related personal loss, experience reconciliation?</li> <li>• How do Sri Lankans who have experienced a personal war-related loss experience reconciliation?</li> <li>• Which institutions are the most important to furthering reconciliation? What are people’s experiences of these institutions?</li> <li>• How does political will and corruption impact on reconciliation and how is this expressed in people’s perceptions?</li> <li>• How do women experience reconciliation? Is there a difference? Women are, in Sri Lanka and elsewhere in the world, believed to be peace makers and “unifiers”. In the survey findings women’s perceptions on most questions are similar to those of men. The disaggregation appears to not bring up differences in women’s voices. How can this be explained?</li> </ul>



## Reconciliation (cont.)

<b>Factors that impact perceptions of reconciliation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What factors shape people’s views on reconciliation? Both negative and positive views on reconciliation influence public perception – but to what extent?</li> <li>• How powerful are the influences of politicians and the media in shaping people’s views on reconciliation?</li> <li>• Which has more influence – gentle positive stories relating to peace or harangues and rants or hateful comments?</li> <li>• Why do Sri Lankans think that reconciliation is desirable?</li> </ul>
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## Constructively Dealing with the Past

<b>Determinants of dealing with the past</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Is how the past acknowledged culturally determined?</li> <li>• Is the belief that confronting the past leads to more conflict and mistrust a “homegrown” belief?</li> <li>• Is confronting the past in the context of the war, a political act – seen as being influenced by an outside agenda?</li> </ul>
<b>Politicization of dealing with the past</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How does political interference and influence form a barrier to dealing with the past? Is it a perception that relates to the courts and the dispensation of justice to victims?</li> <li>• Who has benefited from the rebuilding efforts after the war and what are the personal and societal impacts of neglecting the demands for justice and the rule of law?</li> </ul>

## Justice for All

<b>Demanding justice</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Does the narrowing gap between the demand for justice in the North and the East and the demand for economic and social justice in the South impact on fostering a deeper understanding between the ethnic groups in the South and the North?</li> </ul>
<b>Militarisation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Does the increased militarisation in the South promote a coming together of people’s groups from different ethnic groups? Without an understanding of the mutual benefits of such a united effort, is there possibility for true unity?</li> </ul>
<b>Justification of violence</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• If Sri Lankan citizens state that violence cannot be justified under any circumstances, why is there so much violence and police brutality? Why are there such high numbers of child victims of violence perpetrated by parents, guardians, and teachers?</li> </ul>

## Identity and Belonging

<b>Defining identity</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What conclusions may be drawn about the factors which the data indicates are bases of identity? Has there been a shift away from the traditional language, ethnicity, religion factors? If so, what caused the shift?</li> </ul>
<b>Majority and minority identities influencing identity</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How do people living in primarily Sinhala communities perceive Sri Lankan-ness when compared with citizens of mostly Tamil or mostly Muslim communities?</li> </ul>
<b>Diversity and identity</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How do people of different ethno-religious and cultural identities experience Sinhala/Tamil nationalism in daily interactions?</li> <li>• Does living among a mixed community increase the desire for a strong Sri Lankan identity?</li> </ul>

## Interpersonal, Social, and Political Trust

<b>Drivers of trust/mistrust</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What strengthens or weakens trust among and within social groups in Sri Lanka?</li> <li>• Has the level of social trust been affected by the divisive rhetoric and experiences of people living in different regions, particularly those who have been more marginalised over the years for various reasons, and does this go beyond the effects of the armed conflict?</li> <li>• How does social homogeneity versus heterogeneity affect how people trust those who are different to them?</li> </ul>
<b>Dynamism of trust</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What practices or events in the public domain impact on the erosion of political trust defined as people's trust in the institutions related to reconciliation?</li> <li>• Are people unsure of whom they can trust, reflecting the dynamism of trust and the impact that the external context can have on levels of trust?</li> </ul>
<b>Other aspects</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What is the reason for the findings from Uva and Sabaragamuwa which for centuries have been neglected by the state?</li> <li>• How is social trust affected by the interconnectedness of driving factors that affect multiple levels of engagement for people?</li> </ul>

## Equal Opportunity

<b>Awareness of equality as a right</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Is awareness of fundamental rights a foundation for economic, social, and political advancement among women and men?</li> <li>• To what extent are regular citizens aware of the right to equality?</li> </ul>
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## Active Citizenship

<b>Factors that encourage/discourage active citizenship</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Does low trust levels have an impact on the low levels of citizen activism?</li> <li>• Does fear of reprisals prevent citizens from standing up for their own or the rights of others?</li> </ul>
<b>Political influence on active citizenship</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Does the prevailing culture of political patronage hold citizens back from challenging the status quo?</li> </ul>

## Accountable Governance

<b>Acceptance of diversity</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How does the low acceptance of diversity or respect of others' religions manifest itself in Sri Lankan society?</li> </ul>
<b>Effects of greater respect</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How do members of minorities experience the lack of respect for their religion or culture? How does the majority community experience the lack of respect for their religion or culture?</li> </ul>
<b>Experiences of discrimination</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How do people of all ethnic groups experience systemic or individual discrimination in their everyday lives?</li> </ul>
<b>Economic and political power</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How does the exercise of political and economic power and control by a small group of political elites impact on social harmony? Does it help or hinder social harmony?</li> </ul>

## Security and Wellbeing

<b>Impact of well-being factors on reconciliation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How will the growing economic insecurity and the attempts by individuals to deflect attention away from the failure of governance impact on unity and peace?</li> <li>• Will policies and programmes of the past and those currently being implemented hold the fragile relationships among ethnic groups together?</li> </ul>
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The Sri Lanka Barometer “Our Voices, Our Choices” comes at a critical time in the country’s journey to national reconciliation and aims to fill an important gap in understanding people’s experiences in the post-war period, their perceptions about progress made to date, and their expectations about the work that remains. It comprises four key components: (1) an annual, island-wide public opinion survey, (2) thematic studies using largely qualitative methodologies, (3) discussion papers and concept notes, and (4) an outreach component.

The Barometer is an initiative of the Strengthening Reconciliation Processes (SRP) programme funded by the European Union and the German Federal Foreign Office; and implemented by the German Technical Cooperation (GIZ) and the British Council in Sri Lanka, in partnership with the Ministry of Justice.

It is implemented through a Consortium that seeks to generate evidence on citizens’ understanding and expectations about reconciliation and social cohesion to inform public discourse. Together with SRP, the Consortium currently includes the Centre for Poverty Analysis (CEPA) in Sri Lanka and the South African Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR). Discussions are underway to include the Open University of Sri Lanka (OUSL) in the next phase of the Barometer in 2022.

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*“Sri Lanka is a multi-cultural country - reconciliation is attainable if friendly relations among groups are established; this will in turn help nation-building.”*  
Community Consultation, Kandy District

*“The thought that the majority should get the priority – that thought is a hindrance.”*  
Community Consultation, Ratnapura District

*“Reconciliation is a peaceful mind.”*  
Community Consultation, Matara District

*“Reconciliation can happen only when people FEEL it. When you are treated differently you can’t feel it. When you don’t get equal treatment, you can’t feel the urge to live in harmony.”*  
Community Consultation, Mullaitivu District

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**For more information please see  
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